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Abstract 
'Philosophical Perspectives on Humour and Laughter' 
by John Lippitt 
Dissertation submitted for the degree of M.Litt. in Philosophy, 
University of Durham, 1991. 
This dissertation looks at some of the most important theories of humour and 
laughter, and aims to consider how successful or otherwise those theories have been 
in explaining these complex phenomena. After a general introduction in Chapter 
One, each of Chapters Two to Four offers an analysis of one of the three main 
theoretical traditions: what have been labelled the incongruity, superiority and 
release theories. Key figures in these traditions are Schopenhauer (incongruity), 
Hobbes (superiority) and Freud (release). My analyses are lengthy, constituting 
the bulk of the dissertation, because of the need to consider each theory in more 
detail than has been the case in previous, often very superficial, reviews. Each of 
them is ultimately rejected as an inadequate general theory, but the desirability of 
looking for what is of value in each theory; what light each does shed on humour 
and laughter, is stressed. 
During the brief interim conclusion, Chapter Five, key reasons for the failure 
of previous theories are emphasised, and a suggestion is made as to why any gen-
eral, supposedly all-encompassing theory is likely to fail. The common temptation 
to offer yet another general theory is therefore resisted: after all, there are other 
interesting aspects of this subject to be considered. One such issue is taken up in 
Chapter Six. This final chapter explores the important connection between laugh-
ter, the sense of humour and individual freedom, by comparing and contrasting 
two views of the function of laughter: Bergson's theory of laughter as a social 
corrective, and Nietzsche's view that laughter is the appropriate response to the 
ultimate liberation of an individual. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
The philosophy of humour and laughter is a very rarely studied field. This 
seems surprising for at least two reasons. Firstly, the list of thinkers who have 
considered these subjects worthy of discussion, even if their discussions have of-
ten been brief, is an impressive one: Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Hobbes, Kant, 
Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Bergson and Freud are some of the names 
it includes. Secondly, if philosophy should concern itself with central aspects of 
human life, it certainly cannot afford to ignore humour and laughter. The posses-
sion of a sense of humour ranks very high on the list of desirable - even essential 
- personal attributes. Replies to questionnaires show it as one of the qualities re-
garded as most important in potential partners, and increasingly, phrases such as 
'Must have a sense of humour!' are appearing in job advertisements. If you woke 
up one morning with an uncontrollable urge to make yourself very unpopular, and 
maybe make a few enemies for life, a good way of achieving this would be to accuse 
as many people as possible, whenever the opportunity arose, of having no sense of 
humour. This is often reacted to as the most grievous of insults. As one writer 
has commented, 'men will confess to treason, murder, arson, false teeth or a wig. 
How many of them will own up to a lack of humor?n 
On the other hand, it is not difficult to see why people have shied away from 
analysing humour and laughter. Humour is notoriously difficult to define or ex-
plain, and common sense tells us that the potential humour theorist is about to 
step into a minefield. This may indeed lead some to dismiss philosophising in this 
area as pointless. Yet such pessimism is unwarranted. It is reasonable to work on 
the assumption that the efforts of that impressive list of thinkers mentioned earlier 
were not all a complete waste of time. Before going any further, though, we should 
be clear on what value the philosophy of humour and laughter can have, and hence 
of exactly what this dissertation does and does not attempt to do. 
1 Frank Moore Colby, quoted in Edmund Bergler, Laughter and the Sense of Humor (New 
York: Intercontinental Medical Book Corporation, 1956), title page. 
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The views of the humour- theoretical pessimist are acceptable to the following 
extent. It is perfectly reasonable to doubt that one will ever find a simple formula 
to which all humour can be reduced, and which will allow us to give out a cry of 
'Eureka!' and to claim that we now understand all there is to understand about it. 
In earlier work in this area, one finds comments such as the following: 'Laughter 
manifests itself in such varied and heterogeneous conditions ... that the reduction of 
all these causes to a single one remains a very problematical undertaking. After so 
much work spent on such a trivial phenomenon, the problem is still far from being 
completely explained. ' 2 The naivete of such a remark lies in the implied assumption 
that a 'complete explanation' of laughter is attainable. 
But even if it is not, this is a totally insufficent reason to dismiss unread and 
unconsidered the insights of our list of thinkers. A central claim of this dissertation 
is that, whilst being unable to give the whole answer, many of the major theories 
offered in the history of this subject shed important light on our understanding 
of the intrinsic workings of humour, the psychology of the Iaugher, or of what 
functions humour and laughter serve. A number of the theories can be made more 
plausible than they at first appear, and have often been given credit for being. 
(Wholesale dismissal of such theories is common. Colin Radford, for instance, 
comments of general theories of humour that: 'The few attempts to provide them 
strike most of us as quite hopeless' 3 .) 
The main purpose of the dissertation, then, is to consider the adequacy or oth-
erwise of some of the most important theories of humour and laughter, attempting 
to show both their weaknesses and their strengths: the respects in which they fail 
as satisfactory explanations of humour or laughter, but also how they shed light 
on the elusive phenomena with which they deal. 
1.1 A preliminary point on terminology 
At this stage, something should be said about terminology, to avoid a poten-
tially major problem. In all but the most recent writing in this field, there is no 
general terminological consensus. Different writers use different terms to mean 
2 T.A.Ribot, La Psychologie des Sentiments (Paris: F. Alcan, 1896), quoted in Arthur 
Koestler, The Act of Creation (New York: Dell, 1964), p.32, my emphasis. 
3 Colin Radford, 'Morality and humour', in Cogito Vol.3-2, p.133. 
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essentially the same thing, and worse still, different writers use the same term to 
mean different things. 'The comic', for instance, is used by some to mean what 
others mean by 'the ludicrous', whereas in other writings 'the comic' is treated as 
a subdivision of 'the ludicrous', along with such further subdivisions as wit and 
satire. This problem is exacerbated by problems of translation. Freud's Der Witz 
und seine Beziehung zum Unbewussten for example, the main subject of our Chap-
ter Four, has been translated both as Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious 
and Wit and its Relation to the Unconsious. Yet the English reader understands 
by 'jokes', something very different from what he understands by 'wit'. To avoid 
difficulties of this kind, then, we need to make clear from the outset our use of 
terminology. 
This dissertation is predominantly concerned with what is perceived, thought 
of or experienced, as funny or amusing. Contemporary research in this field, across 
numerous academic disciplines, seems agreed upon using 'humour' as the relevant 
general term here. Indeed, the recently founded inter-disciplinary periodical for 
research in this area takes as its title Humor: the International Journal of Humor 
Research. (This journal is closely linked to an organisation called the 'International 
Society for Humor Studies'.) In the rest of this dissertation, then, I shall follow this 
currently accepted usage of terminology. Humour will not be a subdivision of some 
umbrella term such as 'the ludicrous', along with wit, the comic, satire, and so on, 
but will itself be that umbrella term. Anthropologist Mahadev Apte distinguishes 
between 'those who may be interested in concentrating on some specific aspect 
of the phenomenon of humor, such as joke, comedy, riddle, or pun, versus those 
who wish to explore the nature of humor on a grand scale, as the philosophers 
who examined humor in general did. '4 These he refers to as 'micro-' and 'macro-
humorologists' respectively. I belong to the second of these categories. 
My reasons for concentrating upon humour in general- 'macro-humorology' -
rather than worrying about its various subdivisions are well expressed by Stephen 
Leacock. Leacock complains of a writer who: 
'has a whole book to elucidate what "nonsense" is and how to distinguish what 
is nonsensical from what is "ludicrous" or "ridiculous" or "absurd" or "funny" 
4 Mahadev L. Apte, ·Disciplinary boundaries in humorology: an anthropologist's ruminations', in 
Humor Vol.l-1, p.20. 
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or "comical". All these words run so closely together, with shades of meaning 
at once so obvious and so impalpable, like the blending colours of the rainbow, 
that it is as unprofitable as it is futile to try to reduce their meanings to a 
contrasted scheme of gradations. '5 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines humour as 'that quality of action, speech 
or writing which excites amusement'6 • We shall follow this general definition, and 
understand humour as that which excites, or aims to excite, amusement: another 
understanding widely accepted in contemporary humour research. We must there-
fore include within our definition not only that humour to be found in narrative 
jokes, novels, plays, films and television programmes, but also any chance occur-
rence in everyday life which may be perceived as amusing. Humour, then, on this 
understanding, can either be prepared, or naturally-occurring. 
Laughter, of course, is not always caused by amusement at humour. There 
are certain kinds of non-humorous laughter which there will be no time to discuss 
here: laughter as a result of tickling, or of inhaling nitrous oxide, for instance. 
But the laughter with which we shall predominantly be concerned is that resulting 
from amusement at humour - though, as we shall see, such laughter often appears 
inextricably linked with other feelings, such as superiority, triumph or joy. 
So, my general understanding of the relevant terms will be that something 
read, heard or seen is perceived as humorous; that the mental state appropriate 
to such a reaction to that stimulus is, or at least involves, amusement; and that 
this mental state may (although it will not necessarily) outwardly manifest itself 
in laughter. 
1.2 The humourlessness of humour research 
One further point should be made, before outlining the plan of the dissertation. 
The analysis of humour can often be a humourless - indeed sometimes painful -
business. E.B.White remarked that: 'Humor can be dissected, as a frog can, but 
the thing dies in the process and the innards are discouraging to any but the pure 
5 Stephen Leacock, Humour and Humanity (London: Thronton Butterworth, 1937), p.15. 
6 The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary (Book Club Associates by 
arrangement with Oxfo~d University Press, 1979), p.453. 
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scientific mind'7 • There is an odd- but commonly held- assumption that a piece of 
work concerned with the theory of humour should itself be funny. Apart from the 
inclusion of examples of humour within this dissertation, the reader who expects 
this will be disappointed. I share the sentiments of Victor Raskin, editor of the 
above-mentioned Humor journal, as expressed in its first issue: 
'One thing this journal should not be expected to be is funny. To quote a 
friend, a journal on schizophrenia or a journal on aggressive behavior does not 
typically publish schizophrenic or abusive prose. Neither should we be expected 
to be funny. '8 
1.3 Dissertation outline 
We can now return to the plan of the dissertation. Its format will be as 
follows. Each of Chapters Two, Three and Four will examine one of three main 
traditions in humour theory, which relates humour to the notions of incongruity, 
superiority and the release of energy respectively. That these three are the main 
theoretical divisions is a matter of fairly common agreement. 9 I make no apologies 
for considering views put forward within each of these traditions in considerable 
detail: many reviews thereof are too superficial to give a clear idea of exactly what 
is being claimed by a particular theory, or to enable a fair judgement to be passed 
upon it. Also, I shoul~ mention that in dealing with the subject of these three 
chapters, I shall refer to the incongruity, superiority and release traditions rather 
than the incongruity, superiority and release theories. There is not, in each of 
these traditions, a well-established existing theory on which subsequent writers in 
that tradition were consciously trying to improve. The history of humour theory 
is rather less neat than this: most of the thinkers considered in this dissertation 
7 E.B.White, 'Some Remarks on Humor', in The Second Tree from the Corner (London: 
Hamish Hamilton, 1954), p.173. 
8 Victor Raskin, 'From the Editor', in Humor Vol.l-1, p.3. 
9 For instance, John Morreall - one of very few contemporary philosophers to have devoted any 
prolonged period of time to researching, and publishing on, the theory of humour - uses this schema 
consistently (see bibliography for Morreall's publications), as do most brief historical reviews of 
humour-theoretical literature, examples of the latter being that found in Victor Raskin, Semantic 
Mechanisms of Humor(Dordrecht: Reidel, 1985), pp.30-41 and D.H.Monro, 'Humor' entry in 
Paul Edwards (ed. in chief), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.3 (New York: Macmillan 
Publishing Co., Inc., and The Free Press, 1967), pp.90-93. 
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show little or no evidence of having read those other writers now considered to 
have offered the 'classic' readings in the field. 
Each of the principal writers in the three theoretical traditions offers a theory 
which is intended to be comprehensive, and so each theory will be analysed in 
these terms. It will be concluded that though none of them succeeds in offering an 
adequate all-encompassing theory, each explains certain aspects of the phenomena 
of humour and laughter better than other theories. Certain important connections 
between different theories will be made along the way, not least of which is an 
observation as to why ·both incongruity- and superiority-based theories fail: that 
they both need, in order to give an adequate account in terms of the relevant 
concept, to 'stretch' the meaning of the key term. Reasons for rejecting the idea of 
a synthesis of the main theories are given in Chapter Five, along with a reason for 
assuming that any all-encompassing theory is doomed to failure. An area of enquiry 
more manageable than that of attempting to provide a successful comprehensive 
theory is therefore explored in Chapter Six. A number of questions arise from 
the consideration of the main theoretical traditions, one of the most interesting 
and important of which concerns the functions of humour and laughter. Chapter 
Six sheds further light on this by contrasting two diametrically opposed views of 
laughter's function. The first of these, that of Henri Bergson, is firmly established 
as one of the 'classic' theories; the second, that of Friedrich Nietzsche, has been 
all but completely overlooked10 • For Bergson, the function of laughter is to act as 
a social corrective. The strengths and weaknesses of such a view are assessed, and 
compared with the view which emerges from considering the role laughter plays 
in Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra: that laughter is the appropriate response 
to an individual's ultimate liberation. This latter view raises the importance of 
laughter to altogether new heights, Nietzsche taking us far beyond the realms 
of categorising types of humour or analysing jokes, and showing the wider role 
laughter can play in human life, and the potential open to the person who is able 
to take what might genuinely be called a 'humorous attitude' to life. 
1° For instance, neither Morreall nor Monro, the two philosophers whose work on humour and laughter 
has been of most use to me in my research, mentions Nietzsche's contribution to the subject. 
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Chapter II 
The incongruity tradition 
The tradition that relates humour to incongruity is the first of the three main 
theoretical traditions we will consider. By far the most commonly discussed com-
ments in this tradition are those of Arthur Schopenhauer, and we will turn our 
attention to his views shortly. In this, as in most aspects of Schopenhauer's phi-
losophy, however, it is helpful if we first consider Immanuel Kant. 
2.1 Kant on laughter 
As well as their connection with the Schopenhauerian incongruity theory, 
Kant's brief comments on laughter involve the additional factor of release or relief, 
and for this reason it may be said that in Kant we also get the origins of the kind 
of theory we shall consider in Chapter Four. However, it is the connection with 
the incongruity tradition in which we are interested here. We should start with 
Kant's central claim: 
'Something absurd (something in which, therefore, the understanding can of 
itself find no delight) must be present in whatever is to raise a hearty convul-
sive laugh. Laughter is an affection arising from a strained expectation being 
suddenly reduced to nothing 'Y 
In an attempt to illustrate his point, Kant offers an anecdote about an Indian, 
who is astonished to see the beer in a shaken-up bottle turn into froth and flow 
out when the bottle is opened. When asked what is so wonderful about this, the 
Indian's explanation is that what surprised him was not the froth's getting out, 
but how anyone had ever managed to get it in to begin with. 12 
Kant claims this is amusing not due to our feeling any sense of superiority 
over the Indian, but 'rather that the bubble of our expectation was extended to 
11 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, trans. Janies Meredith Creed (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1952), p.199. 
12 Kant, Critique of Judgement, pp.199-200. 
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the full and suddenly went off into nothing'.13 This also explains our amusement, 
Kant says, at the following story. The heir of a wealthy relative is lamenting the 
failure of his attempt to arrange the deceased's funeral on a massively imposing 
scale. The reason for this failure, he explains, is that 'the more money I give my 
mourners to look sad, the more pleased they look' .14 
A preliminary point to be made here is that we cannot dispense as readily as 
does Kant with the notion of superiority or degradation in the Indian example. 
While a feeling of superiority over Indians is not essential to appreciating this joke, 
it remains true that particular races or social groups are often made the butts of 
jokes in order to increase the comedian's chances of getting a laugh, and that 
people are generally more likely to laugh at a joke towards the butt of which they 
feel some prejudice or antagonism. However, we can leave this point on one side 
for the time being, as the theoretical tradition which relates humour to feelings of 
superiority and degradation will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
The main point is that despite his illustrations, it is still unclear exactly what 
Kant means by a 'reduction into nothing'. There are some jokes in which a 're-
duction into nothing' does literally occur, as in Kevin Mcintyre's 'I'm not saying 
my aunt's fat, but she's about the only woman I know'. 15 This kind of joke might 
legitimately be referred to as a 'non-joke'. It works because we expect a particular 
kind of joke (for instance, 'I'm not saying my wife's fat, but she's the only woman 
I know who ever got chosen to play Bethlehem in the school nativity play. nG) To 
the hearer's surprise, the kind of joke expected is never completed, however, and a 
new meaning in the phrase is discovered. As well as 'non-jokes', shaggy-dog stories 
would also seem to illustrate Kant's point fairly well. 
However, 'reduction into nothing' in this literal sense is an adequate explana-
tion of only a very small field of humour and, if we interpret him literally, it seems 
that Kant's formulation is not the best explanation of his own examples. In both 
13 Kant, Critique of Judgement, p.200. 
14 ibid. 
15 On a number of occasions in this dissertation, I will make reference to jokes for which it is not pos-
sible to cite a reference, as this material has never beeu published or recorded on vinyl. Mcintyre's 
joke is one such instance. 
16 I have stolen this joke from comedian Jo Brand, who tells it about herself. 
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of these, what exactly is it that Kant expects us to be expecting? Is it simply that 
the hearer expects some sort of explanation: an explanation from the heir of why 
his plans were not succeeding, or from the Indian of why he was puzzled? If this is 
so, amusement is not caused by this expectation being reduced to nothing, because 
an explanation is indeed given. John Morreall discusses Kant's funeral joke, and 
agrees that we do expect that an explanation for the heir's lamentations will be 
given. But, he argues, if this expectation were indeed 'reduced to nothing'; if no 
such explanation were given, then there would be no joke. 'If the story, say, ended 
after telling us that the heir lamented his inability to arrange for an imposing 
funeral, we would have frustrated expectation but would be unlikely to laugh. '17 
The humour lies in the nature of the explanations, when they arrive: if these 
jokes are perceived as funny, it is because, as the first part of Kant's formulation 
acknowledges, the Indian's and heir's comments appear absurd or incongruous. 
But we can interpret 'reduction to nothing' in a way less literal than Morreall's 
interpretation, and in a way more favourable to Kant. In many jokes or comic 
anecdotes, the beginning of the joke sets up the mind to follow a particular path. 
Now after the two examples we have already quoted, Kant remarks that: 'We must 
be careful to observe that the reduction is not one into the positive contrary of 
an expected object - for that is always something, and may freqently pain us -
but must be a reduction to nothing.'18 This suggests the point that what makes 
the joke work is often not getting the complete opposite of what we expected, but 
rather the outcome's suddenly making us realise that we have followed completely 
the wrong path: the one we have followed turns out to lead nowhere; or at least, 
not to the same place as the punchline of the joke. This is the sense in which our 
'expectation' is 'reduced to nothing.' 
For instance, consider the following two jokes. In one episode of the TV show 
Cheers, the bar slob Norm, after yet another evening's sitting around drinking, 
announces that he is leaving, since he has promised his much neglected wife that 
he will pick up some Chinese food. 'That's nice of you', someone comments, 
surprised. 'Yeah, well', says Norm, 'I spilled it on the carpet this morning.' Here 
17 John Morreall, Taking Laughter Seriously (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1983), p.l7. 
18 Kant, Critique of Judgement, p.200. 
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we have followed the wrong path; the one that leads from a mistaken assumption 
about the way the phrase 'pick up' is used in this sentence. A similar process is at 
work in Emo Phillips's account of being in trouble at school as a small boy, and 
being sent to the headmaster. Another boy, who had gone through this terrible 
ordeal the previous week, told Emo that, as a result of his experience, he still 
could not sit down. This terrified Emo, and he prayed: 'Please God, don't let the 
headmaster find me attractive too ... ' 
It must be said that this understanding of Kant does not seem to be an ade-
quate explanation of his own examples - it is difficult to see what is the particular 
path which the mind is set up to follow in these cases - and so it is questionable 
whether this was his own original intended meaning. Nevertheless, such an idea 
is valuable in shedding light on how certain humour works. D.H.Monro offers a 
formulation which is essentially the same as that outlined above: 'The mind is as 
it were wound up ready to proceed in a definite direction: it is suddenly wrenched 
off its path and turned in a different direction'. 19 If understood in this way, Kant's 
ideas may be seen as giving birth to the kind of incongruity theory outlined more 
explicitly by Schopenhauer. It is to this that we now turn. 
2.2 Schopenhauer's formulation 
Schopenhauer's central claim is as follows: 
'The cause of laughter in every case is simply the sudden perception of the 
incongruity between a concept and the real objects which have been thought 
through it in some relation, and laughter itself is just the expression of this 
incongruity. It often occurs in this way: two or more real objects are thought 
through one concept, and the identity of the concept is transferred to the 
objects; it then becomes strikingly apparent from the entire difference of the 
objects in other respects, that the concept was only applicable to them from a 
one-sided point of view. It occurs just as often, however, that the incongruity 
between a single real object and the concept under which, from one point of 
view, it has been rightly been subsumed, is suddenly felt. Now the more correct 
the subsumption of such objects under a concept may be from one point of view, 
19 D.H.Monro, Argument of Laughter (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1951), p.147. 
17 
and the greater and more glaring their incongruity with it, from another point 
of view, the greater is the ludicrous effect which is produced by this contrast. 
All laughter, then, is occasioned by a paradox, and therefore by unexpected 
subsumption, whether this is expressed in words or in actions. This, briefly 
stated, is the true explanation of the ludicrous' .20 
In a supplementary chapter, Schopenhauer grudgingly offers some examples 'in 
order to come to the assistance of the mental inertness of those readers who always 
prefer to remain in a passive condition'. 21 These may be divided into two kinds, 
according to whether laughter is caused by passing from the real or perceptible 
to the thought or conception, or vice versa. These are witticisms and absurdities 
respectively. Examples of witticisms include 'the familiar anecdote of the Gascon 
at whom the king laughed when he saw him in light summer clothing in the depth 
of winter, and who thereupon said to the king: "If your majesty had put on what 
I have, you would find it very warm"; and on being asked what he had put on, 
replied: "My whole wardrobe!" m 
In this instance, under the usual conception of a 'whole wardrobe' is subsumed 
the object of the peasant's single summer coat, and the humour arises from the 
incongruity of this with the conception. 
Puns are merely special instances of this idea, the ambiguous word again en-
abling an inappropriate percept to be subsumed under some general concept. For 
example, in Romeo and Juliet, when Mercutio says 'Ask for me tomorrow and you 
shall find me a grave man', the percept of death emerging from the play on the 
word 'grave', is subsumed under the concept of gravity in the sense of seriousness. 
Similarly, parody employs the same method, when it 'substitutes for the incidents 
and words of a serious poem or drama insignificant low persons or trifling motives 
and actions. '23 Here, 'commonplace realities' 24 are subsumed under 'the lofty con-
20 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, Vol.l, trans. R.B.Haldane and J.Kemp 
(London: Routledge, 1883), pp.76-77. (The German word which is here translated as 'ludicrous' 
is liicherlich, which comes from the verb lachen - 'to laugh'- and hence can also be translated 
as 'laughable'.) I shall refer to the above paragraph, an important one, as Schopenhauer's core 
paragraph. 
21 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, Vo1.2, p.271. 
22 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, Vol.2, p.272. 
23 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, Vol.2, p.276. 
24 ibid. 
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cepts given in the theme'25 • Trivialisation, a very common technique in humour, 
works in a similar fashion, subsuming the trivial under the serious and noble. 
The second species of the ludicrous, the absurd, follows the opposite path from 
the abstract conception to the real object. For example, consider the invitation 
to a man who remarked how much he liked walking alone: 'So do I: therefore we 
can go together'. Here, we start from the general conception that a pleasure which 
two people enjoy, they can share. But the humour arises from the fact that we 
subsume under it the very case which excludes companionship. The conception 
does not necessarily have to be explicitly stated, as it is not, for instance, when 
we find certain animals ludicrous because something about them resembling man 
leads us to subsume them under the conception of the human form. 
Schopenhauer uses the notion of incongruity to contrast laughing and joking 
with seriousness. Seriousness consists in the consciousness of the perfect agreement 
and congruity of the conception, or thought, with the perception, or reality: 'the 
serious man is convinced that he thinks the things as they are, and that they are 
as he thinks them'. 26 
The transition from profound seriousness to laughter is so easy because the 
more perfect the agreement that the serious man assumes, the easier this is to 
upset by even a slight incongruity. This explains our offence when others laugh 
at us: we are forced to recognise that there is a great incongruity between our 
conceptions and the objective realities. Schopenhauer also uses the idea of seri-
ousness to explain two further subdivisions of the ludicrous: irony and humour27 • 
Irony arises when the intentionally ludicrous is concealed behind seriousness. The 
irony of Socrates, for instance, often consists of acquiescing in and pretending to 
share others' opinions, until eventually the result perplexes the opponent both as 
to Socrates and his own opinions. Conversely, humour involves seriousness being 
concealed behind a joke. An example of this is Hamlet's reply to Polonius. When 
the latter says 'My honourable lord, I will most humbly take my leave of you', 
25 ibid. 
26 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, Vol.2, p.280. 
27 Schopenhauer (or this translation of him) is clearly using the term 'humour' in a much more limited 
sense than it is used in contemporary humour research, the present dissertation included. 
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Hamlet replies: 'You cannot, sir, take from me anything that I will more willingly 
part withal, except my life, except my life, except my life'. 
2.3 Critique 
Schopenhauer's own claim for his theory is bold: 'here, after so many fruitless 
earlier attempts, the true theory of the ludicrous is given, and the problem which 
was proposed and also given up by Cicero is definitely solved'. 28 
This is too enthusiastic. Though I shall be defending Schopenhauer's central 
insight as a worthwhile one, there are important objections to an incongruity 
theory, which we need to consider now. 
Perhaps the first, preliminary, point to make is that the use I shall make of 
Schopenhauer will not include a use of his taxonomy of species of the ludicrous. 
My concern in this dissertation is not with deciding whether a particular joke is 
best described as a witticism or an absurdity. For instance, consider the following, 
from a piece by Woody Allen: 
'In the end Socrates' brave death gave his life authentic meaning; something 
my existence lacks totally, although it does possess a minimal relevance to the 
Internal Revenue Department'. 29 
If we are to make any sense of Schopenhauer's talk of percepts and concepts 
here, it would seem that in this case we are moving from the more abstract concept 
that one's life has no authentic meaning, to the particular reality that one is 
important to the tax authorities. By Schopenhauer's criteria, this makes the joke 
a case of the absurd. Yet if there is anything absurd about the statement that 
Allen is making, it is in a much weaker sense of the word than Schopenhauer's 
example of two people who like walking alone doing so together. Unlike in the latter 
example, there is no sense of logical impossibility in the Allen joke. And could not 
Allen's remark be more accurately described as a witticism? Furthermore, it is 
not clear to me that such categories as this need be mutually exclusive. Can we 
28 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, Vol.2, p.272. Two pages earlier, Schopenhauer 
has referred to Cicero's comments on the problem of the origin of laughter and his dismissal of the 
problem as insoluble. 
29 Woody Allen, 'My Apology', in Side Effects (Sevenoaks: New English Library, 1981), p.35. 
20 
not have witty absurdities, humorous ironies and so on? One could, I suppose, 
attempt independent definitions of each term, whilst accepting that they need not 
be mutually exclusive, but I shall make no such attempt here since, to reiterate 
the point made in the introduction, my concern in this thesis is with 'macro-
humorology', and so I shall not be concerned with developing Schopenhauer's, or 
constructing my own, taxonomy of humour. 
2.3.1 Types of 'incongruity' and range of usage 
An important challenge facing any incongruity theorist is the necessity of defin-
ing more clearly what is meant by the term 'incongruity'. And in fact, though the 
term is littered throughout most contemporary discussions of humour, hardly ever 
does one find any clear explanation as to what is meant. In attempting to address 
this shortcoming, the Oxford English Dictionary seems a reasonable place to start. 
Here we find such definitions as: 
'disagreement in character or qualities: want of accordance or harmony; dis-
crepancy, inconsistency .... want of accordance with what is reasonable or fitting; 
unsuitableness, inappropriateness, absurdity .... want of harmony of parts or el-
ements; want of self-consistency; incoherence'. 30 
It is worth noting that there are thinkers, other than Kant and Schopenhauer, 
for whom incongruity is central to the laughable. Joseph Warton, for instance, 
refers to 'those incongruities and absurdities of behaviour, on which ridicule is 
founded' 31 , whilst Alexander Gerard regarded the object of the sense of the lu-
dicrous as being 'in general incongruity, or a surprising and uncommon mixture 
of relation and contrariety in things. More explicitly; it is gratified by an incon-
sistence and dissonance of circumstances in the same object, or in objects nearly 
related in the main; or by a similitude or relation unexpected between things on the 
whole opposite and unlike' .32 In one of the most detailed eighteenth-century essays 
on laughter, James Beattie claims that: 'Laughter arises from the view of two or 
30 The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, Vol.l (London: Book Club 
Associates, in association with Oxford University Press, 1979). 
31 Joseph Warton, in the Adventurer (12th Feb., 1754); quoted in J.Y.T.Greig, The Psychology 
of Laughter and Comedy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1923), p.241. 
32 Alexander Gerard, An Essay on Taste (London, 1759), p.66. 
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more inconsistent, unsuitable, or incongruous parts or circumstances, considered 
as united in one complex object or assemblage, or as acquiring a sort of mutual 
relation from the peculiar manner in which the mind takes notice of them'. 33 
Later theorists too, talk of similar concepts: Monro of the inappropriate34 , and 
Edith J. Hols of irregularity35 • 
A previous commentator in this area, Marie Collins Swabey, agrees that theo-
rists in this tradition have meant something corresponding to just about all of the 
terms quoted above from the Q.E.D.: 
'sometimes the notion that things are incongruous emphasizes chiefly that they 
are markedly dissimilar or in contrast to one another; sometimes that they are 
inappropriate or unsuited to their situation; again that there is a lack of rele-
vance between them; again that there is a clear-cut incompatibility or incon-
sistency between them (as indicating that they are mutually exclusive, without 
necessarily mutually exhausting all possibilities). And lastly, incongruity may 
plainly mean contradictory: that two propositions, properties, or states of af-
fairs are opposites in the full sense, so that the denial, absence or falsity of one 
of them is equivalent to the affirmation, presence, or truth of the other, since 
between them they exhaust the range of possible alternatives'. 36 
Swabey, whose own view of humour is strongly rooted in the incongruity tradi-
tion, is very rare amongst theorists in that she considers the range of usage of the 
term, a procedure which includes considering numerous examples of humour. Let 
us consider her account next. To begin with, Swabey makes a distinction between 
two types of incongruity: 
'Basically, perception of the comic requires the grasp of incongruities that are 
both logical (as regards the science of reasoning) and teleological (involving 
33 James Beattie, 'An Essay on Laughter and Ludicrous Composition', in his Essays (Edinburgh: 
William Creech, 1776), p.320. 
34 Monro, Argument of Laughter, pp.235-256. 
35 Edith J.Hols, 'A Rhetoric of Humor: One-liners', in Robert L.Brown and Martin Steinmann Jr. 
(eds.), Rhetoric 78: Proceedings of the Theory of Rhetoric: An Interdisciplinary 
Conference (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Center for Advanced Studies in Language, 
Style and Literary Theory, 1979), pp.191-199. 
36 Marie Collins Swabey, Comic Laughter: A Philosophical Essay (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1961), pp.ll0-111. 
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a fitness of the parts within the pattern of the whole) ... comic incongruities 
may be divided into those which appeal strongly to our sense of rational form 
(logical incongruities proper) and those which appeal more obviously to our 
sense of incompatibilities in their matter (which may be called mainly factual 
incongruities). m 
She gives as an example of a joke which involves a formal incongruity leading to 
self-contradiction the following schoolboy howler: 'Lincoln was a great Kentuckian. 
He was born in a log cabin, which he built with his own hands. '38 
Other logical laws may be violated: as, for instance, in the story of the man 
who returned a borrowed kettle with a hole in it. He denied responsibility on three 
grounds: firstly, he had not borrowed the kettle, secondly it already had a hole in 
it when he borrowed it, and finally, he had returned it without a hole. 
We can add that one might also be amused by the breaking of mathematical 
rules, particularly when this is done unintentionally, as in my junior school when 
a friend told me that for the first lesson of the afternoon, half of the class would 
be doing English, half of us Maths and half of us French. 
Humour based upon 'factual incongruities' is far more common. Swabey dis-
cusses numerous examples here, which she divides into four main categories. We 
shall consider these in turn. To begin with, many jokes depend upon equivoca-
tion or ambiguity. This covers double entendres, Swabey giving as an example 
the following Marx Brothers' joke: 'I tried to pick up a little Hungarian, but she 
slapped my face'. Here, 'there is an equivocation both on the term "Hungarian" 
- as meaning either (1) a language or (2) a person native to Hungary, and the 
term "pick up" - as meaning either ( 1) to acquire knowledge in an unsystematic 
way or (2) to force one's acquaintance upon another without introductions. The 
revelation in the conclusion of the use of the term in the premise in this second, 
slangy sense is what gives the unexpected comic effect. '39 One of the meanings in 
an ambiguity-dependent joke does not have to be sexual, of course; as in the story 
of the woman apprehended for stealing reams of paper and boxes full of pens from 
37 Swabey, Comic Laughter, p.l15. 
38 ibid. 
39 Swabey, Comic Laughter, p.119. 
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a stationery store, whose excuse to the policeman who asked her to explain herself 
was that she was gathering material for her new novel. 
Similar to the double entendre is another common kind of joke, where, instead 
of the joke hinging upon two possible meanings of one particular word, it is de-
pendent upon two possible understandings of a whole phrase. Normally, the literal 
meaning is taken of a phrase meant as a figure of speech: 
'I woke up one morning and my girlfriend asked me if I slept good. I said, "No, 
I made a few mistakes". Ho 
'Doctor: Mrs. O'Reilly, I don't like the look of your husband. 
Mrs. 0: Neither do I, Doctor, but he's good to the children.' 
Or, less commonly, the opposite may occur, where an intended literal meaning 
is interpreted as a figure of speech: 
'I said to my wife, "All things considered, I'd like to die in bed", and she said, 
"What, again?" '41 
Swabey also includes comic plots involving mistaken identity, or of women 
being dressed as men, under this heading. Examples of each would be the misun-
derstandings over the pairs of twins in Shakespeare's The Comedy of Errors, and 
of Rosalind's assuming the name and dress of the countryman Ganymede in As 
You Like It. The idea here is that from persons wrongly judged to be the same, 
invalid inferences are drawn. 
The second category after equivocation or ambiguity consists of the fallacies 
of irrelevance or non sequitur. In Mel Brooks's film Young Frankenstein, when the 
doctor is faced with a major problem, his servant Igor, played by Marty Feldman, 
offers a suggestion. "You know", he says, "It's at times like these that I remember 
what my old dad used to say to me". His hopes arisen, Frankenstein asks eagerly 
what that was. Igor gives a nostalgic smile, and then barks out his dad's words: 
"Hurry up and get out of that bathroom! You're in there all day and all night: get 
4° From stand-up comedian Steven Wright's album I Have a Pony (Warner Bros. Records Inc., 
1985 ). 
41 A Rodney Dangerfield gag, quoted in Melvin Helitzer, Comedy Writing Secrets (Cincinnati: 
Writer's Digest Books, 1987), p.77. 
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a move on, and give someone else a chance!" The total irrelevance of the content of 
this memory to the situation, together with its unexpectedness, is what makes this 
funny. Under the heading of irrelevance we can also include much of the humour 
of those Alan Bennett or Victoria Wood characters who assail their audience with 
monologues the ideas in which are only very loosely connected, if at all: 
'Good evening. My name's Kitty. I've had a boob off and I can't stomach 
whelks so that's me for you ... There's a rumour going round our block that 
I play golf. Let me scotch it. I do have what seems to be a golf-bag on 
my telephone table but it's actually a pyjama-case made by a friend who has 
trouble with her nerves in Buckinghamshire .. .l've just had my TV mended. I 
say mended - a shifty young man in plimsolls waggled my aerial and wolfed my 
Gipsy Creams, but that's the comprehensive system for you. 142 
An irrelevant aside, too, can be amusing in virtue of its irrelevance. Take the 
following, from Bertie Wooster: 
'I marmaladed a slice of toast with something of a flourish, and I don't suppose 
I have ever come much closer to saying "Tra-la-la" as I did the lathering, for I 
was feeling in mid-season form this morning. God, as I once heard Jeeves put 
it, was in His heaven and all was right with the world. (He added, I remember, 
some guff about larks and snails, but that is a side issue and need not detain 
Thirdly, humour can arise from what Swabey describes as 'disparities in subject 
matter, modes of operation, and conventions of two different worlds '44 • She gives 
as an example a cartoon of two cleaners dusting the lens of a huge telescope in 
an observatory, one of whom says: 'And you should have heard him swear when 
I showed him it was only a fly speck.' Here the high-flying world of astronomy is 
brought together with the more down-to-earth, everyday world of the cleaners. 
42 Victoria Wood, Up To You, Porky (London: Methuen, 1985), pp.69-70. Note that the cat-
egories of joke being discussed here are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The idea of making 
mistakes while asleep might lead one to include as an example of irrelevance the Steven Wright 
example mentioned under the previous heading. 
43 P.G.Wodehouse, Stiff Upper Lip, Jeeves (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966), p.5. 
44 Swabey, Comic Laughter, pp.120-1. 
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This third category is a highly important one, and it is illuminating here to 
compare Swabey with two other theorists: Monro and Arthur Koestler, both of 
whom make very similar points. Monro notices that an explanation of humour con-
stantly requires reference to 'the linking of disparates, to the collision of different 
mental spheres, to the obtrusion into one context of what belongs in another. '45 By 
'the linking of disparates', Monro understands jokes in which 'two remote spheres 
of thought can be connected'46 • As an example, he gives a cartoon of an insect 
exterminator explaining his technique to a client: 'Their first reaction is one of 
fright and hysteria. Then a strange apathy seems to seize them and they lose all 
will to live. >47 The disparates linked here are the insect-exterminator's trade and 
the attitude of the psychologist. (We will see wider illustrations of the use of this 
technique shortly, when we discuss 'configurational' theories.) The 'collision of 
different mental spheres' and 'the obtrusion into one context of what belongs in 
another' are so similar as to make it pointless to distinguish between them. Either 
could be illustrated by Swabey's astronomy cartoon, Aristophanes' description of 
a politician as having a voice like a pig on fire, or this memorable line from a Ring 
Lardner story: 
'"Shut up', he explained.'48 
We could also include here jokes where a general concept or a circumstance 
suggested by a certain phrase has, in Schopenhauer's terminology, an inappropriate 
instantiation subsumed under it, such as Schopenhauer's example of the two men 
who like walking alone doing so together, or Paul Merton's confession that he has 
always wanted to ask Lee Harvey Oswald: 'Can you remember what you were 
doing when President Kennedy was assassinated?' 
'The obtrusion into one context of what belongs in another' seems a natural 
explanation of the following, from Pickwick Papers: 
45 Monro, Argument of Laughter, p.235. I shall refer to these important factors, very common 
in humour, as Monro's three factors. 
46 Monro, Argument of Laughter, p.248. 
47 ibid. 
48 Ring Lardner, The Young Immigrants, quoted in Fred Metcalf (ed.), The Penguin Dic-
tionary of Modern Humorous Quotations (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986), p.l8. 
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'"Married!", exclaimed Pott, with frightful vehemence. He stopped, smiled 
darkly, and added, in a low, vindictive tone: "It serves him right!" '49 
But this might also be brought under the 'linking of disparates': many will 
find this funny because of the sense in which the sentiments are appropriate rather 
than inappropriate. This illustrates the important point that it makes more sense 
to combine factors such as Monro's three, rather than treating them as separate 
categories. Monro himself does this, using 'inappropriateness' as a 'convenient 
single word '50 to link all three factors. 
Koestler's view is similar to those of Swabey and Monro. For Koestler, 'the 
pattern underlying all varieties of humour is "bisociative" - perceiving a situation 
or event in two habitually incompatible associative contexts'51 . (This is part of 
an attempt on Koestler's part to compare the creation of laughter with science 
and art, all of which are dependent upon this central idea of 'bisociation': 'When 
two independent matrices of perception or reasoning interact with each other the 
result .. .is either a collision ending in laughter, or their fusion in a new intellectual 
synthesis, or their confrontation in an aesthetic experience ... the same pair of ma-
trices can produce comic, tragic, or intellectually challenging effects'. 52 ) Along the 
same lines, too, is Dr. Johnson's definition of wit as 'the unexpected copulation of 
ideas'53 • 
We move on to Swabey's fourth category. What Swabey sees as the weakest 
sense in which the term 'incongruity' is used occurs when 'incongruous' is used 
to mean possessing 'strikingly contrasting qualities at the farthest extremes of 
the scale from one another'. 54 She mentions laughter at the juxtaposition of the 
elephant and the mouse or the giraffe and the monkey, and insists that this results 
from the suggestion of logical contradiction which 'appears in the conflict between 
thought and perception of which we are aware in facing the bizarre fertility of 
49 Charles Dickens, Pickwick Papers, quoted in T.G.A.Nelson, Comedy: The Theory of 
Comedy in Literature, Drama, and Cinema (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 
p.47. 
50 Monro, Argument of Laughter, p.235. 
51 Koestler, The Act of Creation, p.95. 
52 Koestler, The Act of Creation, p.45. 
53 Quoted in Richard Boston, An Anatomy of Laughter (London: Collins, 1974), p.63. 
54 Swabey, Comic Laughter, p.lll. 
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nature'55 : that animals as diverse as this could still be members of the genus 
animal. But awareness of a mere contrast between an elephant and a mouse, 
whilst recognising they are both animals, is surely not enough to amuse many 
people. Swabey's mention of the 'juxtaposition' of these very different examples 
is more important than she emphasises. Take the scenario, common in children's 
humour, of an enormous elephant being afraid of a tiny mouse. If this is funny, 
it is surely because of some such juxtaposition: to a common sense view, the 
mouse should be afraid of the elephant. This depends, then, upon more than the 
appearance of 'strikingly contrasting qualities at the farthest extremes of the scale 
from one another'. 
Rather than dismiss Swabey out of hand, though, let us comment on how 
her mention of a 'striking contrast' does suggest another fairly common kind of 
humour. Consider this exchange, from Evelyn Waugh's Decline and Fall, on school 
sports day: 
'"My boy has been injured in the foot", said Lady Circumference coldly. 
"Dear me! Not badly, I hope? Did he twist his ankle in the jumping?" 
"No", said Lady Circumference, "he was shot at by one of the assistant 
masters. But it is kind of you to enquire". '56 
Here, the humour lies in the contrast between the subject-matter under discus-
sion and Lady Circumference's preservation of the niceties of polite speech, which 
are so inappropriate to the circumstances. 
Woody Allen's early essays, too, often depend upon striking contrasts. For 
instance the following, from 'A Look at Organised Crime': 'Identifying criminals 
is up to each of us. U,sually they can be recognised by their large cuffiinks and 
their failure to stop eating when the man sitting next to them is hit by a falling 
anvil. '57 
However, such humour is not a new, fourth, category, but an extension of the 
third: it involves the kind of factor which Monro brought under the heading of 
55 ibid. 
56 Evelyn Waugh, Decline and Fall (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1937}, p.73. 
57 Woody Allen, 'A Look at Organised Crime', in his Getting Even (London: Star Books, 1975}, 
p.l7. 
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inappropriateness. In trying to ascertain what is amusing in the Allen joke, for 
instance, the first point might appear to be the bizarre image which is conjured 
up. It is important to note, however, that we have here a case of 'obtrusion into 
one context of what belongs in another.' As a piece of practical advice intended 
to enable us to identify criminals is given a method of so doing which involves 
an incident which is so unlikely to happen that it renders itself totally useless as 
the piece of practical advice which it purports to be. There is also a 'linking of 
disparates'. The joke would be less funny if the reference to wearing cufflinks were 
removed. We would certainly be left with a bizarre image which could still amuse 
us. However, the joke is improved by the mention of the first, mundane supposed 
characteristic of criminals, which serves as a total contrast to the bizarre one which 
follows. 
We have now completed our review of Swabey's categorisations, having illus-
trated them, predominantly with examples other than those she herself gives. The 
point of the above review was not to defend Swabey's categories as perfect. It 
might be argued, for instance, that further subdivisions could be made within the 
category of 'factual incongruities', and that double entendres and puns could be 
classed under a heading such as 'semantic incongruities'. We could use an alterna-
tive classificatory terminology, too: humour which involves the breaking of logical 
and mathematical rules could be called 'hard' incongruity, while factors such as 
ambiguity, irrelevance and inappropriateness would be 'soft' incongruity. However, 
the main point of considering Swabey's account was to give us a clearer idea as 
to the range over which the term 'incongruity' has been applied. Our survey has 
confirmed a suspicion which may have been present from the moment of our first 
encounter with the Q.E.D. definitions: that the range of ideas which the term has 
been used to cover is a wide one. This is necessary, the incongruity theorist would 
argue, in order to account for the wide range of humour. But it raises serious 
doubts as to whether all these formulations may genuinely be said to be inter-
changeable with the term 'incongruity'. A recent writer on this topic has claimed 
that 'the systematic elucidation of the concept of incongruity is not the task in 
hand. The task in hand is to use our intuitive understanding of incongruity to 
elucidate what it is to be comical'. 58 The problem with this is that the concept 
58 M.E.Orellana-Benado, 'A Philosophy of Humour' (unpublished D.Phil. thesis, University of Ox-
ford, 1985), pp.32-33. 
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of 'incongruity' is in d?-nger of being stretched so far that to claim that humour 
is based on incongruity ceases to be particularly informative. (This 'stretching' is 
most clearly illustrated in Swabey's observation that it has been used to mean pos-
sessing 'strikingly contrasting qualities at the farthest extremes of the scale from 
one another'.) If incongruity can mean so much, to tell us that humour results 
from incongruity is not as clear-cut a solution of Cicero's problem of explaining 
laughter as Schopenhauer would have us believe. 
However, such an objection does not render the insight of the incongruity 
tradition worthless: far from it. It is true that one might worry about embracing 
an 'incongruity theory', or whatever, due to the difficulty of trying to find an 
acceptable word that will cover all of the factors discussed in this section. But 
we should not let semantic problems obscure what is of value in a theoretical 
tradition. We can defend the notion of humour as incongruity to the following 
extent. There is a tradition, in which the above-discussed views of Schopenhauer 
are central, which observes in humour the kind of properties we have been talking 
about: the presence of factors such as 'the linking of disparates ... the collision 
of different mental spheres ... the obtrusion into one context of what belongs in 
another'. That humour often involves this kind of factor is a point worth making, 
and the incongruity tradition is the theoretical tradition which makes it. 59 
2.3.2 Inherent and perceived incongruities 
Before we go any further, a preliminary point needs to be cleared up. We recall 
that one of Monro's three factors is 'the obtrusion into one context of what belongs 
in another'. It should be pointed out in defending the incongruity tradition to the 
extent that I am, I do not need to claim that anything is objectively incongruous. 
Such a claim would be highly dubious. I am not arguing, for instance, for inherent 
incongruities which transcend cultural boundaries. La Fave et al make the point 
that 'a large number of alleged "jokes" in our culture have as their apparent point 
a domineering woman attacking a submissive man. The point of that type of 
59 In this respect, 'inappropriateness' may be considered a preferable term to 'incongruity'. However, 
since the vast majority of theorists who discuss this aspect of humour use the term 'incongruity', I 
shall follow in this tradition, to avoid making the exposition of certain views discussed later in this 
chapter unnecessarily complicated and long-winded. To the extent that I agree with these views in 
what follows, the term should be understood as being, to quote Monro again, a 'convenient single 
word' to cover factors such as Monro's three. 
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"joke" is the incongruity that men, not women, are supposed to be the aggressors. 
However, Margaret Mead .. .found a society (Tchambauli) in which the women were 
the aggressors. This type of "joke", we predict, would be found unfunny in such a 
culture. '60 
On the same point, Jerry Palmer61 tells of Venezuelan Indians who have con-
verted to Catholicism, yet continue to believe in their traditional gods. Noting 
from Catholicism that suicide prevents one from getting into heaven, they have 
devised a safeguard against getting to heaven and not liking it: wearing a cord 
around their necks, to show God that they committed suicide. As Palmer points 
out, this is liable to amuse the Westerner because of the twin incongruities of be-
lieving that it is possible to fool God, and believing that there could be anywhere 
preferable to heaven. Yet with the limited understanding of the Western concep-
tion of God that seems to have been available to them, such a belief obviously does 
not appear to that society as incongruous. 
This point can be extended. Neil Schaeffer argues that 'from the point of view 
of nature, there are no real incongruities. It is only from our human point of view 
that we imagine nature as comedian arranging incongruities for our pleasure'. 62 So 
a photograph of a seagull passing a flying fish in flight shows something which is not 
inherently incongruous, but may be regarded by some as a humorous incongruity 
because, to most of us, a fish which flies is a case of the obtrusion into one context 
of what we generally think of as belonging to another. 
So what matters, as Schopenhauer saw, is that something should be perceived 
or thought of as incongruous. Hence, strictly speaking, we should really make 
the third of Monro's three factors a great deal clumsier. When 'incongruity' is 
used in this sense, it will mean something like 'the obtrusion into one context of 
what belongs, is felt or held to belong, or is recognised as being felt or held by 
60 Laurence La Fave, Jay Haddad, and William A. Maesen, 'Superiority, Enhanced Self-Esteem, 
and Perceived Incongruity Humour Theory', in Antony J. Chapman and Hugh C. Foot (eds.), 
Humour and Laughter: Theory, Research and Applications (London: John Wiley 
and Sons, 1976), pp.84-5. The reference is to Margaret Mead's Sex and Temperament in 
Three Primitive Societies (New York: Mentor Books, 1935). 
61 Jerry Palmer, 'Theory of Comic Narrative: semantic and pragmatic elements', in Humor Vol.l-2 
(1988), pp.111-126. The illustration discussed here is given on p.115. 
62 Neil Schaeffer, The Art of Laughter (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), p.7. 
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certain people to belong, in another'. This avoids the problem of incongruities 
being dependent upon cultural factors, and might also explain certain cases of 
some people being amused by things which do not amuse others. 
For instance, consider the following joke. 
'A man and woman are making passionate love in the bedroom. Suddenly the 
apartment door opens and a man comes in: "Darling! I'm home, my love." 
He walks into the bedroom, looks at the naked couple and says, "What is she 
doing here?" '63 
To find this joke funny, one needs to believe that homosexuality is abnormal, or 
to recognise that it is generally felt to be so by our society at large, or at least by a 
group of people of which the joke-teller is probably a part. If none of these beliefs 
are held, then it will not be possible for the hearer to perceive or understand 
the intended incongruity of the joke, and so he will be unable to find the joke 
amusing. Of course, to point out the importance of perceiving or understanding 
such intended incongruities is not to deny that there may well be vitally important 
additional factors which affect someone's being amused or otherwise by such a joke. 
If the hearer is gay, his reaction to it is likely to depend upon whether or not he 
regards the joke as ridiculing gays: this reaction will be heavily dependent upon 
his perception of the attitude of the joke-teller and the context in which the joke 
is told. Nevertheless, the point is that the perception or understanding of the 
intended incongruity is what is required for the hearer to recognise it as a joke: 
to recognise that it is supposed to be funny. On the imaginary planet Zag, where 
homosexuality is the norm, it would not be possible to perceive an incongruity 
in the punchline, and so it is difficult to see how this punchline could even be 
recognised as such. (If anything, it would be the first sentence of the joke that is 
funny to the Zogites.) 
2.3.3 Humour and laughter 
A further point concerns Schopenhauer's fault of equating the degree of fun-
niness of a piece of humour with the amount of laughter which results from it. 
He asserts that 'the greater and more unexpected [an] incongruity is, the more 
63 Quoted in Melvin Helitzer, Comedy Writing Secrets, p.lOO. 
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violent will be (the laugher's]laughter'64 • This position is indefensible. We should 
point out two facts here. The first concerns Schopenhauer's claim, at the start 
of his core paragraph, that 'the cause of laughter is simply the sudden perception 
of .. .incongruity'. Here Schopenhauer is failing to distinguish between humour and 
laughter. Clearly, humour and laughter are very closely linked, and it would be a 
strange essay on one which did not mention the other. However, the physiological 
activity known as laughter can be brought about as a result of intense joy, a feeling 
of embarrassment, or exposure to nitrous oxide, as well as by humour. Accepting 
this, one way of dealing with this problem is to make a distinction between humor-
ous and non-humorous laughter: in the former, the predominant cause of laughter 
is that something is perceived as funny or amusing, whereas in the latter this is not 
the cause. This is a fairly minor objection: Schopenhauer's fault is simply that he 
does not explicitly make clear that his is a theory of humorous laughter. But it is 
this failure which causes Schopenhauer to make the further, more serious, error of 
equating the amount of laughter with the degree of funniness. This is a sin which 
is also committed in certain psychological research. Howard R. Pollio, for instance, 
measures the reactions of two separate audiences to the same comic film according 
to three factors: length of time between punchline and audience laughter, length of 
laughter itself, and loudness or intensity of laughter. 65 He concludes that because 
'jokes that produced guffaws at 8pm sometimes bombed out at lOpm, and vice 
versa'66 this makes it 'clear that what was funny for one group of people was not 
as funny for another group of people'. 67 
But it is by no means this simple. Pollio is ignoring vital social factors in-
volved in group laughter. The amusement of the individuals in a group cannot be 
ascertained by measuring the laughter of the group as a whole. Consider young 
Fred, a member of the film's audience. The people around Fred may have the 
effect either of making him laugh more heartily at something which individually 
he would find at most only moderately amusing, or alternatively of making him 
feel more inhibited about laughing at something which he finds genuinely funny. 
64 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, Vol.2, p.271. 
65 Howard R. Pollio, 'What's So Funny?'. in New Scientist Vol.7!) No.1120 (14th Sept. 1978), 
pp.774-777. 
66 Pollio, 'What's So Funny?', p.776. 
67 ibid. 
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This could be for conscious reasons of either forcing himself to laugh in order to fit 
in with those around him (maybe he is a naive youngster who does not want his 
friends to realise that he hasn't understood a particular risque joke) or consciously 
restraining the urge to laugh (maybe he is not so naive and gets the joke, but has 
found himself sitting in between the parish priest and his most prudish teacher). 
Alternatively, it seems to be the case that there is something about simply being 
surrounded by other people also laughing that makes one tend to laugh more, for 
whatever unconscious reason. (This, surely, is a major reason for the dubbing of 
'canned laughter' on to television comedy shows: this is the only means available to 
the programme-makers of attempting to extend the infectiousness of the laughter 
of a theatre or cinema audience into the sitting-room.) I suggest that Pollio's mea-
sures of the sum total of laughter would be considerably greater than the measures 
obtained by showing the film to each audience member individually, recording his 
laughter and adding these results together. This does not prove, however, that 
because I laugh less when watching films alone that I must therefore find them 
less funny under these circumstances. To be fair, Pollio shows elsewhere in his 
paper that he is aware that the social context within which humour is experienced 
is extremely important. He also comments that: 'Laughing and smiling are only 
indicators of what's funny; indicators which must be used with tact and delicacy 
if their implications are to be read unequivocally'. 68 However, this only makes 
it even odder that he should make the equation between amount of laughter and 
degree of funniness which we saw him making earlier. 
An interesting study might result from the question as to whether and to what 
extent amusement is socially constituted, and indeed the notion of laughter as a 
social entity will be discussed in Chapter Six. The only point we need to make 
for the time being, however, is that it is not true that the funnier a piece of 
humour is perceived as being, the greater will be the laughter it induces. This is 
an obvious point, but one overlooked by Schopenhauer. Hence we may reject the 
Schopenhauerian assertion with which we opened this section. 
2.3.4 A further point on Schopenhauer 
We should observe at this stage that although we are making use of his central 
68 ibid. 
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observation, we are no longer applying a straightforwardly Schopenhauerian view. 
We must question whether this is really capable of explaining all the examples 
of humour considered so far. We recall Schopenhauer's emphasis upon the sub-
sumption of percepts under concepts. He asserts that 'in everything that excites 
laughter it must always be possible to show a conception and a particular, that 
is, a thing or event, which certainly can be subsumed under that conception, and 
therefore thought through it, yet in another and more predominating aspect does 
not belong to it at all, but is strikingly different from everything else that is thought 
through that conception'.69 While this might work as an explanation of certain 
jokes (for instance, the example of the king, the peasant and his 'whole wardrobe') 
it fares less well with explaining the humour in, say, examples based upon 'striking 
contrasts', such as Woody Allen's advice on spotting criminals. What is the inap-
propriate particular here, and what is the conception under which it is subsumed? 
This is very difficult to see. Schopenhauer's explanation of humour seems too rigid 
- although, as stated above, his central observation is a useful one. 
2.3.5 Incongruity, congruity and incongruity-resolution 
But several writers are sceptical about the idea that incongruity is involved 
in humour at all. One ·such is Roger Scruton 70 • Scruton considers a caricature of 
Mrs. Thatcher, and is unconvinced that this contains any incongruity. 
'The caricature amuses us, not because it does not fit Mrs. Thatcher, but 
because it does fit her, all too well. It is true that it must also contain an 
exaggeration: but the exaggeration is amusing because it draws attention to 
some feature of her. 171 
Also, in the comedy of a character's acting 'true to himself', what amuses is 
'the total congruence between the idea of the man and his action. '72 
But this is not so much of a spanner in the works as Scruton appears to think. 
To be amused by the character who acts true to himself, we need a frame of 
69 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, Vol.2, p.271. 
70 Roger Scruton, 'Laughter' in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl.Vol.56 (1982), 
pp.l97-212. 
71 Scruton, 'Laughter', p.202. Scruton's italics. 
72 ibid. My emphasis. 
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reference outside that particular individual: to chuckle and say 'just like old Ned', 
there must be something rather idiosyncratic about a particular aspect of Ned's 
character or behaviour. What amuses us is precisely the incongruous nature of 
Ned's behaviour when compared with 'normal' people and how we expect them 
to behave in that respect. The same applies to caricatures. The art historian 
Baldinucci defines caricature thus: 'the word signifies a method of making portraits 
aiming at the greatest possible resemblance of the whole of the person portrayed 
while yet, for the purpose of fun, and sometimes of mockery, disproportionately 
increasing and emphasizing the defects of the features, so that the portrait as a 
whole appears to be the sitter himself while its elements are all transformed'73 • The 
mention of the 'defects' of the features imply, as with our judgement of old Ned, an 
outside standard against which such judgements must be made. The features of a 
person on which a caricaturist seizes are often those which are idiosyncratic to that 
individual: an obvious example from recent British political history being Denis 
Healey's eyebrows. If these are funny, this is because of the difference between 
those of Healey and smaller, less bushy, 'normal' eyebrows. 
Scruton does not succeed in showing that the idea of incongruity plays no part 
in humour. However, his point that 'if one wishes to describe the humour of a 
caricature in terms of incongruity it must be added that it is an incongruity which 
illustrates a deeper congruity between an object and itself174 sheds light upon 
an area worth exploring. In fact, Soren Kierkegaard made a similar observation 
about caricatures: 'A caricature is comical, and why? Because of the contradiction 
between likeness and unlikeness'75 • 
With Baldinucci's definition in mind, we can agree that the best caricatures 
often exaggerate and distort features of their victim to such a degree that, in one 
sense, they do not much resemble the person's actual physical likeness at all. (In 
fact, if the actual physical likeness is too strong, and the caricature is indistin-
guishable from a photograph of its victim, only in exceptional circumstances will 
73 Quoted in Harold Osborne (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Art (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1970), pp.203-204. 
74 ibid. 
75 Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, translated by David F. Swenson 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1941), p.461. 
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it amuse us.) And yet it is a feature of these best caricatures that they still some-
how seem to 'fit' their subject. The Oxford Companion to Art echoes Kierkegaard 
in viewing the essential characteristic of caricature as being 'like in unlike'76 • 
This point about caricatures has been generalised to cover a wider field of 
humour, as in Monro's remark that 'there is an element of appropriateness in the 
inappropriate, when it is funny. It is not merely a question of something intruding 
where it does not belong, but of something which plainly does belong, but is not 
allowed for by our pre-existing attitude. 177 
A similar point is made by theorists who subscribe to the view that it is not 
incongruity, but rather the resolution of incongruity, which makes something funny. 
In the case of jokes, resolution is 'a form of problem solving to find a cognitive rule 
which makes the punchline follow from the main part of the joke and reconciles 
the incongruous parts'. 78 In other words, resolution involves 'the fitting of the 
apparently anomalous element into some conceptual schema. '79 We also recall 
Monro's 'linking of disparates' in this connection. Patricia Keith-Spiegel, in her 
impressive catalogue of humour theories, refers to such viewpoints, where 'humor 
is experienced when elements originally perceived as unrelated suddenly fall into 
place'80 , as 'configurational theories'. She classes as incongruity theories those in 
which 'it is the perception of "disjointedness" that somehow amuses, [whereas in] 
configurational theories, it is the "falling into place" or sudden "insight" that leads 
76 Osborne (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Art, p.204. 
77 Monro, Argument of Laughter, p.255. The importance of congruity is also stressed by Schaef-
fer, The Art of Laughter, p.9, and Thomas Brown, Lectures on the Philosophy of the 
Human Mind, quoted in Greig, The Psychology of Laughter and Comedy, pp.251-252. 
78 Jerry M. Suls, 'A two-stage model for the appreciation of jokes and cartoons: an information-
processing analysis', in Jeffrey H. Goldstein and Paul McGhee (eds.), The Psychology of 
Humor (New York: Academic Press, 1972), p.82; quoted by David Navon, 'The Seemingly Ap-
propriate but Virtually Inappropriate', in Poetics Vol.17-3 (1988), p.209. 
79 John Morreall, 'Funny Ha-ha, Funny Strange and Other Reactions to Incongruity' in John Mor-
reall (ed.), The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1987), p.l97. For a review of psychological research in the area of incongruity and 
incongruity-resolution, see Christopher P. Wilson, Jokes: Form, Content, Use and Func-
tion (London: Academic Press, 1979), pp.37-40. Wilson concludes that whilst incongruity is an 
important factor in, and possibly a sufficient cause of, amusement, there is no reason to conclude 
that amusement must necessarily depend upon the resolution of incongruity. 
80 Patricia Keith-Spiegel, 'Early Conceptions of Humor: Varieties and Issues', in Goldstein and 
McGhee (eds.), The Psychology of Humor, pp.4-39. This quote is from p.11. 
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to amusement. '81 
Some humour is clearly well-explained by configurational theories. A partic-
ularly good example is the anecdote of John Sparkes's character Siadwel, about 
his grandmother's fear of the floor ('Siadwel: is it still there?'). When asked by 
a bemused psychiatrist why she has such a strange phobia; why she isn't instead 
afraid of 'something sensible, like heights', she explains that 'it isn't heights that 
kill you: it's the floor'. Parodies, too, are often explicable in terms of seeing some 
congruity beneath the incongruity. To take an example from contemporary popu-
lar culture, there is the extraordinarily successful comic Viz, which parodies both 
children's comics and the tabloid press82 • Viz contains a strip-cartoon, 'Billy the 
Fish', which is a parody of boys' football comics such as Roy of the Rovers. Its hero 
is a character with the head of a footballer attached to the tail of a fish, and the 
reader is constantly reminded that 'despite being born half-man, half-fish, young 
Billy Thomson had made the goalkeeper's jersey at Fulchester United his own ... ' 
Billy's heroics constantly overcome the most ridiculous odds, including winning a 
game single-handed when the rest of his team is left stranded at sea. On one level, 
this is sheer absurdity, and will certainly appear that way to the uninitiated. How-
ever, the person who compares it with boyhood memories of Roy of the Rovers, 
can perceive beneath it a 'hidden congruity': something which suddenly 'fits', or 
'falls into place'. In Roy of the Rovers, too, the heroes always come up smelling 
of roses, to a ridiculou~ degree. Similarly, a staple of Roy of the Rovers was the 
speech-bubbles detailing comments made by fans or on the team-benches at crucial 
points in the match. In 'Billy the Fish', coaches and managers exchange dialogue 
like: 'That looked like a questionable last-minute penalty decision, Tommy', 'Yes, 
Syd; but its not for us to question the judgement of a league official', while fans 
1:-: 
pass comments like 'Tremendous reflexes from the cat-like man-fish wonder!' As 
any football fan will know, these are, to say the least, somewhat untypical com-
ments. But again, the humour lies beneath the sheer absurdity: in the reader's 
awareness of the fondness of Roy of the Rovers writers, TV sports commentators, 
81 ibid. 
82 Viz's concentration on genuine parody is perhaps clearer in earlier issues of the magazine. Since 
its national success, it has unfortunately moved increasingly in the direction of supplying 'lowest 
common denominator' humour, often involving considerable violence. 
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and footballers themselves, when interviewed, for this bizarre kind of cliche-ridden 
language. 
But 'configurational theories'; or 'resolving incongruity'; or seeing a hidden 
congruity, cannot explain humour such as the following. Consider these famous 
lines: 
''Twas brillig, and the slithy toves, 
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe; 
All mimsy were the borogroves, 
And the marne raths outgrabe. '83 
What is amusing here is precisely our failure to 'resolve the incongruity': try as 
we might, we cannot make any sense of this poem; there is no conceptual schema 
which will allow us to do so, despite the fact that the ingenuity of Carroll's choice 
of words and rhythm is that they sound as if they ought to mean something. The 
same point can be illustrated by riddles such as: 
'What's the difference between a duck?' 
'One of its legs is both the same. '84 
Neither what Keith-Spiegel calls incongruity theories or what she calls config-
urational theories can be claimed as all-encompassing. Moreover, in many jokes, 
some will find the incongruity itself amusing, while others will be amused at the 
deeper congruity. As regards making a contribution to my claim for the insight of 
the incongruity tradition, based upon factors such as Monro's three, whether our 
attention is focussed upon the incongruity itself, or its resolution, is not the point. 
If the latter is the case, there must, after all, be something incongruous to re-
solve. Though interesting as a further way of categorising jokes, for our purposes, 
Keith-Spiegel's distinction is unimportant. Monro recognises this by including 
both 'the linking of disparates' (which sounds similar to configurational theories) 
83 The first, and also the last, verse of the poem Jabberwocky, from Lewis Carroll's Through the 
Looking Glass (Maidenhead: McGraw Publishing, no date), pp.99-100. 
84 Morreall offers a version of this as a nonsense question without an answer: 'What's the difference 
between a duck with one of its legs both the same?' (Morreall, 'Funny Ha-ha, funny Strange, and 
Other Reactions to Incongruity', p.197.) 
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and 'the collision of different mental spheres' (which sounds like Keith-Spiegelian 
incongruity theories) under the same heading of 'inappropriateness'. 
2.3.6 Is incongruity the real root of funniness? 
We now turn to a further, very important, question. This is: even if one 
accepted the extended understanding of incongruity outlined earlier, and if it were 
possible to identify an incongruity in all instances of humour, is it really that 
incongruity itself which is the sole or predominant reason for amusement? It will 
be argued that it is not. Interesting in this regard is part of a workshop recently 
conducted at Indiana University85 . Observing that there are certain recurring 
types of joke, or 'joke skeletons', such as reversals, literal interpretations of figures 
of speech, and so on, researcher Douglas Hofstadter calls such a skeleton an 'ur-
joke' .86 The perceived funniness of different individual jokes with the same 'ur-joke' 
can vary massively. Hofstadter explains this in terms of the difficulty of unmasking 
the ur-joke, arguing that one's enjoyment of a joke is enhanced by there being an 
added difficulty in the unmasking. For instance, 'I've told you a million times not 
to exaggerate' is found by some people, we are told, to be considerably less funny 
than 'I'd give my right arm to be ambidexterous', and 'perhaps this discrepancy 
is due to the fact that it takes a moment longer to detect the self-undermining 
quality in the latter example. '87 So 'if two jokes sharing the same skeleton are not 
equally funny, the reason must be that the skeleton is buried to different amounts 
in the different jokes. '88 
This is surely inadequate. It is true that if a joke is too 'obvious', it will 
often be regarded as a poor one. But if we need to put too great an amount of 
mental energy into 'solving' a joke, this can greatly detract from our ability to 
enjoy it as a joke. However, the main objection to Hofstadter's claim is that to 
focus all our attention on the structure of the joke, which is what Hofstadter's 
suggestion does, and what the incongruity tradition as a whole is in danger of 
85 The 'Workshop on Humor and Cognition' at Indiana University's 'Center for Research on Concepts 
and Cognition', February 18 and 19, 1989. This is detailed in Douglas Hofstadter and Liane Gabora, 
'Synopsis of the Workshop on Humor and Cognition', in Humor Vol.2-4 (1989), pp.417-440. 
86 Hofstadter and Gabor a, 'Synopsis of the Workshop on Humor and Cognition, p.431. The ur prefix, 
from German, means 'original' or 'primordial'. 
87 Hofstadter and Gabora, 'Synopsis of the Workshop on Humor and Cognition, p.434. 
88 ibid. 
40 
doing, is to overlook many vital factors in humour appreciation. Monro raises as 
a criticism of Schopenhauer's formulation that it stresses 'the formal side of a joke 
to the exclusion of its content'89 • Essentially the same objection was made by 
some members of the Indiana group to Hofstadter's suggestion. It was argued that 
'certain topics of discourse- sex, of course, but also death, religion, politics, ethnic 
groups, and so on - have inherent tension associated with them, and that much of 
the humor of a particular joke is due not so much to its ur-joke, but to its subject 
matter.'90 
This led to attempts to offer non-sexual versions of the following sexual joke: 
'A man in his fifties goes to the doctor and says, "Doc, I've got a problem. You 
see, when I was younger I always used to get erections that I couldn't bend 
with my hand. Now though, I can bend every erection I get. What I want to 
know is, am I getting stronger or weaker?" '91 
Two non-sexual versions were proposed: 
'A woman goes to the psychiatrist and says, "Doctor, I've got a problem. You 
see, when I was younger I loved making puzzles for myself and then trying to 
solve them. It used to be that the puzzles I invented were so difficult that I 
couldn't solve any of them. These days, however, I solve every puzzle I make 
up. The question is, am I getting smarter or stupider?" ' 
'God goes to the doctor and says, "Doc, I've got a problem. You see, I used to 
be able to make stones that were so heavy that I couldn't lift them. But now I 
can't make a stone that I can't lift. The question is, am I getting more or less 
omnipotent?" '92 
The ur-joke is summarised as follows: 'Someone already confused by a double-
edged message becomes even more stymied when confronted by its opposite, an 
equally double-edged message. '93 What is certainly clear here is that these three 
89 Monro, Argument of Laughter, p.l55. 
90 Hofstadter and Gabora, 'Synopsis of the Workshop on Humor and Cognition', p.434. 
91 ibid. 
92 Hofstadter and Gabora, 'Synopsis of the Workshop on Humor and Cognition', p.435. 
93 ibid. 
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versions are all essentially the same joke. Yet, not surprisingly, members of the 
Indiana group did not rate all three versions as equally funny. This very clearly 
raises serious doubts about attempting to analyse jokes entirely in terms of their 
structures, and hence about focussing all our attention upon a factor such as 
incongruity. 
2.3. 7 Bain's criticism, context and attitude 
We now turn to a connected point; with what is probably the most often quoted 
objection to the incongruity tradition. This is Alexander Bain's remark that: 
'There are many incongruities that may produce anything but a laugh. A de-
crepid man under a heavy burden, five loaves and two fishes among a multitude, 
and all unfitness and gross disproportion; an instrument out of tune, a fly in 
ointment, snow in May, Archimedes studying geometry in a siege, and all dis-
cordant things; a wolf in sheep's clothing, a breach of bargain, and falsehood 
in general; the multitude taking the law into their own hands, and everything 
of the nature of disorder; a corpse at a feast, parental cruelty, filial ingratitude, 
and whatever is unnatural; the entire catalogue of vanities given by Solomon, 
- are all incongruous, but they cause feelings of pain, anger, sadness, loathing, 
rather than mirth. '94 
Bain's point is echoed in the following observation by literary critic Robert 
Corrigan: that incongruity does not necessarily 
'evoke a comic response, nor is it unique to the comic form. Incongruity is a 
technique which has been used in all dramatic forms - serious and comic. It 
is capable of producing dire emotions as well as side-splitting laughter. The 
coming of Birnam Wood to Dunsinane, for instance, is unquestionably incon-
gruous, but no one in the play or audience thinks it is funny .. .I believe a good 
case could be made for the idea that incongruity is the cause of horror in the 
94 Alexander Bain, The Emotions and the Will, 2nd ed. (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 
1865), pp.282-283. The same passage also appears in Bain's review of Leigh Hunt's Wit and 
Humour, selected from the English Poets, in the Westminster Review (October 
1847), p.34. 
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theatre as well as laughter. '95 
As it stands, Bain's criticism is unwarranted. Schopenhauer is not claiming 
that all incongruity is humorous, which is the position Bain is attacking. The 
claim is rather the other way around: that all humour is based on incongruity. 
However, Bain's central point is an important one. Some incongruities are per-
ceived as funny, while others are not. There are many different possible reactions 
to incongruity, amusement being but one, alongside puzzlement and the kinds of 
negative emotion mentioned by Bain96 • And this raises the question: why do we 
find some incongruities funny, and not others? 
We cannot adequately meet Bain's criticism by attempting to distinguish be-
tween intrinsically humorous and non-humorous incongruities, because of the non-
universality of what people find amusing. And this fact focusses attention upon a 
closely related question: why are some people amused by a particular incongruity, 
whilst others are not? 
These two questions highlight an important fact overlooked by Schopenhauer: 
that there are other factors which exert a considerable influence upon whether or 
not a person finds a particular incongruity amusing, other than the incongruity 
itself. The Indiana workshop raises the importance of taking into account the 
content or subject matter of humour, as well as its structure. Apparently, it 
is the third version of the Indiana joke which evoked the most laughter amongst 
the group there, one suggestion as to the reason for this being that the scenario 
of God's going to the doctor for advice is itself amusing. What is set up in this 
version of the joke is what Schaeffer refers to as a 'ludicrous context'97 • But it also 
seems likely that many people would find the sexual version of the joke funniest. 
There is a second factor of great importance. A reaction of amusement is also 
dependent to an enormous extent upon the context within which the humour is 
set, and the attitude of the person concerned. For instance, take Dorothy Parker's 
Resume: 
95 From the editor's introduction to Robert w. Corrigan (ed.), Comedy: Meaning and Form 
(Scranton, PA: Chandler Publishing Co., 1965), p.6. 
96 This is discussed at more length by Morreall in 'Funny Ha-ha, Funny Strange and Other Reactions 
to Incongruity'. 
97 This concept is referred to throughout Schaeffer's The Art of Laughter. 
43 
'Razors pain you; 
Rivers are damp; 
Acids stain you; 
And drugs cause cramp. 
Guns aren't lawful; 
Nooses give; 
Gas smells awful; 
You might as well live. '98 
Whether a person finds this essentially amusing, essentially poignant or de-
pressing, or experiences mixed feelings, will depend on a wide variety of factors, 
such as whether he is of a predominantly melancholy or jovial disposition, his mood 
at the time, and possibly the mode within which it is presented to him: as a witty 
poem, or as a despairing comment upon the tragedy of existence. 
This point about the importance of context and attitude may be further il-
lustrated by some of the examples from Bain's list. Bain claims that these all 
fail to produce 'mirth'. But this is not necessarily true. Whether one finds such 
things as 'gross disproportion' and 'parental cruelty' funny depends entirely upon 
the context within which they are presented, and one's attitude thereto. Laugh-
ter at 'gross disproportion' is common enough. There are numerous jokes about 
hunch-backs, such as Igor in Young Frankenstein, whom we mentioned earlier. 
When showing Dr. Frankenstein to his room, Igor requests the doctor to 'Walk 
this way'. Sure enough, the able-bodied Frankenstein does as he is told, apeing the 
way that Igor walks due to his deformity. 'Parental cruelty', too, though in most 
contexts far from a laughing matter, is also a common enough subject for humour. 
For instance, there is the father who, wanting to save himself money and time by 
not having to bother buying his children any Christmas presents, goes outside on 
Christmas Eve, fires a single shot into the air, and returns, saying: 'Bad news, kids, 
Santa Claus just committed suicide.' Other members of Bain's list have humorous 
potential, too: we could even go so far as to say that there is nothing on that list 
which cannot be perceived as humorous, given the appropriate attitude on behalf 
98 Dorothy Parker, Resume, in The Collected Dorothy Parker (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1989), p.99. 
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of the perceiver99 • 
2.4 Incongruity and the function of humour and laughter 
Finally, we turn our attention to an important question which a theory such as 
Schopenhauer's, which concentrates upon the form or structure of humour, does 
not treat as central. This is: what are the functions of humour and laughter? 
What purposes do they serve? And why should the perception of an incongruity 
provoke amusement and be enjoyable, as laughter at humour usually is? 
In fact, Schopenhauer does offer us an answer to these questions. We have 
seen that for him, laughter essentially results from an incongruity between what is 
thought and what is perceived: between a concept and a percept. Why, though, 
should this be a pleasurable experience? Schopenhauer's explanation is that we 
take pleasure in seeing our 'strict, untiring, troublesome governess, the reason, for 
once convicted of insufficiency.noo The function of humour and laughter, then, is 
to give us this pleasure. 
If we spell this out in more detail, we see that Schopenhauer's reasons for hold-
ing such a view are rooted in his metaphysics. Reason is insufficient because 'in 
every suddenly appearing conflict between what is perceived and what is thought, 
what is perceived is always unquestionably right; for it is not subject to error at all, 
requires no confirmation from without, but answers for itself. 1101 But why should 
the revelation of the inadequacy of reason afford pleasure? This is because 'per-
ception is the original kind of knowledge inseparable from animal nature, in which 
everything that gives direct satisfaction to the will presents itself. 1102 The cease-
less blind striving of the will that is central to Schopenhauer's metaphysics, then, 
is more easily satisfied by the knowledge that comes from perception than that 
which comes from thought, since the latter demands exertion. Since all one is, es-
sentially, is embodied will, one takes pleasure in the apparent victory of perception 
over reason. 
99 In Chapter Six, in considering Nietzsche, we shall consider a view which goes even further than this, 
claiming that there is nothing at all which cannot be perceived as funny, given the appropriate 
attitude. 
100 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, Vol.2., p.280. 
101 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, Vol.2., p.279. 
102 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, Vol.2, p.280. 
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An analysis of Schopenhauerian metaphysics lies beyond the scope of this dis-
sertation. But can we develop anything from Schopenhauer's comments about the 
reason: is the thought of an escape or holiday from reason illuminating in any 
way? 
It certainly has some plausibility. Examples of absurd or nonsense humour, for 
instance, may seem to be explicable in such terms. In the words of Harvey Mindess, 
'by inviting us to contemplate incredible events, they spring us free from rationality, 
from the monotony of humdrum sensible thought.n°3 One way in which this can 
work is by our deriving pleasure from seeing at least superficially logical reasoning 
used in an absurd argument. A master of this is N.F.Simpson. In Simpson's play 
One Way Pendulum104 the hero, Kirby Groomkirby, has devoted his life towards 
trying to teach five hundred 'speak your weight' machines to sing the Hallelujah 
Chorus. The reason for embarking on this difficult enterprise is that Kirby likes 
wearing black but, being a logical sort of person, needs some reason to do so. He 
thinks that his project may be able to help him here. His reasoning is as follows. 
Firstly, if speak-your-weight machines can speak, it seems reasonable to assume 
that they are capable of learning to sing too. Once they have been successfully 
trained, Kirby plans to have them transported to the North Pole, and once they 
are here, the attraction of these performing machines will attract enormous crowds 
to the Pole. If all members of the crowd thus assembled can be persuaded to jump 
at the same moment, the combined force of this will cause the earth's axis to tilt, 
leading to an Ice Age in Britain and hence many deaths and many funerals, thereby 
giving Kirby the ideal excuse to wear black. 
It seems plausible to argue that the amusement derived from this is due to 
being temporarily freed from 'the monotony of sensible thought'. There is a great 
deal of truth in the following words from Mindess: 
'As human beings we are capable of visualising things which cannot be, conjur-
ing up both frightening and wonderous fantasies, dispensing with the bound-
aries of time and space, the law of cause and effect. There is a wealth of 
irrationality in us. It may be the source of much anguish, yet it also furnishes 
103 Harvey Mindess, Laughter and Liberation (Los Angeles: Nash Publishing, 1971), p.77. 
104 N.F.Simpson, One Way Pendulum (London: Faber and Faber, 1960). 
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the most ecstatic joys we know. As anyone recalling youthful dreams of glory 
can attest and as the state of romantic infatuation proves, an irrational distor-
tion of reality is a potent formula for bliss. Our reasoning abilities, however, act 
to tone it all down: to modify, control and stabilize our moods and fantasies. 
While logic, therefore, may alleviate distress, it also curtails and inhibits joy. 
Much as we can profit from thinking things through, we must admit that reason 
is an agent of constriction over the free and glorious play of the mind. 
Our delight in nonsense humor reflects the extent of our drive to break 
loose, to shake off the bonds of sensibleness and frolic in the novelty of free-
associative thinking. '105 
This shows something of the anarchic side of humour, and of the important 
connection between humour and playfulness, a theme to which we will return 
at various points throughout our discussion. One of the true greats of nonsense 
humour, of course, is Lewis Carroll. It seems plausible to suggest that as a profes-
sional mathematician, Carroll would have been more bound than most by having 
to adhere to the dictates of reason and the rules of logic, and that his other ca-
reer, as writer of nonsense humour, could have provided him with relief from these 
constraints. 
But making these suggestions, that the irrational can have a great appeal, and 
that a 'holiday from reason' may appear desirable, is making a less bold claim than 
Schopenhauer's claim that reason has actually been convicted of 'insufficiency'. In 
fact, in absurd or nonsense humour, there remains a certain inner logic. Total 
gibberish is rarely funny. In the Simpsonian example, for instance, reason has not 
been shown to be insufficient: in fact, quite the opposite has occurred. Although 
superficially Kirby's line of reasoning has the appearance of a rational argument, 
it has many serious flaws and 'gaps' in reasoning. The path that we follow is a 
ridiculous one precisely because there are flaws in his argument: reason and logic 
have not been shown insufficient, they have triumphed. In such humour, we have 
only the illusion of escaping reason. 
Moreover, there are many important areas of humour which the idea of an 
'escape from reason' does not adequately explain. Overtly sexual humour, for 
105 Mindess, Laughter and Liberation, p.80. 
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instance, or that in which aggression or hostility plays a large part, cannot be 
explained in this way. In such examples, the primary focus of our attention is not 
on the internal line of reasoning in the joke. This confirms our suspicion that more 
than incongruity; that more than the structure of pieces of humour, needs to be 
considered if we are to come to a greater understanding of humour, laughter and 
their functions. 
2.5 Summary and conclusion 
In conclusion, then, what can we can say of the notion of humour as incon-
gruity? I have argued that the central idea behind the incongruity tradition is one 
which sheds useful light on the phenomenon of humour. To note the fact that some 
jokes involve logical inconsistencies ('hard' incongruity) and that factors such as 
Monro's three, or 'inappropriateness' ('soft' incongruity) are very common in hu-
mour, is to make a worthwhile humour-theoretical observation. However, we have 
seen the very wide range over which the term 'incongruity' has been applied, and 
this wide range of application causes problems. We observed that attempts had 
been made to use the term as loosely as to mean 'strikingly contrasting qualities 
at the farthest end of the scale from one another'. We cannot explain all humour 
in terms of incongruity: to attempt to do so would involve stretching the concept 
of incongruity so wide it ceases to be informative. Furthermore, even if it were 
the case that incongruity were involved in all humour, we doubted that this was 
necessarily the factor in virtue of which this humour was funny, since the same 
joke-structure can produce different jokes, some of which are perceived as funnier 
than others. The incongruity tradition puts an excessive emphasis upon the struc-
ture of jokes and the cognitive side of humour, at the expense of other important 
factors, such as subject matter, and the attitude and feelings of the laugher. Fi-
nally, Schopenhauer explains the function of humour and laughter in terms of an 
'escape from reason', an answer which cannot adequately explain many important 
kinds of humour. 
We turn, then, to our second theoretical tradition, which relates humour, 
laughter and superiority. 
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Chapter III 
The superiority tradition 
It is popularly held that humour is, in the language of 1066 And All That, a 
'Good Thing'. (We remarked, for instance, in Chapter One, on the offence taken 
by people accused of having no sense of humour.) Theorists in the superiority 
tradition have tended to challenge this view, concentrating on humour's negative 
side. 
This tradition dates back as far as Plato. In this chapter, we will briefly 
consider the views of Plato and Aristotle, and carefully analyse those of Thomas 
Hobbes. We will show something of the humour of which Hobbes's is a good 
explanation, before going on to consider some of the flaws in both Hobbes's theory 
and later developments in the superiority tradition. 
Let us start with Plato's brief comments on laughter. In the Republic, he claims 
that the proper objects of laughter are 'what is foolish and wrongn°6 • However, 
since he seems to view amusement as an emotion, Plato is concerned that indul-
gence in laughter can lead to a lack of self-control. The ideal society's guardians, 
then, should not be 'too fond of laughtern°7 and so no literature portraying gods 
or other reputable characters as overcome with laughter can be permitted. In 
the Philebus, Plato discusses what he considers to be 'the true character of the 
comicn°8 : self-ignorance. Self-ignorance manifests itself in a man's imagining him-
self as better than he really is, either in terms of wealth, physical characteristics 
such as height or good looks, or virtue (especially wisdom). Such people are laugh-
able. If they have the capacity to revenge themselves on those who scoff at them, 
they are dangerous; but those who lack this capacity, 'you may truly call comic 
figuresn° 9 • For Plato, then, comic figures; those at whom one may properly laugh, 
106 R bl. Plato, epu ~c, trans. Desmond Lee, 2nd ed. (Harmondworth: Penguin, 1974), V 452. 
107 R bt· Plato, epu ~c, III 388. 
108 Plato, Philebus, trans. A.E.Taylor (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1956), p.169. 
109 ibid. 
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are those who are inferior in this important respect of self-ignorance: they may 
presumably be said to be 'foolish and wrong'. 
3.1 Thomas Hobbes and 'Sudden Glory' 
Aristotle belongs to the superiority tradition too, as we shall shortly see. By 
far the most commonly quoted superiority theorist, however, is Thomas Hobbes. 
In fact, Hobbes is one of the most commonly quoted of all writers on laughter. 
His remarks are very brief, and it is worth quoting them in full. In the Leviathan, 
laughter is mentioned during his discussion of men's passions, two possible causes 
of the phenomenon being given: 
'Sudden Glory, is the passion which maketh those Grimaces called LAUGH-
TER; and is caused either by some sudden act of their own, that pleaseth 
them; or by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by compari-
son whereof they suddenly applaud themselves. mo 
The first of these, unless taken to include pleasure at one's 'cleverness' in ac-
tually making a joke or thinking up a witticism, does not appear to be concerned 
with laughter at humour, be it spoken, written, or that occurring in humorous 
situations; but rather that engendered by the triumph of winning a race or the 
satisfaction of successfully solving a puzzle. The second possible cause is remi-
niscent of Aristotle, who makes a connection between the laughable and the ugly. 
Comedy, for Aristotle, is 'an imitation of men worse than the average; worse, how-
ever, not as regards any and every sort of fault, but only as regards one particular 
kind, the Ridiculous, which is a species of the Ugly. 'lll In a vein similar to Plato, 
he continues: 'The Ridiculous may be defined as a mistake or deformity not pro-
ductive of pain or harm to others; the mask, for instance, that excites laughter, is 
something ugly and distorted without causing pain. mz 
Seeing its causes as he does, Hobbes, like Plato, has strong reservations about 
laughter: 
110 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981), p.125. 
111 Aristotle, Poetics, trans. by Ingram Bywater a.s On the Art of Poetry (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1920), p.33. 
112 ibid. 
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'it is incident most to them,· that are conscious of the fewest abilities in them-
selves; who are forced to keep themselves in their own favour, by observing the 
imperfections of o~her men~ And therefore much Laughter at the defects of 
others, is a signe of Pusillanimity. For of great minds, one of the proper workes 
is, to help and free others from scorn; and compare themselves onely with the 
most able. '113 
Similar sentiments are expressed elsewhere: 
'Great persons, that have t.heir minds employed on great designs, have not 
leisure enough to laugh, and are pleased with the contemplation of their own 
power and virtues, so as they need not the infirmities and vices of other men to 
recommend themselves to their own favour by comparison, as all men do when 
they laugh' .U4 
Hobbes's other main passage on laughter occurs in his Human Nature: 
'There is a passion that hath no name; but the sign of it is that distortion ofthe 
countenance which we call laughter, which is always joy: but what joy, what we 
think, and wherein we triumph when we laugh, is not hitherto declared by any. 
That it consisteth in wit, or, as they call it, in the jest, experience confuteth: 
for men laugh at mischances and indecencies, wherein there lieth no wit nor jest 
at all. And forasmuch as the same thing is no more ridiculous when it groweth 
stale or usual, whatsoever it be that moveth laughter, it must be new and 
unexpected. Men laugh often, especially such as are greedy of applause from 
every thing they do well, at their own actions performed never so little beyond 
113 Hobbes, Leviathan, p.125. 
114 Thomas Hobbes, 'The Answer of Mr. Hobbes to Sir William Davenant's Preface before Gondibert' 
(Paris, Jan 10, 1650), in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, Vol.4, ed. Sir William 
Molesworth (London: John Bohn, 1840), pp.454-455. Hobbes and Plato are not alone in having 
a low view of laughter. Lord Chesterfield shared their sentiments, commenting, in a letter to his 
son, that: 'I am sure that since I had full use of my reason, nobody has ever heard me laugh' (Lord 
Chesterfield, Lord Chesterfield: Letters to his Son (London: Dunne, 1901), p.58), and in 
The Philosophy of Laughter and Smiling (London: J. Burns, 1877), George Vasey ainls 
to show that laughter is objectionable both morally and aesthetically, and is also medically harmful. 
Arguments over the desirability or otherwise of laughter are at the centre of Umberto Eco's novel 
The Name of the Rose (London: Pan, 1984), in which the monastery librarian Jorge is 
prepared to kill in order to suppress Aristotle's lost treatise on comedy, because he sees laughter 
as a threat to religious faith and man's dignity. For a review of further anti-laughter sentiments, 
see Richard Boston, An Anatomy of Laughter (London: Collins, 1974), pp.l67-176. 
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their own expectations; as also at their own jests: and in this case it is manifest, 
that the passion of laughter proceedeth from a sudden conception of some 
ability in himself that laugheth. Also men laugh at the infirmities of others, 
by comparison wherewith their own abilities are set off and illustrated. Also 
men laugh at jests, the wit whereof always consisteth in the elegant discovering 
and conveying to our minds some absurdity of another: and in this case also 
the passion of laughter proceedeth from the sudden imagination of our own 
odds and eminency: for what is else the recommending of our selves to our 
own good opinion, by comparison with another man's infirmity or absurdity? 
For when a jest is broken upon ourselves, or friends of whose dishonour we 
participate, we never laugh thereat. I may therefore conclude, that the 
passion of laughter is nothing else but sudden glory arising from some 
sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison 
with the infirmity of others, or with our own formerly: for men laugh 
at the follies of themselves past, when they come suddenly to remembrance, 
except they bring with them any present dishonour. It is no wonder therefore 
that men take heinously to be laughed at or derided, that is, triumphed over. 
Laughter without offence, must be at absurdities and infirmities abstracted 
from persons, and when all the company may laugh together: for laughing 
to one's-self putteth all the rest into jealousy and examination of themselves. 
Besides, it is vain glory, and an argument of little worth, to think the infirmity 
of another, sufficient matter for his triumph.'115 
3.2 Critique of Hobbes 
The first comment that should be made is that Hobbes's view of laughter is 
exactly what one would expect from someone with his overall view of man. As one 
commentator observes: 
'Laughter is an emotion whose analysis typically reflects the general Hobbesian 
conception of man's nature as a social creature: the ceaseless competition for 
115 Hobbes, Human Nature, in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, Vol4, pp.45-47. 
The emphasis is mine. This part of the passage is particularly important, and will be referred to 
in what follows as 'Hobbes's conclusion'. 
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positions of power, the unrelenting struggle for self-preservation, and the purely 
egoistic nature of man, who continuously strives for superiority over others. nia 
But how accurate a view of laughter is this? Let us consider the Human 
Nature passage in detail. Notice first that Hobbes affirms our suspicion that he is 
not concerned exclusively with laughter at humour. Of the four causes of laughter 
which he mentions here, the first parallels the first cause given in the Leviathan 
passage. Little need be said about this: it is the area in which the Hobbesian 
notion of 'self-glory' is most obviously evident, and there is no doubt that there 
are cases of people reacting to a personal achievement by laughing. But there is 
no reason to suppose that this is always the result of a conscious comparison of 
oneself with, and feeling of superiority to, others. 
Regarding the second cause of laughter Hobbes outlines, the ability he claims 
that oae perceives in oneself when laughing at one's own jests is presumably the 
ability to have thought up the jest. If I repeatedly find myself to be the only 
person who laughs at my jests, Hobbes can explain this: I am the only person who 
derives pleasure from my ability to make them. But while pleasure may indeed 
by derived from a sudden realisation of one's ability as a jest-maker, Hobbes is 
surely wrong to put all, or even the predominant, emphasis here. To do so is to 
overlook the obvious fact that an essential part of the pleasure of making a joke 
(or jest) comes precisely from the enjoyment of what one perceives as being the 
humour content of the joke itself: we can enjoy a joke for its own sake. Hobbes's 
explanation ignores the pleasure obtained from the humour of the joke regardless 
of who told it, and relegates the quality of the joke itself to a secondary status. 
His view is thereby like those theories of aesthetics which put all the emphasis 
on the audience's response to a work of art, completely ignoring the work of art 
itself. For Hobbes, presumably the only reason that one obtains greater pleasure 
from thinking of an excellent, rather than a mediocre, joke, is that one perceives 
in oneself a greater ability in doing the former than in doing the latter. Getting 
greater pleasure from an excellent joke rather than a mediocre one simply because 
the former is better than the latter seems to play no part in Hobbes's explanation, 
and this is wholly unacceptable. 
116 David Heyd, 'The Place of Laughter in Hobbes's Theory of the Emotions', in Journal of the 
History of Ideas, Vol.43-2 (1982), p.286. 
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In this way, Hobbes fails to give an account of the object of amusement. We 
shall discuss this in more detail shortly, in our criticism of Hobbes. For the moment, 
however, we move on to Hobbes's third cause of laughter: that 'men laugh at the 
infirmities of others, by comparison wherewith their own abilities are set off and 
illustrated'. 
There is no shortage of evidence that people are amused by 'the infirmities 
of others'. As late as the eighteenth century, it was common for the wealthy to 
visit lunatic asylums to laugh at and taunt the inmates for fun. A particularly 
intriguing example of laughing at the 'infirmities of others', is in the 'drumming-
contests' of the Greenland Eskimo, described by Johan Huizinga. 117 This is the 
judicial procedure by which the validity or otherwise of a complaint by one member 
of the community against another is decided. To the accompaniment of a drum, the 
two rivals take turns in singing songs attacking the other's character and behaviour. 
According to Huizinga, 
'No distinction is made between well-founded accusations, satirical remarks 
calculated to tickle the audience, and pure slander ... This offensive chanting is 
accompanied throughout by all kinds of physical indignities directed at your 
opponent, such as breathing and snorting into his face, bumping him with 
your forehead, prizing his jaws open, tying him to a tent-pole - all of which 
the 'accused' has to bear with equanimity and a mocking laugh. Most of the 
spectators join in the refrains of the song, applauding and egging the parties 
on ... The sessions of such a contest may extend over a period of years, during 
which the parties think up new songs and new misdeeds to denounce. Finally 
the spectators decide who the winner is. nls 
But we obviously do not have to change either centuries or cultures to find 
plenty of examples of this third of Hobbes's causes of laughter. There is, for 
instance, the malicious laughter of the playground, where for the unfortunate child 
who has a disadvantage such as a speech impediment or a need to wear thick 
spectacles, or who does not fit in for some other reason, the merciless ridicule 
117 Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens: a study of the play element in culture (London: 
Temple Smith, 1970), pp.l06-108. These contests are also briefly mentioned by Morreall, Taking 
Laughter Seriously, p.9. 
118 Huizinga, Homo Ludens, pp.l06-107. 
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which this can bring from other children must seem almost as bad as the physical 
bullying which often accompanies it. Further support for Hobbes comes from the 
fact that in stage comedy, one recalls the fool as the best known of all stock comic 
characters119 , and that the very weedy, the very fat, the ugly old hag, and so on, 
are all comic stereotypes. 
It is pointless treating this third of Hobbes's causes of laughter seperately 
from the fourth: that of 'jests, the wit whereof always consisteth in the elegant 
discovering and conveying to our minds some absurdity of another'. Countless 
jokes involve as their butts a person with some genuine or supposed defect, be it 
physical (as in 'sick' jokes about the blind or deaf, for instance), or mental ('thick 
Irishman' jokes in England, or 'dumb Polack' gags in the United States). 
Racist and sexist humour are two areas which provide support for a superiority 
thesis. Racist and sexist jokes essentially set up an 'us against them' situation, 
and the person to whom the joke is told, provided he is one of 'us', is invited to 
join with 'us' in laughing at 'them'. Such jokes often play upon some perceived 
defect or inferiority which 'they' have (the 'thickness' oflrishmen, or the meanness 
of Scots or Jews, for instance). Alternatively, one may be invited to rejoice in the 
superiority of 'us' over 'them' in terms of power-relations, as in obnoxious jokes 
such as the following: 'How do you stop a Paki from drowning?' 'Take your foot off 
his head. 1120 Racism is often fostered by people feeling threatened by, or resentful 
of, minority communities: for instance, inferior workers who, feeling their own 
job to be on the line, or having lost it already, object to what they perceive as 
'immigrants coming over here taking all our jobs'. To such a person, the vision 
which jokes like the above conjure up can serve as a form of revenge. Such a joke 
sets up a scenario whereby one group is in a position of superiority over another, 
and the listener is invited to celebrate it by laughing. 
This shows a way in which an objection to laughter along the lines of Hobbes's 
could make good sense. The core of the point Hobbes is making in the second and 
third passages quoted from him above, is that one only needs to laugh in order to 
119 For a classic study of the fool, see Enid Welsford, The Fool (London: Faber and Faber, 1935). 
120 I grew up in an area with a high immigrant population, and considerable racism, and remember 
this joke being very popular with many white school-children. 
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bolster one's self-esteem: were one sufficiently convinced of one's genuine superi-
ority, the 'sudden glory' afforded by laughter would be unnecessary. A plausible 
case could indeed be made for the claim that it is essentially insecurity, and a lack 
of self-esteem, that lie at the heart of sexist and racist humour. 
However, we shall not concentrate on these forms of humour in any great detail. 
We have seen that there are areas of humour of which a credible explanation can 
be given in Hobbesian terms. However, we have also seen that there are flaws in 
his theory, and as we turn our attention to further criticisms of Hobbes, further 
flaws will become apparent. 
3.3 Further criticisms of Hobbes 
3.3.1 Francis Hutcheson and parody 
Francis Hutcheson's attack on Hobbes's view of laughter came about a century 
after the latter's comments were made. 121 Focussing upon Hobbes's conclusion, 
Hutcheson raises two objections: 
'If Mr. Hobbes's notion be just, then, first, there can be no laughter on any 
occasion where we make no comparison of ourselves to others, or of our present 
state to a worse state, or where we do not observe some superiority to our-
selves above some other thing: and again, it must follow, that every sudden 
appearance of superiority over another must excite laughter, when we attend 
to it. nzz 
We have already briefly touched upon the first criticism. Hobbes does seem to 
be claiming that comparisons, favourable to ourselves, are made before we laugh. 
Hutcheson offers as a counter-example parody, making the point that one might 
be amused by a parody despite being a great admirer of both the writer parodied 
and the wit of the parodist. This shows, claims Hutcheson, that we can be amused 
without imagining ourselves to be superior. 
121 Francis Hutcheson, 'Reflections upon Laughter' (Glasgow, 1750), reprinted in Morreall (ed.), The 
Philosophy of Laughter and Humor, pp.26-40. 
122 Hutcheson, 'Reflections upon Laughter', p.27. 
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To assess this criticism, let us consider as an example the following parody of 
Oscar Wilde: 
'Lord Sidewinder: Ah, Ronald, I hear you've been sent down. Disgraceful! 
Ronald: Oxford is like the train to Didcot. One is never certain where one will 
alight, due to the state of the track. 
(Enter Celia.) 
(Wearily) Kissing one's sister is rather like looking at Duchamp's Mona Lisa-
one wonders whether the moustache might not be dispensed with. 
(Celia weeps.) 
Hargreaves: Bear up, Miss, remember sisterly affection is like a butler watering 
the port, best kept within reasonable limits. 
(Gong sounds.) 
Lord Sidewinder: Good-oh, grub up. 
(They go in.) 
Hargreaves: When the Last Trump sounds for the Upper Class it will be 
sounded on a gong, as like as not.n23 
What is happening here? The three successive witty comparisons illustrate a 
Wildean stock-in-trade. As generally happens in parody, an idiosyncratic feature 
of a writer's style is highlighted - Wilde's scenes can appear, to the uncharitable 
reader, to consist of wall-to-wall witticisms at times - and the writer is thus made 
to look a little ridiculous. Hutcheson is right that a great admirer of Wilde is 
perfectly capable of being amused by this parody, while admiring the wit of the 
parodist. And he certainly need not feel superior to either Wilde or Dean: it is 
difficult to see in what way the fact that Oscar Wilde has a particular stylistic 
quirk makes our Wilde fan, a person who has never succeeded in writing a play 
in his life, superior to him. It is not, contrary to the Hobbes formula, his 'own 
odds and eminency', in comparison to Wilde, that he is convicted of here. We do 
not make conscious comparisons, favourable to ourselves, between our own writing 
abilities and those of the writer parodied in instances like this. 
But there is a connection here between humour and 'sudden glory'. In parody 
there is at least an element of degradation. Part of the pleasure we take in parody 
123 J.Dean, 'A Play of No Importance', in E.O.Parrott (ed.), Imitations of Immortality (Har-
mondsworth: Penguin, 1986), p.154. 
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often involves perceiving a chink in the armour of the 'great man': from seeing 
a great writer, whom one had thought of as a kind of mortal god, appear more 
human, more like ourselves, through the pointing out of his fallibility or eccentric-
ities. The pleasure taken here is not one of Schadenfreude. It is, however, a much 
weaker variation on the same theme. Having these little foibles and weaknesses 
pointed out, and the gulf between the writer and ourselves narrowed may not make 
us feel superior to him, but we can at least take pleasure in not feeling as inferior 
as we would previously have done, had we compared ourselves to him. So although 
Hutcheson is right that we do not laugh as a result of comparing ourselves with, 
and judging ourselves superior to, the writer parodied, a modified claim appropri-
ate to the superiority tradition can be made: that parody involves an element of 
degradation, and that this may contribute to our amusement thereat. 
3.3.2 Hutcheson's second objection and the object of amusement 
Hutcheson's second objection is analagous to Bain's criticism of the incongruity 
tradition. Like the latter criticism, it is, as it stands, an unfair attack: even if all 
laughter is caused by a feeling of superiority, it does not follow that all feelings of 
superiority must necessarily cause laughter. However, this criticism of Hutcheson's 
draws attention to an important point. He highlights a similar fault in Hobbes to 
that Bain highlights in Schopenhauer: Hobbes offers no explanation as to what it 
is about those instances of superiority which do result in laughter, which makes 
them differ from those which do not have such a result. Why should the response to 
some feelings of sudden glory be laughter, while to others this is not the response? 
This reveals an important deficiency in Hobbes. We saw earlier, when dealing 
with the second cause of laughter mentioned in the Human Nature passage, that 
Hobbes relegates to a secondary status the pleasure derived from a joke itself, and 
we claimed that he was thereby ignoring the object of amusement. The point 
here is a two-fold one. Firstly, whatever feelings of superiority may be involved in 
humour, it is not these feelings themselves which are the object of our amusement. 
And secondly, it is often the object of our amusement, rather than any feeling of 
superiority, which causes laughter. 
We need to illustrate this in more detail. A constant feeling of superiority over 
everyone and everything around you will not leave you helpless with mirth for the 
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rest of your life. Hobbes realises this, and we have seen that he claims we must 
have a sudden realisation of superiority. But this is not enough. Hobbes does 
not stress the fact that this sudden realisation must be sparked off by 
something. After all,· not all instances of feeling superior to one who has been 
degraded necessarily amuse us. We may feel, for instance, morally superior to the 
disgraced politician of whose gross corruption we suddenly learn, but our reaction 
is likely to be one of contempt or disgust, and not amusement. Once we accept 
this, the question arises as to what it is about those instances of feeling superior, 
or derisive, which do amuse us, that make us amused. While amusement may 
indeed involve feelings of derision or superiority, there must be some other factor 
present in that which one finds amusing, other than a sudden feeling of superiority, 
or this would not explain why all instances of sudden superiority do not amuse 
us. And Hobbes pays no heed to this additional factor, or to the role it plays 
in amusing us. We recall the fourth cause of laughter given in Human Nature, 
in which Hobbes talks of laughter at 'jests, the wit whereof always consisteth in 
the elegant discovering and conveying to our minds. some absurdity of another'. 
Hobbes puts all the emphasis upon superiority over the other. However, this is 
to overlook the fact that the actual object of our laughter is the absurdity. And 
this in turn overlooks the fact that in many instances - even if there are indeed 
superior feelings present - the predominant cause of one's amusement is not these 
feelings - the fact that the absurdity is 'of another' - but the absurdity itself. 
Take, as a concrete example, the schoolboy howler given in the previous chapter, 
about Lincoln's being born in the cabin which he built with his own hands. One 
could offer a Hobbesian explanation of what amuses a person about this, by saying 
that this is a mistake which the amused person would not himself have made. But 
such an explanation is inadequate. It is more plausible to say that one is amused 
by the absurdity itself. One can accept the likely Hobbesian response that there is 
a definite sense in which one feels superior to the schoolboy without accepting 
that this is why one is amused. 
The problem with coming to any definite conclusion about what causes amuse-
ment is the vitally important point that two people may be amused by the same 
joke for different reasons. For one, the predominant cause of amusement in the 
Lincoln howler will be the absurdity itself, as suggested, whereas with another, 
who has a strange grudge against schoolboys, what predominates could be the 
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pleasure of the feeling of superiority over schoolboys which the joke engenders. An 
additional problem is that we cannot be sure that a person is capable of isolat-
ing the precise reason or set of reasons why something amuses him: laughter at 
humour is so often a momentary phenomenon, and it is often difficult to analyse 
in retrospect what, exactly, made one laugh. It is perfectly reasonable to claim, 
however, that in laughter at many absurdities, the absurdity itself, without any 
feelings of superiority, is enough to amuse; that Hobbes's theory pays no heed to 
this possibility; and that this renders his account seriously deficient. 
Monro seems to support this position. He asks why, by most adults, bare-faced 
insults are denied the status of wit, but a 'veiled' insult, one masquerading as a 
compliment, is regarded as a witticism. (An example would be 'You're the kind of 
person Rev. Spooner would have called a shining wit'.) Monro's claim is that the 
'whole point [is] that a complimentary form of words has been twisted to convey an 
insult ... The insult no doubt reinforces the joke by appealing to our malice, but the 
distinctively witty thing about it is precisely this twisting, this discrepancy between 
the concept and what is subsumed under it.n24 And, furthermore, no feelings of 
malice need necessarily be involved: it is perfectly possible to be amused at 'put-
downs' such as the above even if they are made against people towards whom one 
feels no particular antagonism. This is possible precisely because it is possible to 
be amused at the wit itself, for its own sake. 
3.3.3 Hobbes's oversight as the opposite of Schopenhauer's 
So the danger of an approach based upon Hobbes's remarks lies in his exclusive 
concentration upon the feelings of the Iaugher at the expense of any consideration 
of the details of the object of amusement itself, other than that it produces these 
feelings. It is worth pausing at this point to remember one of our conclusions about 
the incongruity tradition. We argued that concentrating entirely upon incongruity 
involved putting too much emphasis upon the structure of jokes and the cognitive 
side of humour - on the intrinsic details of the humour analysed - and ignoring such 
factors as the attitude and feelings of the Iaugher. We have now seen that Hobbes 
makes precisely the opposite mistake, which is just as important. In Hobbes, 
the emphasis is solely upon the feelings of superiority of the Iaugher: the fact 
124 Monro, Argument of Laughter, p.152. 
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that some initial stimulus is required to spark off this laughter is ignored, and 
no consideration at all is given towards the nature of this initial stimulus. It is 
important that any theory with ambitions of comprehensiveness should take into 
consideration both aspects of the object of amusement, which Schopenhauer does 
but Hobbes does not, and aspects of the feelings of the Iaugher, which Hobbes 
does but Schopenhauer does not. 
3.4 Superiority as inessential: puns, nonsense and absurdity 
As this last claim makes clear, we are, by making the above criticism of Hobbes, 
in no way denying that a consideration of the the feelings of the Iaugher is impor-
tant. But we will show here that, contrary to the views of Hobbes and his followers, 
these feelings are not always those of superiority. 
This conclusion will seem obvious if we consider the superiority tradition to 
be claiming that all laughter is of an essentially scornful nature, which is how 
numerous critics have read it. However, it is essential to understand that what 
is being claimed by Hobbes's followers is more subtle than this. This will be 
illustrated here by a consideration of two defenders of Hobbes: Alexander Bain and 
Anthony Ludovici. In this section, we will give the claim that humour is dependent 
upon feelings of superiority a run for its money. Three important kinds of humour 
- puns, nonsense and absurdity - will be discussed, and the attempt to bring these 
under the umbrella of a superiority-based explanation considered. After all, if a 
superiority-based theory is to succeed, it must be able to explain kinds of humour 
such as this, which do not, at first glance at least, seem explicable in these terms. 
We will see that although a superiority theory can in fact account for a greater 
variety of humour than at first meets the eye, it is ultimately inadequate - and 
for an interesting reason, closely linked to one of the reasons for the failure of the 
incongruity-based theory of the previous chapter: the need to stretch terminology. 
Pushing a theory as far as it can go and seeing what one would need to say in order 
to explain certain kinds of humour via such a theory is a good way of illustrating 
its deficiencies - as we shall see. 
An important observation should be made at the outset. In insisting on the 
centrality of superiority to humour, the superiority theorist is guilty of an impor-
tant omission. This is to fail to consider the spirit of sheer playfulness which 
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is so often involved in the appreciation of humour. James Sully remarks that 
sometimes we laugh because of an event or entity's 'satisfying something within us 
akin to the child's delight in the gloriously new and extravagent...something of the 
laughing joy of the infant at the sudden invasion of his nursery wall by a dancing 
sunbeam. '125 Something of this spirit remains with us into our adult lives: consider 
the pleasure the adult can still derive from re-reading classic children's stories such 
as Winnie the Pooh, and from such scenes as the one in which Pooh attempts to 
steal honey from a bees' nest at the top of a tree, by disguising himself as a small 
black cloud against a blue sky by covering himself in mud and holding on to a blue 
balloon. One is able to laugh at this to the extent that one has managed to retain a 
degree of this spirit of playfulness. But the importance of such a spirit can explain 
far more than just children's humour. It goes a long way towards explaining the 
adult's enjoyment of those categories under consideration in this section: puns, and 
absurd and nonsense humour. We claimed earlier that we sometimes take pleasure 
in absurdity for its own sake. The same claim can be made about nonsense, puns 
and word-play. Hobbes does not account for this: although in the Human Nature 
passage he observes that 'absurdities', together with 'infirmities abstracted from 
persons', are the cause of 'laughter without offence', he offers no discussion of this 
source of laughter; nor of nonsense or word-play. It is for this reason, then, that 
we look, in the following pages, at amusement at these three types of humour. We 
start by turning our attention to puns. 
3.4.1 Puns 
This sub-section will serve to illustrate two points. Firstly, we will see that 
there is a greater connection between amusement at puns and feelings of superiority 
than may at first meet the eye. However, secondly, we will also see that not all 
puns can adequately be explained in these terms, and that such an explanation is 
an example of the general objection made earlier, of overlooking the importance 
of the role of the object of amusement in causing laughter. 
Before we can proceed, we need to reintroduce the first of our defenders of 
Hobbes. We came across Alexander Bain in the last chapter, as a critic of the no-
tion of laughter as a response to incongruity. Bain belongs firmly in the superiority 
125 James Sully, An Essay on Laughter (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1902), p.140. 
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tradition. He asserts that: 'The occasion of the Ludicrous is the Degradation of 
some person or interest, possessing dignity, in circumstances that excite no other 
strong emotion. 1126 Seeing some person degraded obviously makes us feel superior 
in comparison to him. Bain covers a wider field than Hobbes, since the objects of 
our laughter do not have to be, at least directly, people: 'laughter can be excited 
against classes, parties, systems, opinions, institutions, and even inanimate things 
that by personification have contracted associations of dignity' .127 Bain regards 
Hobbes's definition as inadequate to explain 'Humour, which is counted something 
genial and loving, and as far removed as may be, from self-glorification and proud 
exultation at other men's discomfiture'. 128 But there is a sting to this: 'Not, how-
ever, that there is not even in the most genial humour, an element of degradation, 
but that the indignity is disguised, and, as it were, oiled, by some kindly infusion, 
such as would not consist with the unmitigated glee of triumphant superiority. 1129 
Hobbes's view of laughter, we have seen, is expressed in the dramatic language of 
'sudden glory'. Bain's view explicitly allows for a factor which Hobbes does not 
actually deny, but certainly does not make clear: that the element of superiority 
involved in humour may be 'disguised'; may not be obvious on a first analysis of 
what is funny about a particular piece of humour. 
We should mention that our only interest here is in Bain's views on puns. 
It is not a problem, therefore, that, as is clear from the above, Bain uses the 
word 'humour' in a narrower sense than we have been doing: as a sub-category 
of what we, along with most contemporary humour research, have understood by 
the term. (Bain's general term is clearly 'the ludicrous'.) Since puns are included 
both amongst what we call humour, and amongst what Bain calls 'the ludicrous', 
this terminological difference is of no consequence. 
To face our question: is amusement at puns adequately explicable in terms 
of feelings of superiority? Unlike Hobbes, Bain explicitly mentions puns. In a 
comment on Herbert Spencer's theory of laughter, which we shall consider in the 
next chapter, he criticises Spencer for 'rejecting the fact of Degradation as the 
126 Bain, The Emotions and the Wil~ p.248. 
127 Bain, The Emotions and the Wil~ p.249. 
128 ibid. 
129 ibid. 
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governmg circumstance of the ludicrous. ' 130 To Spencer's claim that there are 
'many good instances in which no one's dignity is implicated, as when we laugh at 
a good pun'13 \ Bain retorts: 'I very much wish he had produced such a pun, as I 
have never yet met one of the sort .. .I quite understand the laugh of pleasure and 
admiration at a felicitous stroke of mere wit; but no one confounds this with the 
genuinely ludicrous. Wit, with all its brilliancy and ingenuity, is sadly wanting in 
unction, if it takes no one down.n32 
There is at least something in this. The pun is often regarded as a fairly 
low form of humour, more likely to elicit groans than laughs, and the compulsive 
punster may find his habit leads to his being regarded as tedious company. But 
if a pun ceases to be 'harmless', and an element of superiority or pleasure in 
the degradation of another enters into an audience's attitude towards the subject 
matter, this greatly increases its chances of a good reception. Let us illustrate this 
point with a concrete example. A joke from Woody Allen's nightclub act illustrates 
the point well. Asked to comment on a newspaper report that his ex-wife had, 
while walking home alone one night, been 'violated', Allen remarked that, knowing 
his ex-wife, it was 'probably not a moving violation'. In the available recording 
of Allen's act133 one detects in the laughter of some of the men in the audience a 
malice which would support Bain's thesis. Maybe they identify with Allen, as a 
result of their own sexual experience, or perhaps they perceive it more generally 
as a male joke against women. What is certainly true is that an important part 
of the pleasure of the joke is at the expense of, and in Bain's terminology involves 
the degradation of, Allen's ex-wife. 134 
However, Bain is wrong to take someone's being 'taken down', or 'degraded', 
as being the only factor that can make a successful pun. The pleasure taken in an 
absurd image can be enough: we are again forced to point out that an absurdity 
can be amusing for its own sake. This point too is best illustrated by a concrete 
example. In an episode of The Goon Show, Eccles comes upon Seagoon sitting 
130 Bain, The Emotions and the Wil~ p.253. 
131 Spencer, quoted in Bain, The Emotions and the Will, p.253. 
132 ibid. 
133 Woody Allen: Standup Comic (Casablanca Record and Filmworks, Inc., 1979). 
134 She certainly perceived it that way herself: she filed a lawsuit against hinl. 
64 
inside a piano. On being asked why he is there, Seagoon says 'I'm hidin'.' Eccles 
replies: 'But Haydn's been dead for years!' Can this be explained in terms of 
degradation? Who or what is degraded here; to whom are we supposed to feel 
superior? It is true that a name can be mistaken for a thing named, so that for 
the schoolboy who makes fun of a teacher with an unusual surname, ridiculing 
the name is seen as ridiculing the teacher himself. It is also true that the Haydn 
joke may conjure up a mental image of a 'great composer' sitting inside his piano. 
But this 'degradation', if sue~ it be, is not the reason why this pun is funny. The 
humour resides rather in the pleasure taken in the absurd image itself, together 
with the additional absurdity that if the mistake was a genuine one; if Eccles really 
did think Seagoon was Haydn, this would still do nothing to explain why he was 
sitting inside a piano, rather than on its stool. 
This example illustrates how Bain is guilty of the same fault as Hobbes: over-
looking the fact that the object of amusement itself, regardless of feelings of superi-
ority, can cause amusement and laughter. We see here the emergence of a problem 
similar to one that we found with the incongruity tradition; the fact that, even if 
an incongruity can be traced in a particular item of humour, this does not prove 
that this is necessarily what makes it funny. Similarly, the fact that 'degradation' 
is involved in a joke does not prove that this is what makes that joke funny. 
Just as a pun can be amusing because of the absurd image it conjures up, so 
a writer's playing with words for its own sake can be enough to amuse. Many of 
the Monty Python sketches written by Eric Idle illustrate this point. They include 
an interview, on a chat-show called 'Blood, Devastation, Death, War and Horror', 
with a 'Man Who Talks Entirely in Anagrams'. He is currently working on an 
anagram version of Shakespeare ('Have you done Hamlet?' 'Thalme. "Be ot or 
bot ne ot, taht is the nestquie" .'135 ). When the titles come up on this episode, the 
show is not called Monty Python's Flying Circus, but Tony M. Nyphot's Flying 
Risccu. A further example of word-play for its own sake is the following from 
P.G.Wodehouse, which shows how the unexpected appearance of an unusual word 
can be used for comic effect: 
135 Graham Chapman, John Cleese, Terry Gilliam, Eric Idle, Terry Jones and Michael Palin, Monty 
Python's Flying Circus: Just the Words, Vol.2 (London: Guild Publishing, 1989), p.91. 
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'He spoke with a kind of what-is-it in his voice, and I could see that, if not 
actually disgruntled, he was far from being gruntled. '136 
So we have not shown any necessary link between amusement at puns or word-
play and feelings of superiority. Let us see if our second disciple of Hobbes can 
fare any better in offering a superiority-based explanation of puns. Anthony M. 
Ludovici137 offers puns as one of his thirty-six examples of what makes us laugh, 
all of which he attempts to explain by a version of Hobbes's theory. A brief ex-
position of Ludovici's overall position is necessary in order to understand both his 
comments on puns, and those on nonsense and absurdity, which we shall look at 
later. For Ludovici, Hobbes's comments are 'completely satisfactory and there-
fore comprehensivell38 • Hobbes's is an 'exhaustive definitionn39 of laughter; the 
problem is merely that it is not 'a perfect verbal statement'140 of that exhaus-
tive definition. Ludovici borrows from one G.T.Wrench a phrase which he thinks 
better than Hobbes's, namely that 'laughter is the expression of superior adap-
tation'.141 Ludovici illustrates the use he intends to make of this term with a 
couple of examples from fables, one of which comes from La Fontaine's The Fox 
and the Stork. Here the stork is invited to dine with the fox, only to find that 
dinner is served on flat platters, from which the stork, encumbered by his long 
beak, is unable to eat. Here, clearly, the fox is in a position of superior adaptation 
to the stork. However, the bird gets his revenge, himself attaining a position of 
superior adaptation to the fox, by reciprocating the latter's invitation, and serving 
the food in long thin vases, from which his former host cannot eat. 'A man who 
has only one glove in a company of people all of whom have their complement of 
gloves, a man who is left on the pavement in the rain to wait for the next omnibus 
while those in front of him fill the one that has just driven up, and a man who 
loses his hat in the wind while those about him do not - each of these men is in 
136 P.G.Wodehouse, The Code of the Woosters, quoted in G.F.Lamb (ed.), Harrap 's Book 
of Humorous Quotations (London: Harrap Books, 1990), p.333. 
137 Anthony M. Ludovici, The Secret of Laughter (London: Constable and Co., 1932). 
138 Ludovici, The Secret of Laughter, p.47. 
139 Ludovici, The Secret of Laughter, p.49. 
140 ibid. 
141 Ludovici, The Secret of Laughter, p.62; my emphasis. According to Ludovici's footnote, 
Wrench uses this phrase in the discussion of laughter to be found in his Grammar of Life 
(London: Heinemann, 1908), pp.67-8. Apparently Wrench does not himself think all laughter is of 
this sort - unlike Ludovici. 
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a position of inferior adaptation, while those about him, or in front of him in the 
case of the omnibus, enjoy superior adaptation in the sense given to the term in 
this book. n42 
'Superior adaptation', for Ludovici, is the essence of all laughter. So how does 
it explain the pleasure derived from puns? Ludovici gives three explanations. The 
first, attributed to Bergson, is that 'the repetition of similar sounding words in one 
sentence is ... sometimes unintentional and a sign of absent-mindedness (that is to 
say, inferior adaptation). '143 
The second and third explanations, Ludovici claims, owe to Bain: 'In the 
grasping of a pun there is self-glory (superior adaptation) at having noticed the 
play on the words, and there is triumph (superior adaptation) over the degradation 
of a nobler word. n44 
Let us deal with each of these explanations in turn. The first clearly will not 
do. What of the intentional pun? This exhibits not absent-mindedness but, in 
the good punster, precisely the opposite: a lively, fully alert mind, spotting new 
meanings and twisting phrases. 
A problem with the second explanation is that Ludovici does not make it 
clear whether this is supposed to apply to amusement at puns made by oneself 
or by others.145 Yet this is a vitally important distinction. Ludovici's case is at 
its strongest if he is taken to be referring to one's own ability to pun. I may 
indeed experience a kind of 'self-glory' at my ability to create plays-upon-words, 
seeing this as a manifestation of my command of language. However, we are again 
faced with the same problem we faced earlier in relation to Hobbes: the failure 
to distinguish between the cause and the object of laughter. What we accused 
Hobbes of doing in general, Ludovici is doing here in the case of puns: relegating 
the pleasure derived from the pun itself to a secondary status. 
142 Ludovici, The Secret of Laughter, p.l8. 
143 Ludovici, The Secret of Laughter, p.78. 
144 ibid. 
145 Furthermore, there is in fact no such claim made by Bain in the article to which the reader is 
referred in Ludovici's footnote. 
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To turn to puns made by others. In the majority of such cases, there is no 
reason to assume that there is any great difficulty involved in merely noticing 
their plays-on-words, and so one cannot see why a feeling of self-glory would thus 
arise. There are exceptions to this, however, where Ludovici's case is more plau-
sible. There are puns the understanding of which requires a particular piece of 
knowledge, such as awareness of an allusion which one understands, but recognises 
that many people would not. For instance, take the reference, in Finnegan's Wake, 
to 'we grisly old Sykos who have done our unsmiling bit on 'alices, when they were 
yung and easily freudened' 146 . Here, a certain 'self-glory' may arise in the educated 
person: unlike the man in the street, he understands this as a pun on psychoanal-
ysis, and on Freud and Jung as probably the two most important figures therein. 
But Ludovici faces a problem even in cases such as this. In puns of this sort, where 
the pleasure comes from 'self-glory' in the above sense rather than from someone's 
degradation, there are 'still going to be good and bad puns. And what makes the 
difference between a good pun of this sort, and a merely tiresome one? A vitally 
important factor is the cleverness or ingenuity of the pun. So the problem which 
faces Ludovici in the case of sophisticated puns made by someone else is this. Even 
granted the possibility of a feeling of superior adaptation over those one could think 
of who would be unable to understand the pun, why do we not have to take into 
consideration one's relation to the punster? We are, on the Hobbesian view of 
man which Ludovici seems to share, constantly comparing ourselves with others. 
And in comparison to the punster, one's position is one of inferior adaptation. It 
is he, after all, who thought up the clever pun, so he is superiorly adapted to the 
hearer in this regard, and certainly cannot be counted amongst those to whom the 
hearer is in a position of superior adaptation due to their lesser understanding or 
sophistication. If one's self-esteem depends upon a constant comparison with, and 
the resultant finding oneself superior to, others, surely there are circumstances in 
which whatever superior adaptation one possesses is outweighed by one's inferior 
adaptation to the person who not only also understands the pun, but also had the 
wit to think it up in the first place. 
Elsewhere, Ludovici talks about sharing the superior adaptation of others: 'We 
show teeth at a good ruse, a good trick, a good case of diamond cut diamond, and 
146 James Joyce, Finnegan's Wake (London: Faber, 1939), p.ll5. 
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also at a witticism, because we sympathise, or side with the stronger party - the 
witty or resourceful speaker or trickster- and share his superior adaptationn;7 ~ut 
explaining puns in terms of sharing the superior adaptation of the punste~'wilr' not 
do. It is still not clear, from a theorist who declares himself a follower of Hobbes, 
why we should share this superior adaptation; why the cleverness of the wit or 
the punster does not lead to a feeling of inferior adaptation in comparison to him. 
So to Ludovici's third explanation, that the pleasure derived from a pun in-
volves triumph over 'the degradation of a nobler word'. Ludovici does not make 
clear exactly what he means by this phrase. Taken at face value, it seems a very 
odd claim. Why should we take pleasure in the degradation of a mere word? Max 
Eastman voices these sentiments: 'I am, like Mr Ludovici and others, quite hard-up 
for self-esteem, but I am not so hard-up that I can get a kick out of my superiority 
to a misused word, and I think few sane people aren48 • 
But more can be made of Ludovici's claim than this, if we interpret him as 
referring not to the degradation of words themselves, but of the person or subject 
to which they refer. This obviously includes 'taking someone down', along the lines 
already suggested by Bain. However, it also allows for puns in which, although 
no individual is taken down, the subject matter is 'degraded'; through a 'noble' 
topic, such as religion, or an intellectually respected one, being either trivialised 
or brought down to the level of the everyday. Secondly, there is the very common 
kind of double entendre in which, although the pivotal word does not itself have 
connotations of nobility, its second meaning nevertheless causes what might be 
regarded as a certain 'lowering of the tone'. One example of such a pun - either 
wholly unintentional or an ingenious attention-grabbing ploy- was of the Yorkshire 
carpet warehouse which proudly advertised the 'Cheapest Shag in Leedsn49 • 
So it is possible to read Ludovici in such a way as to make his claim appear 
more reasonable than Eastman allows, and thereby to go some way towards of-
fering a superiority-based explanation of amusement at puns. But neither Bain 
nor Ludovici offers a fully satisfactory account. It still remains true that there are 
147 Ludovici, The Secret of Laughter, p.83. 
148 Max Eastman, Enjoyment of Laughter (London: Han1ish Han1ilton, 1937), p.147. 
149 An advert from the Leeds Evening Post, included in The Thrid Book of Boobs from 
Private Eye (London: Private Eye Productions and Andre Deutsch, 1985). 
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puns which are not adequately explicable in terms of superiority or degradation, 
and which owe their humour to other factors, such as those already mentioned: 
the enjoyment of an absurdity for its own sake, or of word-play for its own sake. 
3.4.2 Nonsense and absurdity 
We should now turn our attention to the two further types of humour we 
identified as potential problem areas for the superiority theorist. Consider first 
nonsense verse. Is it possible to explain such examples as our earlier illustration of 
Lewis Carroll's Jabberwocky, or the poems of Edward Lear, in terms of superiority 
or degradation? It could be argued that the poetic art is being degraded by using 
it to express, in the case of the most famous lines of Jabberwocky, what is mean-
ingless. But this explanation is inadequate. As one critic has observed: 'Nonsense 
poetry, at its best, at its least contaminated, leaves parody, leaves satire, leaves the 
literature against which it is set, for its own freedom'. 150 In fact, one might even 
claim that a person's admiration for poetry could be enhanced by Jabberwocky, 
in so far as there is a certain beauty to the way in which nonsense is expressed. 
Furthermore, those who hate poetry will not be the greatest appreciators of non-
sense verse. Rather, just as parodies of a particular author will be best appreciated 
by those who know and admire the author's work, so nonsense verse will be best 
appreciated and admired by those having a knowledge and appreciation of poetry. 
The pleasure taken in nonsense verse is not an enjoyment of the degradation of, 
but rather an enjoyable momentary relief from the seriousness of, poetry. As such 
it also involves as an important element 'an inconsequent, sophisticated and good 
humoured playingn 51 : the theme of playfulness has emerged again. 
We move on to absurd humour. We have already mentioned laughter at absur-
dities in section 3.3.2., observing that an absurdity itself can be enough to amuse, 
without any feelings of superiority. In much humour of this variety, it is difficult to 
see where feelings of superiority enter the picture at all. Take the absurd scenario 
presented in a chariot-race scene from the Buster Keaton movie The Three Ages. 
When one of the dogs pulling his chariot collapses, Keaton solves the problem by 
150 Geoffrey Grigson, in the introduction to his collection The Faber Book of Nonsense Verse 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1979), p.13. 
151 Grigson, The Faber Book of Nonsense Verse, p.13. 
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getting a spare dog out of the boot. Where is the element of superiority here? It 
is precisely the absurdity of the scenario that is amusing. Likewise, amusement at 
sheer absurdity for its own sake will be a familiar experience for any fan of Monty 
Python type humour. 
3.4.3 Ludovici's explanation of nonsense, absurdity and incongruity 
Despite this point, Ludovici attempts to offer a superiority-based explanation 
of nonsense and absurdity. We will see that his explanation is inadequate - but that 
it fails for an interesting reason. In attempting to account for this kind of humour, 
Ludovici is forced to show himself to be less of a Hobbesian than we saw him 
claim to be earlier. By focussing on the question of exactly what role superiority 
can be said to play in Ludovici's explanation, we shall see that the key fault with 
this explanation is essentially the sa]Jle as one of the important reservations we 
expressed against the incongruity tradition: the stretching of terminology. 
Ludovici attempts ,to explain amusement at nonsense, absurdity and incon-
gruity in terms of 'superior adaptation'. When setting out his examples of what 
makes us laugh, each of the above warrants a mention as one of his thirty-six causes 
of laughter. We are told that we laugh at 'a mere absurdity, as, for instance, when 
we are told that two lions, kept in adjoining cages, broke through the partition 
separating them, and in their fury mauled each other until only the tips of their 
tails were left.'152 But this same example, borrowed from Schopenhauer, is also 
given under the heading of incongruity.153 We are also told that 'we laugh at a 
good nonsense picture by Lear or Batemanns4 • But nonsense, too, is included 
under the heading of 'mere absurdity' in Ludovici's explanation of laughter at the 
latter. So nonsense, absurdity and incongruity are all closely linked. 
How is such laughter to be explained? We laugh at absurdity, Ludovici tells 
us, because of our 'liberation from the customary constraints, or rigid laws of 
reason and logic ... All nonsense comes under this head, and leads to the order 
of laughter which Hobbes, in his explanation, says arises from "absurdities" and 
152 Ludovici, The Secret of Laughter, p.20, example k. 
153 Ludovici, The Secret of Laughter, p.23, example x. 
154 ibid., example y. 
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"infirmities abstracted from persons.". '155 An almost identical explanation is given 
for incongruity, at which we laugh 'because it is the characteristic of a mad world, 
freed from the mental and physical bondage of logic, reason and scientific method; 
and, in such a world, even if only imagined, we taste once more of the euphoria 
of irrational infancy or merely the joys of emancipation from reason 1156 . Similarly, 
our enjoyment of the nonsense picture is that such a picture 'is possible only in 
a world that has abolished the constraints of reason. '157 Essentially the same 
explanation, then, will cover nonsense, absurdity and incongruity (the last two, it 
seems, meaning the same thing for Ludovici.) 
We have discussed, in the previous chapter, the idea of humour's involving a 
holiday from the constraints of reason and logic, and need say no more about this 
here. The key point to all this, as far as the present discussion is concerned, is 
that if we do momentarily escape from reason and logic, this puts us in a position 
of superior adaptation. 
The problem is this: what is the status of 'superior' in 'superior adaptation' 
here? Ludovici claims that superior adaptation is merely Hobbes's definition under 
a 'new wording' 158 • But in fact he is using the term to cover a much wider range of 
sensations than Hobbesian 'sudden glory'. This is evident if we consider Hobbes's 
conclusion: 'the passion of laughter is nothing else but sudden glory arising from 
some sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the 
infirmity of others, or with our own formerly'. If the 'eminency' we conceive in 
ourselves is merely that of being able to enjoy, say, the absurdity about the lions 
mauling each other until only the tips of their tails were left, whereas someone 
else might not; or of comparing our current selves, momentarily released from 
the constraints of reason and logic, with the selves that we were before hearing 
this joke, then Hobbes is making a much weaker claim than most writers have 
interpreted him as making. Hobbes's view of human nature suggests that he is 
talking about some eminency conducive to superiority in a much more explicit sense 
than that engendered by the understanding of a particular joke. Fairly conclusive 
155 Ludovici, The Secret of Laughter, p.77, my italics. 
156 Ludovici, The Secret of Laughter, p.Bl. 
157 ibid. 
158 Ludovici, The Secret of Laughter, p.88. 
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contextual support for this claim comes from the fact that immediately after his 
conclusion he goes on to add his remark about laughter 'without offence' being 
at 'absurdities', showing that laughter thereat is not included in what has been 
discussed immediately beforehand. 
Indeed, Ludovici is forced to admit himself that he is no longer an orthodox 
Hobbesian, in dispensing with this conscious element of comparison and allowing 
that in 'laughter over mere surprises, incongruities or absurdities ... no conscious 
superiority enters into the matter at alln59 . 
Having established this, we are faced with the question: if Ludovici intends 
'superior adaptation' not in the sense of Hobbesian 'sudden glory' but in the much 
weaker sense outlined above, is superior adaptation enlightening as an explanation 
of laughter? Ludovici's other examples of superior adaptation show further the 
wide use he makes of this term. Some of these examples show that he considers 
any feeling of pleasure worthy of the term. A child being chased who reaches the 
safety of his mother is said to laugh because he finds superior adaptation160 , and 
in discussing why laughing gas has the effects it does, Ludovici is quite happy to 
report that many of those who have breathed it speak of a quite strongly pleasant 
sensation, and 'pleasure has from the beginning of time been rooted in feelings of 
superior adaptation'161 . 
By using his superior adaptation formula over so wide a range as he does, 
Ludovici is able to account for considerably more than Hobbes. But there is the 
major problem that in stretching his term to cover as much as he does, 'superior 
adaptation' does not remain very enlightening as an explanation of laughter. In 
using the same term to cover experiences so diverse as both amusement at jokes, 
puns and howlers, and the physical pleasure of inhaling nitrous oxide, Ludovici 
has not succeeded in explaining these experiences by anything other than what 
Monro calls 'an ambiguous verbal formula'. 162 The reservations we expressed in 
the previous chapter concerning the range over which the term 'incongruity' was 
159 Ludovici, The Secret of Laughter, p.63. 
160 Ludovici, The Secret of Laughter, p.74. 
161 Ludovici, The Secret of Laughter, pp.76-77. 
162 Monro, Argument of Laughter, p.106. 
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used apply all the more strongly to the vast range of diverse experiences Ludovici 
is attempting to subsume under this 'ambiguous verbal formula'. 
The above is the most important objection to Ludovici. However, one fur-
ther point should be made. This is that once Ludovici has admitted that we do 
not always consciously compare ourselves with others, he is compelled to main-
tain laughter in such circumstances as being an instinctive or unconscious sign of 
superior adaptation. For instance, he discusses the laughter of embarrassment of 
a person in a situation of inferior adaptation, the example he gives being a man 
whose hat is blown off and who is forced to grope around for it on the ground. 
The crowd of onlookers laugh, due to their position of superior adaptation. The 
victim laughs, too, because: 'knowing instinctively that it is the signal of superior 
adaptation, he tries out of vanity to bluff you into thinking his adaptation is still 
superior, and thus dampen your own feelings of superior adaptation and quell your 
laughter. It is all quite unconscious, both in him and in the crowd'. 163 
It seems impossible to refute a theorist who simply claims that something is 
unconsciously known. But it is surely reasonable to ask what justifies Ludovici in 
talking about it being known, unconsciously and instinctively, that laughter is the 
sign of superior adaptation. In order to defend his position that all laughter can 
be explained in term of superior adaptation, he has shown that he needs to resort 
to assuming as instinctively knowable a view which he has been trying to get us 
to accept as an informative theory. 
What can we conclude as a result of our consideration of puns, nonsense and 
absurdity? This consideration has necessarily been a lengthy one, in order that we 
see exactly how well these areas can or cannot be explained in terms of superiority. 
We have seen that superiority-based explanations are possible, but not satisfactory. 
Not all puns can adequately be explained in this way, and to offer superiority-
based explanations of nonsense and absurdity involves an unacceptable stretching 
of terminology. It is perfectly possible to enjoy a piece of humour for its own sake, 
and an explanation of our three categories would benefit from bearing in mind the 
importance of a spirit of playfulness - a point the superiority tradition tends to 
overlook. 
163 Ludovici, The Secret of Laughter, p.76. 
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3.5 Laughing at oneself 
We now consider a final objection to superiority-based theories: the phe-
nomenon of laughing at oneself. We will consider three superiority-based expla-
nations of this phenomenon. Ludovici explains such laughter in terms of feigning 
superior adaptation; we can attribute to Hobbes an explanation in terms of laugh-
ing at a former self to whom we are now superior; and Albert Rapp offers the 
view that the person at whom we laugh is a different self to the one that does the 
laughing. None of these attempted solutions, we shall see, is satisfactory. 
We turn to Ludovici first. If we laugh at jokes at our own expense, he claims, 
it is: 
'only out of vanity, to convince the joker that we are still superiorly adapted, 
or else that we are good fellows, or "good sports", or whatever the jargon of 
the day may be for the gregarious hero. If we are not vain, we either do not 
show teeth at a joke against ourselves, or else we show them out of courtesy, 
to encourage the joker.n64 
This bluff is most important when the 'joke' is a taunt. Here Ludovici explicitly 
demonstrates a Hobbesian view of human nature: 'Shakespeare said: "They laugh 
that win." Yes, but they also laugh that lose, if they who lose are anxious to 
despoil the victor of one of the most precious fruits of his victory - the evidence 
of inferior adaptation in the vanquished. '165 In laughing at himself, then, a person 
in a position of inferior adaptation unconsciously exhibits to the outside world the 
sign of superior adaptation. 
Apart from our doubts about the range of experiences Ludovici is attempting 
to subsume under the heading of 'superior adaptation', and that one cannot refute 
what is asserted as being unconscious knowledge, a further objection applies to 
Ludovici here. It applies also to Hobbes, though, and so before outlining it, we 
shall first consider Hobbes's view. 
Hobbes places definite limitations on our ability to laugh at ourselves. The 
claim made in the sentence prior to his conclusion, that we never laugh at jokes of 
164 Ludovici, The Secret of Laughter, pp.B0-81. 
165 Ludovici, The Secret of Laughter, p.85. 
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which we are the butt, is modified in the very next sentence, where he is prepared 
to allow that we do sometimes laugh at the follies of our former selves 'except 
they bring with them any present dishonour.' Couple this with the claim in the 
conclusion that in laughing at ourselves we must be conscious of some eminency 
of our current self over this former self, and it is clear that for Hobbes, we must, 
in laughing, have transcended the self at which we laugh in the respect in which 
we find it laughable: we must have become superior to it. (Similar sentiments are 
expressed by a later theorist, Harold W. Watts: that a recognition of ourselves is 
comic only if 'it is ourselves as we were some years since, not as we now are1166 .) 
The problem with both Hobbes's and Ludovici's explanations is that they 
both exclude the possibility of finding something about one's current self genuinely 
amusing. But it is surely possible so to do. For instance, consider this. A former 
acquaintance of mine, a Mathematics postgraduate, was highly intelligent, but 
very absent-minded, and tended to spend a fair proportion of the year in a dream-
world. One Christmas, back home from university for the holidays, he wandered 
into the kitchen, where his mother was about to start drying-up, only to find that 
the only available tea-towel was dirty. 'Go up to the airing-cupboard, please Steve, 
and see if there there are any clean tea-towels', she asked. Disappearing upstairs, 
Steve returned a couple of minutes later, empty-handed, and reported: 'Yes, there 
are.' It had genuinely not occurred to him that the reason for his mother's enquiry 
was that she wanted him to fetch a clean tea-towel if he found one. When his 
highly amused mother pointed this out to him, Steve too was able to see the 
absurdity of the situation, and also found it funny. Whatever is funny here - the 
incongruity of someone of very considerable academic intelligence not possessing 
the common sense to interpret the most simple of requests, perhaps - there is no 
need to doubt Steve's sincerity in claiming to have found this genuinely amusing. 
And yet he, and he alone, is the butt of the joke here. In Steve's laughing there 
and then, it cannot be claimed, along Hobbesian lines, that it is a former self at 
whom he is laughing, as, say, we might laugh when recalling an error we made as 
children. Here, no change in Steve's character has taken place which would guard 
him against making a similar mistake in the future. 
166 Harold W. Watts, from 'The Sense of Regain: A Theory of Comedy', in University of Kansas 
City Review, 1940; reprinted in Paul Lauter (ed.), Theories of Comedy (New York: Dou-
bleday, 1964), pp.448-449. 
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A modified claim, made by Albert Rapp, concerns not the difference between 
a present and a past self, but rather claims that the person we laugh at, and to 
whom we feel superior, is a view of ourselves as someone other than the person 
who laughs. Rapp maintains: 'What happens, in effect, is: a person learns to 
regard himself as though he were someone else ... He then proceeds to smile amiably 
and objectively at the antics and predicaments which accrue to his alter ego.n61 
Morreall disagrees with this. In numerous places168 , he describes getting up and 
making one's breakfast before being fully awake, and pouring coffee all over one's 
cornflakes by mistake. In instances like this, he claims, we often laugh all the more 
heartily because it is indeed 'our very selves - the ones who are laughing - who 
made the blunder.n69 
Morreall is right to say that we do not consciously dissociate our laughing 
selves from the self at which we laugh. This applies to Steve's laughter at himself 
just as well as to that of Morreall's groggy breakfast-maker. What we do do in 
such circumstances is cultivate a certain distance from ourselves: we step back 
and view ourselves from outside, thereby attaining a more objective view of our 
situation. (This important idea will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six.) 
But this does not mean that in so doing we are in any way denying that the person 
that we step back and look and laugh at is ourselves. 
3.6 A pro-superiority point: being laughed at 
Before concluding, a similar observation should be made here as was made 
in the previous chapter: we should not let the numerous important objections to 
the idea of basing a theory on superiority obscure the positive qualities of this 
theoretical tradition. We have denied that superiority is a necessary ingredient in 
humour, but it is certainly true that it is sometimes a factor. We have already 
mentioned some of the kinds of humour which a superiority-based theory can well 
explain. In addition, those who would deny that superiority is involved in humour 
must find an alternative explanation to the highly important question of why we 
dislike being laughed at. Is it not offensive to us because, unless we are voluntarily 
167 Albert Rapp, The Origins of Wit and Humor (New York: E.P.Dutton, 1951), p.67. 
168 See, for instance, Taking Laughter Seriously, p.13. 
169 Morreall, Taking Laughter Seriously, p.12. 
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'playing the fool', we are laughed at because we have shown ourselves to be, or 
are being treated as if we were, inferior in some sense? One can obviously feel 
inferior for reasons other than being the victim of a derisive, malicious 'laughter 
of the playground'. The parent who laughs lovingly at his child's errors in getting 
to grips with language, such as referring to 'par carks' or 'chish and fips', may be 
surprised to see the child burst into tears on being laughed at, though no malice at 
all was intended. This is explicable in terms of the child's associating being laughed 
at with being in a position of inferiority, and indeed, the adult is superior in that 
he has a superior command of language, and has already mastered the simple 
vocabulary with which the child is still struggling. Hobbes's emphasis is surely 
wrong in examples such as this: the adult's laughter is not explicable in terms of 
his 'sudden glory' over the child, nor in that the adult recognises and glories in 
superiority over a former, childish, self. But this should not obscure the fact that 
a feeling of inferiority of the object of laughter in comparison to the laugher is 
present even in examples as devoid of derision or intentional degradation as this. 
3. 7 A new interpretation of 'superiority': the 'god's eye view' 
One more aspect of the connection between humour and superiority is worth 
briefly mentioning. In his entry on humour in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
Monro brings a new twist to the notion of superiority, in his comment that 'in 
humor at its best we are conscious of surveying the whole human scene from some 
godlike level at which all men look pretty much alike: all weak, all lovable, all 
transparently obvious in their petty pretences'170 • Monro is making an important 
point. There is such a thing as what might be called the 'humour of recognition', 
in which one is reminded of what it is to possess the weaknesses and foibles of a 
human being. This is, of course, a very long way from superiority in the sense 
of Hobbesian 'sudden glory'; the constant comparison of oneself with others, and 
the glorying in the fact that one does not share the slightest fault one notices in 
another. But this 'gods-eye view' sheds light upon one of the great rewards which 
humour can offer: the ability to stand back and for a moment transcend the world 
through laughter. This idea has certain parallels with the Nietzschean view of 
laughter which we will discuss in Chapter Six. 
170 Monro, in Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, p.91. 
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3.8 Summary and conclusion 
The tradition relating humour to superiority is an important one. Important 
areas of humour can be well explained in this way: much humour has a 'victim' and 
involves, in one way or another, laughing at 'the infirmities of others'. However, 
just as the incongruity tradition puts all the emphasis upon the structure of items 
of humour at the expense of the feelings or attitude of the laugher, so Hobbes 
makes the opposite mistake: he considers only the feelings of the laugher, largely 
ignoring both the fact that there must be something to spark off this laughter, 
and the qualities of the joke itself. Also, though a consideration of the feelings 
and attitude of the laugher is important, these feelings and that attitude are by no 
means always those of superiority or derision. An attitude of childlike playfulness 
is vitally important to the enjoyment of much humour. It is true that areas of 
humour, such as puns, nonsense and absurdity, which are not clearly explicable 
in terms of superiority, have been explained by superiority theorists in these terms. 
But these explanations are unsatisfactory. It is perfectly possible to be amused 
at something for its own sake, without feelings of superiority. Amusement at 
many puns cannot adequately be explained in terms of superiority, and it is more 
plausible to explain most nonsense and absurdity as being enjoyable for its own 
sake, the pleasure taken therein being more akin to that of play. Superiority-based 
explanations of these kinds of humour involve stretching the notion of 'superiority' 
so far that it becomes almost meaningless, in the same way as we saw, in the 
previous chapter, the term 'incongruity' being stretched. Finally, the superiority 
tradition cannot explain an important aspect of laughing at oneself: one's ability 
to be genuinely amused at one's own current weaknesses. 
Having dealt with incongruity and superiority, then, we next need to consider 
the third and final main humour-theoretical tradition: that which relates humour, 
laughter and release. 
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Chapter IV 
The release tradition 
We concentrate on two theorists in this third main tradition: Herbert Spencer 
and Sigmund Freud 171 • We consider Spencer because he seems to have been the 
first to offer a theory along these lines, and Freud because his version is far more 
complex and elaborately worked out. Keith-Spiegel remarks that 'Freud could 
be characterized as the most eminent of the release theorists1172 • In fact, Freud's 
theory is one of the most commonly discussed of all contributions to the theory of 
humour, the book in which it is presented being one of the 'classics' of our field of 
enqUiry. 
This chapter will give an exposition and critique of the key aspects of these 
two release-based theories: first Spencer, and then Freud. Both the deficiencies of 
each theory, and what is of value in this theoretical tradition, will be pointed out. 
4.1 Herbert Spencer and nervous energy 
Spencer's main concern is with the physiology of laughter173 . His theory is 
massively influenced by the nineteenth-century view of nervous energy, whereby 
this is stored up in the body, and must somehow find release by physical means: 
'laughter is a form of muscular excitement, and so illustrates the general law that 
feeling passing a certain pitch habitually vents itself in bodily action'. 174 For 
171 Two reviews of theories in this tradition, which mention more theorists than our two, but in 
very little detail, are Patricia Keith-Spiegel, 'Early Conceptions of Humor', pp.I0-13, and Victor 
Raskin, Semantic Mechanisms of Humor, pp.38-40. In Chapter Four of Taking Laugh-
ter Seriously, Morreall devotes more time and more careful attention to this tradition than to 
the superiority and incongruity traditions, his discussions of which are comparitively superficial. 
Morreall's discussion of what he calls 'the relief theory' has been a considerable influence on the 
present chapter. 
172 Keith-Spiegel, 'Early Conceptions of Humor', p.13. 
173 Herbert Spencer, 'On the Physiology of Laughter'' published in Macmillan's Magazine (Mar, 
1860) and also in Herbert Spencer, Essays on Education and Kindred Subjects (London: 
Dent, 1911), pp.298-309. This essay is reproduced in Morreall's collection, The Philosophy of 
Laughter and Humor, pp.99-110, and page numbers given here refer to that book. 
174 Spencer, 'Physiology of Laughter', p.104. 
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Spencer, 'strong feeling of almost any kindm5 can produce laughter. However, he 
recognises incongruity as 'the usual replyn76 to questions about the explanation of 
laughter, and attempts to explain 'the laughter which follows certain perceptions 
of incongruity'177 • He dismisses as inadequate the claim that 'laughter is a result 
of the pleasure we take in escaping from the restraint of grave feelings' 178 • Often, 
laughter results when there exist no such feelings from which we want to escape: 
'no explanation is thus afforded of the mirth which ensues when the short silence 
between the andante and allegro in one of Beethoven's symphonies is broken by a 
loud sneeze. In this, and a host of like cases, the mental tension is not coerced but 
spontaneous, not disagreeable but agreeable; and the coming impressions to which 
attention is directed, promise a gratification which few, if any, desire to escape.m9 
So how may such laughter situations be explained? To get an answer, we need 
only to consider 'the quantity of feeling which exists under such circumstances, and 
then to ask what are the conditions determining the direction of its dischargenso. 
This is explained by means of an illustration of one particular case. A theatre 
audience is watching a play in which a climax has been reached: the long-awaited 
reconciliation of hero and heroine. Just as they are finally to be reunited, something 
totally unexpected happens. A tame kid wanders on to the stage, stands looking 
at the audience, and then walks up to the couple and sniffs them. The audience 
bursts out laughing. Spencer has an explanation for this: 
'it is readily explicable if we consider what, in such a case, must become of the 
feeling that existed at the moment the incongruity arose. A large mass of emo-
tion had been produced; or, to speak in physiological language, a large portion 
of the nervous system was in a state of tension. There was also great expec-
tation with respect to the further evolution of the scene - a quantity of vague, 
nascent thought and emotion, into which the existing quantity of thought and 
emotion was about to pass. Had there been no interruption, the body of new 
ideas and feelings next excited, would have sufficed to absorb the whole of the 
175 ibid. 
176 Spencer, 'Physiology of Laughter', p.99. 
177 Spencer, 'Physiology of Laughter', p.105. 
178 ibid. 
179 Spencer, 'Physiology of Laughter', p.106. 
180 ibid. 
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liberated nervous energy. But now, this large amount of nervous energy, in-
stead of being allowed to expend itself in producing an equivalent amount of the 
new thoughts and emotions which were nascent, is suddenly checked in its flow. 
The channels along which the discharge was about to take place, are closed. 
The new channel opened - that afforded by the appearance and proceedings 
of the kid - is a small one; the ideas and feelings suggested are not numerous 
and massive enough to carry off the nervous energy to be expended. The ex-
cess must therefore discharge itself in some other direction; ... there results an 
effiux through the motor nerves to various classes of the muscles, producing 
the half-convulsive actions we term laughter. n81 
When some people laugh and others do not, Spencer goes on to explain, this 
is because in the latter, an emotion has arisen which is 'sufficiently massive to 
absorb all the nascent excitement n82 • For instance, when someone falls, those who 
do not laugh are those in whom sufficient sympathy has arisen. Contrasting those 
incongruities which produce laughter with those which do not, Spencer claims 
that 'we see that in the non-ludicrous ones the unexpected feeling aroused, though 
wholly different in kind, is not less in quantity or intensity' .183 Citing Bain's list 
of incongruities which do not cause laughter, which we quoted in Chapter Two, 
Spencer claims that 'in these cases, where the totally unlike state of consciousness 
suddenly produced is not inferior in mass to the preceding one, the conditions 
to laughter are not fulfilled .. .laughter naturally results only when consciousness is 
unawares transferred from great things to small- only when there is what we may 
call a descending incongruity. n 84 
4.2 Critique of Spencer 
There are many flaws in Spencer's theory, and some of these will be outlined 
below. We mentioned above that the theory is rooted very firmly in nineteenth-
century physiology, though a detailed discussion of physiology is beyond the scope 
of this dissertation. A major worry is the lack of explanation as to exactly what 
181 Spencer, 'Physiology of Laughter', pp.106-107. 
182 Spencer, 'Physiology of Laughter', p.l07. 
183 Spencer, 'Physiology of Laughter', p.108. 
184 ibid. 
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nervous energy is. However, even if we are generous enough to give him the benefit 
of the doubt here, taking an intuitive idea of nervous energy, it is still not possible 
to adequately account for laughter along Spencerian lines. 
One reason for this is that in many instances of laughter at humour, it seems 
that no nervous energy is introduced to or developed in the situation, and so none 
could require release. This is especially true of much humour of pure incongruity 
or absurdity; and we recall that it is incongruity-based humour which Spencer 
purports to be explaining. Morreall illustrates this point with a cartoon of a 
perfectly serious optician's client trying on various pairs of glasses, all of which are 
attached to a false nose and moustache. There is no reason to suppose that in the 
incongruity-based humour of which this is an example, any nervous energy has to 
be generated prior to experience of it in order to find it amusing and laugh. 
Indeed, we can advance this point about Spencer's own example of the kid 
on the stage. Spencer's account seems to present the situation as being as if the 
reaction of every member of the audience were identical. Yet this is never the case. 
Some people may well experience the tension Spencer describes, but others may be 
disinterested in the play, and experience no emotional involvement in the lovers' 
reconciliation, and therefore no build up of nervous energy. But there is no need 
to assume that this will prevent them from laughing at the appearance of the kid. 
How could Spencer's theory explain this? 
A connected point is the familiar fact that a given event or piece of humour will 
make some people laugh, but not others. Spencer's explanation of why this is so 
is inadequate. We have seen that he explains differing reactions to the person who 
falls in terms of differing degrees of sympathy for the faller in different spectators. 
But this overlooks the obvious point that some people may not laugh, not because 
they have developed a' great deal of sympathy for the faller, but simply because 
they do not find the mere fact of someone's falling over in the street amusing. This 
is particularly true in the case of fictional falls - in slapstick movies, say - rather 
than those in reality. Many people simply do not find slapstick funny; rather, they 
find it boring. In such people, bored at yet another 'banana-skin joke', there again 
seems no reason to suppose that any nervous energy is built up, and so none could 
require release. 
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Another criticism, made by Morreall, is that even in situations which do involve 
the build-up of emotion, Spencer's notion that such feelings are suddenly rendered 
superfluous is often inapplicable, because in some such cases, 'the conclusion of 
the stimulus is just what we were expecting and the feelings we had been building 
up are perfectly appropriate.' 185 Morreall's example here is of the hostile practical 
joke, such as offering an enemy an exploding cigar, where we laugh when precisely 
what we had been expecting to happen does happen. As we approach our victim, 
says Morreall, our excitement mounts, increasing as we offer him the cigar, and 
he accepts and lights it. 'This kind of situation', Morreall continues, 'is especially 
troublesome to Spencer's theory, in which the conclusion of a laughter stimulus 
must involve a "descending incongruity"; our emotions, he says, must change from 
strong emotion to weak emotion, so that the excess can be discharged in laughter. 
In cases like the exploding cigar, however, we have just the opposite: what starts as 
weak emotion gradually builds until it reaches its greatest strength at the moment 
of laughter. '186 
It is not entirely clear what Spencer means by 'descending incongruity', or by 
consciousness being transferred 'from great things to small'. However, if laughter 
results when excess energy is left over in the nervous system, and this corresponds 
to consciousness transferring 'from great things to small', then it would appear 
that 'great' things are those which generate a large amount of nervous energy, and 
'small' things those which do not. But this does not help much. It does not get 
us any closer to making the theory testable, since Spencer offers only very scanty 
details on what circumstances and subjects generate large amounts of nervous en-
ergy and which do not. Using an intuitive idea, we might reasonably assume that 
most people expend a considerable amount of nervous energy on the subject of 
sex. But if this is so, it casts further doubt on Spencer's hypothesis. There are 
many examples of humour in which our attention is diverted on to sex from a 
humdrum topic on which little emotional energy is spent (for example, 'Excuse 
me, Miss, have you got the time?' 'I've got the time if you've got the energy.'). In 
such examples, using the above understanding of 'great and 'small', our attention 
is not diverted 'from great things to small', but vice versa. Monro remarks that 
185 Morreall, Taking Laughter Seriously, p.26. 
186 ibid. 
84 
'the most successful jokes are those which suddenly plunge us into some subject 
highly charged with emotional tension. 1187 Such jokes, together with those scenar-
ios of which Morreall's exploding cigar is an example, cannot be explained by the 
Spencerian theory. 
So there are many faults with Spencer's theory. However, his central idea, that 
laughter serves as a release of tension, is plausible in some laughter situations. It 
makes sense to say that in the case of the exploding cigar, tension has been built up 
in the practical joker, and an outlet for its discharge is found in laughter. (The fact 
that the conclusion of the stimulus, at the time of discharge, is one which we might 
have anticipated, does not affect this claim.) In fact, the build-up of tension is a 
regular comic ploy. We will consider three uses of this technique: in bedroom farce, 
slapstick and audience-participation. And fourthly, we will consider the tension 
built up by trying to hold back laughter. 
Scenes in the direst bedroom farces, where the audience, but not the returning 
husband, knows that his wife's lover is hiding in the wardrobe or under the bed, are 
often greeted with the most uproarious laughter when the lover, trousers around 
his ankles, is eventually found out. This is clearly explicable in terms of a release 
of built-up tension in the audience. (If an audience member finds this kind of 
comedy tedious, it seems plausible to explain his failure to laugh by claiming that 
little or no tension has built up inside him.) 
In slapstick, too, comics such as Laurel and Hardy play upon the tension factor. 
When, due to Stan's accidental clumsiness, food or water is first spilled over Ollie, 
and Ollie mistakenly assumes Stan has done this on purpose, he does not retaliate 
immediately. There is instead a short period in which our attention is focussed 
upon Ollie's face, and his attempt to keep his composure in the face of mounting 
annoyance. A few titters of expectancy can normally be heard from an audience 
at this stage, which give way to a much greater burst of laughter when Ollie finally 
loses his battle with himself, and flings food at Stan, the slapstick escalating from 
this point onwards. Our opponents of slapstick, mentioned above, will find the 
later, uncontrolled pie-throwing tedious rather than hilarious, but watching Ollie 
gradually lose his composure and eventually resort to attacking Stan often will 
187 Monro, Argument of Laughter, p.l60. 
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make them laugh. This indeed seems explicable in terms of a need to release 
empathetic tension built up by the sight of Ollie trying and failing to restrain 
himself, a factor which is not present once the pie-throwing gets out of hand. 
Thirdly, an easy way for a stand-up comedian or revue group to get a laugh 
is to pick on a member of the audience. When each member of the audience 
thinks, until the last possible moment, that he might be the victim, the laughter 
that results when a victim is finally selected is surely explicable in terms of the 
release of tension in those who have 'escaped'. This was done very effectively by 
a recent Cambridge Footlights team. They started off by speaking disparagingly 
about humiliating an audience, but pointing out that anyway, the chances of any 
particular member of the audience being selected were very low. Two members of 
the cast then moved menacingly into the stalls, looking around at various giggling 
spectators, and saying in rather sinister voices, 'Just relax ... ', 'There's nothing to 
worry about ... ', 'You won't be picked ... unless of course, you happen to be ... this man 
here!' The tremendous burst of laughter which greeted the poor victim's eventual 
selection seems excellently to fit the release from tension formula. Tension was 
built up in each member of the audience, each irrationally convinced, despite the 
cast's perfectly reasonable assurances to the contrary, that he was certain to be 
the unfortunate person chosen. When all but one found that they were safe, they 
were able to relax and discharge the built-up tension in laughter. Although the 
victim, when dragged up on stage, took his fate in good spirits, he did not join in 
the uproarious laughter of relief at the moment of his selection, for reasons which 
a release theory can explain. 
Finally, the tension built up and which has to be released is often the tension 
of trying to prevent oneself from laughing. Few cannot have had the experience of 
trying to hold back one's laughter, a_nd failing, in the way described by William 
Hazlitt: 
'We laugh at a thing merely because we ought not. If we think we must not 
laugh, this perverse impediment makes our temptation to laugh the greater; 
for by endeavouring to keep the obnoxious image out of sight, it comes upon 
us more irresistably and repeatedly, and the inclination to indulge our mirth, 
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the longer it is held back, collects its force, and breaks out the more violently 
in peals of laughter. '188 
A release theory more complex and elaborately developed than Spencer's is 
offered by Freud. Unlike most of those thinkers considered so far, Freud devotes 
an entire book, and a later paper, to developing his theory, which we shall outline 
now. 
4.3 Sigmund Freud and psychical energy 
At the outset of any discussion in English of Freud's Der Witz und seme 
Beziehung zum Unbewussten, a preliminary point should be made concerning the 
translation of its title. James Strachey, whose translation I have used, translates 
this as Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious 189 • Strachey admits that this 
is not perfect, since the word 'joke' seems to cover the German Scherz as well, but 
it is preferable to 'wit', the word used in the original translation 190 , since 'wit', as 
ordinarily used in English, has far too narrow a meaning to plausibly cover some 
of the examples Freud offers. 191 
'Jokes', then, is the better of two inadequate translations. That said, we turn 
to the work itself. Freud spends considerable time analysing what he calls the 
'technique' of jokes. We shall discuss this only briefly, since the main interest in 
Freud's contribution to the theory of humour does not lie here. However, a brief 
outline is necessary, in order to understand some of the more important material 
which follows. 
188 William Hazlitt, Lectures on the English Comic Writers, quoted in Boston, An 
Anatomy of Laughter, p.50. 
189 Sigmund Freud, Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, trans. and ed. James 
Strachey (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1976). 
190 Wit and its relation to the Unconscious, trans. A.A.Brill (London: Kegan Paul, 1916). 
191 Strachey remarks that: 'The only solution to this and similar dilemmas has seemed to be to adopt 
one English word for some corresponding German one, and to keep to it quite consistently and 
invariably even if in some particular context it seems the wrong one. In this way the reader will 
at least be able to form his own conclusions about the way in which Freud is using the word. 
Thus, throughout the book, Witz has been rendered "joke" and Scherz "jest".' (Strachey, in 
the editor's introduction to his translation of Freud, Jokes, p.35). 
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4.3.1 'The Technique of Jokes' 
Freud presents the techniques at work in different types of joke, illustrating 
each with examples. He opens with one from Heine's Hirsch-Hyacinth, who boasts 
of his relations with the wealthy Baron Rothschild: 'I sat beside Salomon Roth-
schild and he treated Iij.e quite as his equal - quite famillionairely. '192 
In the technique of this joke, which Freud assures us is 'an excellent and most 
amusing onen93 , one of the key factors is 'abbreviation' or 'condensation'. Freud 
interprets the thought contained in the joke as being 'Rothschild treated me quite 
as his equal, quite familiarly - that is, so far as a millionaire can. n94 In the 
joke itself, this thought is expressed more succinctly. We will see shortly the full 
importance for Freud of this 'condensation' or, to use his later term, 'economy'. 
The second type of joke-technique considered is 'multiple use of the same ma-
terialn95. This can occur in several ways. For instance, a word can be used in 
two ways, once as a whole, and then as separate syllables. An illustration is this 
quip made at the expense of a red-haired and extremely awkward young relative of 
Rousseau, of whom the hostess to whom he had been introduced complained: 'Vous 
m'avez fait connaltre un jeune homme roux et sot, mais non pas un Rousseau.' 196 
Or the same word may appear twice, being slightly modified on its second appear-
ance. A man of Jewish origin, on making a derogatory remark upon the Jewish 
character, is reprimanded by the comment: 'Your antesemitism was well known to 
me; your antisemitism is new to me. 1197 
Further cases of 'multiple use' Freud brings under a third heading which he 
calls 'double-meaningn 98 , and which he divides up into further sub-classes such 
192 Freud, Jokes, p.47. 
193 ibid. To be fair to Freud, this joke works better in German than in English, since the 'ly' is not 
required: as Strachey points out (pp.49-50), the German for familiar is familiar, and millionaire 
is Millioniir. Hence the composite word translated as 'famillionairely' is famillioniir. 
194 Fr~ud, Jokes, p.48. 
195 Freud, Jokes, p.76. 
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'You have introduced me to a young man who is raux (red-haired) and sot (silly), but not a 
Rousseau.' Quoted by Freud, Jokes, on p.63. 
197 Quoted by Freud, Jokes, p.67. 
198 Freud, Jokes, p.69. 
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as double entendres and the literal interpretation of metaphors, both of which we 
have illustrated in Chapter Two. 
Freud claims that there is in fact something common to all these techniques. It 
is the theme of condensation. All 'are dominated by a tendency to compression, or 
rather to saving. It all seems to be a question of economy.n 99 Take, for instance, 
the Rousseau joke: 'We save having to express a criticism or give shape to a 
judgement; both are already there in the name itself. '200 
All the jokes Freud has considered up to this point have been verbal ones. 
There is a second category, which he describes as conceptual jokes. An important 
technique here is 'displacement'201 • By means of an example, Freud tells of an 
impoverished man who convinces a wealthy friend how desperate is his need of 
some money, which he succeeds in borrowing. Later that day, the friend comes 
across him eating salmon mayonnaise in a restaurant. 
'The benefactor reproached him: "What? You borrow money from me and 
then order yourself salmon mayonnaise? Is that what you've used my money 
for?" "I don't understand you", replied the object of the attack: "if I haven't 
any money I can't eat salmon mayonnaise, and if I have some money I mustn't 
eat salmon mayonnaise. Well, then, when am I to eat salmon mayonnaise?" 202 
The creditor deliberately misses the point of his benefactor's objection, namely 
that in his financial circumstances, he has no right to eat luxuries such as salmon 
mayonnaise at all. Freud's reason for placing jokes such as this under the heading 
'displacement' is that 'the technique of this joke lies precisely in this diverting of 
the reply from the meaning of the reproach' 203 • 
Faulty reasoning is another common joke-technique: 
'A gentlemen entered a pastry-cook's shop and ordered a cake; but he soon 
brought it back and asked for a glass of liqueur instead. He drank it and began 
199 Freud, Jokes, p.77. 
200 Freud, Jokes, p.78. 
201 Freud, Jokes, p.88. 
202 Freud, Jokes, p.86. 
203 ibid. 
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to leave without having paid. The proprietor detained him. "What do you 
want?" asked the customer.-"You've not paid for the liqueur."-"But I gave you 
the cake in exchange for it." - "You didn't pay for that either."- "But I hadn't 
eaten it." '204 
Thirdly, we have 'unification'205 • An example here is the story of the royal 
touring the provinces who notices a commoner who looks incredibly like himself. 
'Was your mother once in service at the Palace?', he asks. 'No, your Highness', 
comes the reply, 'but my father was'. In this technique generally, the idea is 
that 'new and unexpected unities are set up, relations of ideas to one another, 
definitions made mutually or by reference to a common third element. '206 This has 
close parallels with that type of joke mentioned in connection with 'configurational 
theories' in Chapter Two: where something common is noted between entities 
which had previously been seen as disparate or unconnected; where something 
suddenly 'falls into place'. 
These, then, are some of Freud's most important joke-techniques. He does 
not claim that his is the definitive list thereof, but he is satisfied that 'a contin-
ued examination of fresh material can convince us that we have got to know the 
commonest and most important technical methods of the joke-work. '207 
4.3.2 'The Purposes of Jokes' 
Freud next goes on to discuss the purpose [ Tendenz] of different jokes, making a 
distinction between 'tendentious' and 'innocent' jokes. Initially, the exact nature of 
this distinction is not made very clear: we are merely told that in an innocent joke, 
'the joke is an end in itself and serves no particular aim, in the other case it does 
serve such an aim '208 • (What these 'aims' are becomes clearer later.) 'Innocent', 
Freud stresses, merely means 'non-tendentious': innocent jokes are not necessarily 
trivial, and may have something of substance to say. (Some innocent jokes are also 
204 Freud, Jokes, p.98. 
205 Freud, Jokes, p.105. 
206 Freud, Jokes, p.105. 
207 Freud, Jokes, p.130. The 'joke-work' is Freud's term for the psychical processes involved in 
constructing a joke, as opposed to those required to understand it. 
208 Freud, Jokes, p.132. 
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trivial, however, and in such cases, since there is neither an underlying purpose nor 
any considerable intellectual content from which we can derive pleasure, it must 
be from the very techniques of the jokes themselves that we derive that pleasure.) 
In general, the pleasure derived from innocent jokes is less than that derived from 
tendentious jokes. Why is this? The answer, says Freud, is that 'tendentious jokes, 
by virtue of their purpose, must have sources of pleasure at their disposal to which 
innocent jokes have no access'209 • There are only two purposes which a tendentious 
joke can serve. 
'It is either a hostile joke (serving the purpose of aggressiveness, satire, or 
defence) or an obscene joke (serving the purpose of exposure ).mo 
Freud deals with obscene jokes first. He first considers smut, 'the intentional 
bringing into prominence of sexual facts and relations by speech'211 . It is important 
to note that 'smut is directed to a particular person, by whom one is sexually 
excited and who, on hearing it, is expected to become aware of the speaker's 
excitement and as a result to become sexually excited in turn'. 212 But surely smut 
is often not explicitly directed at such a person? Maybe in recognition of such a 
potential objection, Freud adds the following rider: 
'If a man in a company of men enjoys telling or listening to smut, the original 
situation, which owing to social inhibitions cannot be realised, is at the same 
time imagined. A person who laughs at smut that he hears is laughing as 
though he were the spectator of an act of sexual aggression. '213 
Smut in its undisguised form is popular amongst 'the common people' 21 \ but 
in the more refined and educated, it is only tolerated when in the form of a joke. 
From this, we begin to see more clearly the purpose of tendentious jokes: 
'They make possible the satisfaction of an instinct (whether lustful or hostile) 
in the face of an obstacle that stands in its way. They circumvent this obstacle 
209 Freud, Jokes, p.l40. 
210 ibid. 
211 ibid. 
212 ibid. 
213 Freud, Jokes, p.141. 
214 Freud, Jokes, p.144. 
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and in that way draw pleasure from a source which the obstacle had made 
inaccessible. '215 
The development of this obstacle, or 'repression'216 , is brought about to a 
large extent by civilisation and higher education, which causes the more primitive 
pleasures to be lost to us. Tendentious jokes allow us to retrieve them: 
'When we laugh at a refined obscene joke, we are laughing at the same thing 
that makes a peasant laugh at a coarse piece of smut. In both cases the pleasure 
springs from the same source. We, however, could never bring ourselves to laugh 
at the coarse smut; we should feel ashamed or it would seem to us disgusting. 
We can only laugh when a joke has come to our help. '217 
We cannot tell what part of the pleasure taken in tendentious jokes comes from 
the technique and what from the purpose. With this in mind, Freud makes the 
following point: 
'With all obscene jokes we are subject to glaring errors of judgement about 
the "goodness" of jokes so far as this depends on formal determinants; the 
technique of such jokes is often quite wretched, but they have immense success 
in provoking laughter.ms 
The above comments on tendentious jokes apply just as well to the hostile 
subdivision of that category, as to the obscene. Civilised life demands that we 
repress our hostile, as well as our sexual, urges. Here jokes allow us to 'exploit 
something ridiculous in our enemy which we could not, on account of obstacles in 
our way, bring forward openly or consciously; once again, then, the joke will evade 
restrictions and open sources of pleasure that have become inaccessible. '219 • This 
repression is particularly strong when dealing with persons who hold positions 
superior to our own. Our hostility finds an outlet in hostile jokes, such as the 
commoner's reply to the lookalike royal mentioned above. 
215 ibid. 
216 Freud, Jokes, p.145. 
217 ibid. 
218 Freud, Jokes, p.l46. 
219 Freud, Jokes, p.l47. Throughout, any italics are Freud's. 
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But an enormous question remains unanswered. How, exactly, do tendentious 
jokes circumvent the obstacle which stands in the way of the satisfaction of the 
hostile or lustful instinct? What, to use Freud's phrase, is 'the mechanism of the 
pleasurable effect'220 ? In a section entitled 'The Mechanism of Pleasure', Freud 
eventually offers his answer to this question. 
4.3.3 'The Mechanism of Pleasure' 
We have seen that tendentious jokes satisfy purposes which could not, in 
civilised society, be satisfied in any other way. We have also seen that what op-
poses the satisfaction of these purposes is either an external factor, such as the 
higher standing of the person one is addressing and hence the possible dangers of 
getting on the wrong side of him, or an internal impulse such as an inner aversion 
to undisguised hostility or coarse smut. When a joke 'comes to our help', one of 
two things happens. If the obstacle is internal, the joke allows the obstacle to be 
overcome and the inhibition lifted, on this particular occasion at least. Alterna-
tively, if the obstacle is external, by making a joke we avoid having to create the 
psychical inhibition that would otherwise be necessary to restrain ourselves. Now 
for the beginnings of Freud's explanation. He maintains that in either creating or 
maintaining such a psychical inhibition, some expenditure of psychical energy is 
required. When pleasure is obtained from a tendentious joke, 'it is therefore plau-
sible to suppose that this yield of pleasure corresponds to the psychical expenditure 
that is saved. '221 The psychical energy that has thus been saved can be discharged 
in laughter. The principle of economy has reemerged, then: the secret of the plea-
sure derived from tendentious jokes is 'economy in expenditure on inhibition or 
suppression'.222 
What about innocent jokes? We saw earlier that there are some such jokes, 
those which are also trivial, in which the pleasure is derived from the technique of 
the joke alone. Here again, Freud explains this in terms of our economising upon 
psychical expenditure. In plays upon words, for instance, our psychical attitude 
is focussed upon the sound of a word rather than its meaning. 'It may really be 
220 Freud, Jokes, p.165. 
221 Freud, Jokes, p.l67. 
222 ibid. 
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suspected that in doing so we are bringing about a great relief in psychical work 
and that when we make serious use of words we are obliged to hold ourselves back 
with a certain effort from this comfortable procedure. '223 Similarly, with a second 
group of techniques, such as unification and modifying familiar phrases, 'some-
thing familiar is rediscovered, where we might instead have expected something 
new'224 • This recognition is pleasurable simply because it provides a relief from 
the need for psychical expenditure. Finally, with a third group of techniques such 
as displacement, faulty reasoning, absurdity and nonsense, spotting the relief in 
psychical expenditure is 'particularly easy .. .It cannot be doubted that it is easier 
and more convenient to diverge from a line of thought we have embarked on than 
to keep to it, to jumble up things that are different rather than to contrast them-
and, indeed, that it is specially convenient to admit as valid methods of inference 
that are rejected by logic and, lastly, to put words or thoughts together without 
regard to the condition that they ought also to make sense. '225 
Freud thinks that strictly speaking, the first and third of the above groups 
involve 're-establishing old liberties and getting rid of the burden of intellectual 
upbringing'226 and hence are 'psychical reliefs' 227 slightly different from the psychi-
cal economies of the second group. However, the main point is that: 
'Relief from psychical expenditure that is already there and economizing in 
psychical expenditure that is only about to be called for - from these two 
principles all the techniques of jokes, and accordingly all pleasure from these 
techniques, are derived. '228 
But let us return to tendentious jokes, since the question we posed at the end 
of the previous subsection has still not been adequately answered. If, as Freud 
believes, tendentious jokes 'are able to release pleasure even from sources that 
have undergone repression' 229 , how exactly is this achieved? After all, it would 
223 Freud, Jokes, pp.l67-8. 
224 Freud, Jokes, p.l69. 
225 Freud, Jokes, p.174. 
226 Freud, Jokes, p.177. 
227 ibid. 
228 ibid. 
229 Freud, Jokes, p.l85. 
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seem that in facing what has been repressed, we have a potential clash between 
pleasure and what Strachey translates as 'unpleasure', for the following reasons. 
Take the urge one might have to insult a particular person. This urge is opposed 
by the constraints put upon one by a feeling of propriety. Freud claims that if 
the insult 'were able to break through as a result of some change of emotional 
condition or mood, this breakthrough by the insulting purpose would be felt sub-
sequently with unpleasure'230 • And so, ordinarily, no insult takes place. Suppose, 
however, that instead of a bare-faced insult, a good joke can be made 'from the 
material of the words and thoughts used for the insult'231 • In this way, a relatively 
small amount of pleasure may be generated from the technique of this joke. Freud 
thinks that this pleasure - the 'fore-pleasure'232 - acts as an 'incentive bonus'233 by 
means of which the 'suppressed purpose can ... gain sufficient strength to overcome 
the inhibition, which would otherwise be stronger than it'234 • Once repression is 
thus overcome, and the veiled insult or sexual reference made, the 'incomparably 
greater' 235 amount of pleasure derivable from the purpose, as opposed to the tech-
nique, can be released. Hence, overall, 'with the assistance of the offer of a small 
amount of pleasure, a much greater one, which would otherwise have been hard to 
achieve, has been gained'236 • 
4.3.4 Jokes, 'the comic' and humour 
One further section of Freud's book which we need to discuss is the last one, 
where he pursues his distinction between jokes, 'the comic', and 'humour'. We first 
consider the distinction between the first two categories. Freud seems to assume 
that this distinction is more obvious than is justified, though we are offered some 
clues as to what 'the comic' means: 
'A joke is made, the comic is found - and first and foremost in people, only by 
230 Freud, Jokes, pp.186-7. 
231 Freud, Jokes, p.187. 
232 Freud, Jokes, p.188. 
233 ibid. 
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236 Freud, Jokes, p.l88. 
95 
a subsequent transference in things, situations, and so on, as well. '237 
To make Freud's understanding of the comic clearer, we shall consider two of 
his most important sub-classes thereof. Since the key distinction here is between 
the mental and the physical, we shall consider one example of physicality being 
comical, and one of an aspect of someone's mental life being so. The first of these 
is illustrated by what Freud calls 'the comic of movement'238 • Under this heading 
he includes such examples as the 'extravagant and inexpedient'239 movements of 
a clown, a child learning to write who unconsciously sticks out his tongue when 
concentrating upon the movements of his pen, and the tenpin bowler who, even 
after releasing the ball, follows its course as if doing so had some effect on that 
course. 
In these cases, says Freud, we recognise that these movements are exaggerated 
and inexpedient, and laugh as a result of comparing such movements with those 
which we ourselves would have made in similar circumstances. Ideation or thinking 
uses up less cathectic energy than does action. Nevertheless, Freud assures us that 
physiology: 
'teaches us that even during the process of ideation innervations run out to the 
muscles ... Now it becomes very plausible to suppose that this innervatory energy 
that accompanies the process of ideation is used to represent the quantitive 
factor of the idea: that it is larger when there is an idea of a large movement 
than when it is a question of a small one. Thus the idea of the larger movement 
would in this case in fact be the larger one - that is, it would be the idea 
accompanied by the larger expenditure of energy. '240 
So in comparing the exaggerated movement with my own: 
'my increased expenditure in order to understand it is inhibited in statu 
nascendi, as it were in the act of being mobilized; it is declared superfluous and 
is free for use elsewhere or perhaps for discharge by laughter. This would be 
the way in which, other circumstances being favourable, pleasure in a comic 
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movement is generated - an innervatory expenditure which has become an 
unusable surplus when a comparison is made with a movement of one's own. '241 
We move on to our second sub-class, 'the comic which is found in the intellec-
tual functions and the character traits of other people'242 • Freud's example here 
is the kind of 'comic nonsense'243 produced by ignorant examination candidates. 
We have here the opposite of the comedy of movement. Whereas in the latter it is 
excess physical expenditure on the part of the person to whom one compares one-
self which causes laughter, a mental function becomes laughable in precisely the 
opposite circumstances: 'if the other person has spared himself expenditure which 
I regard as indispensable'244 , as in the case of the ignorant examination candidate. 
So 'a person appears comic to us if, in comparison with ourselves, he makes too 
great an expenditure on his bodily functions and too little on his mental ones'245 • 
On the other hand, if t~is balance is reversed, 'we are filled with astonishment and 
admiration'246 • 
However, even if comic pleasure derives from the above-discussed difference in 
expenditure, there remains the fact that such a difference does not always give 
rise to pleasure. Freud's explanation for this is that laughter arises only if the 
difference is not otherwise utilised and is therefore dischargeable. For instance, 
often, 'the comic is greatly interfered with if the situation from which it ought to 
develop gives rise at the same time to a release of strong affect '247 • 
Freud closes his book with a few pages on 'humour'. Again, exactly what he 
understands this term to mean is not entirely clear, but the fact that he treats it 
as a third category, alongside jokes and the comic, shows that he is using the term 
in a much narrower sense than it is used in most contemporary humour research, 
this dissertation included248 • 
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As mentioned above, the greatest obstacle to the emergence of the comic is 
'the release of distressing affects' 249 : pity, anger, pain, and so on. In contrast, 
humour emerges in situations where ordinarily we would release such an affect but 
where for some reason that affect is suppressed in statu nascendi. So the pleasure 
of humour arises 'at the cost of a release of affect that does not occur: it arises 
from an economy in the expenditure of affect. '250 'The crudest case of humour' 251 
is gallows humour, such as the comment of the criminal about to be executed 
one Monday morning: 'Well, this week's beginning nicely'. 252 (An arguably better 
example of gallows humour is the comment attributed to St. Lawrence whilst 
being burned at the stake: 'Turn me over, I'm done on that side'.) The affect we 
would ordinarily feel here is pity, but as soon as we understand that the condemned 
man is capable of seeming unconcerned at his fate, our pity 'becomes unutilizable 
and we laugh it off'253 • 'An economy of pity', Freud tells us, 'is one of the most 
frequent sources of humorous pleasure'25\ and is not limited to gallows humour. 
Much of Mark Twain's humour, for instance, works in this way. Take Twain's 
story of his brother, working as a road-builder, who was blown into the air and 
far away by the explosion of a mine. His wages were duly docked for his having 
been absent from his place of employment. Here, whereas ordinarily we would 
expend energy building up pity, 'we become distracted from our pity'255 , and so 
we are again able to laugh off this expenditure. In some cases, the affect may only 
be partially arrested, and in these circumstances we get 'the humour that smiles 
through tears '256 • 
Humour is essentially a defensive process: 
('Humor', trans. Joan Riviere, in the International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, Vol.9-1 
(1928); reprinted in Morreall (ed.), The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor, pp.lll-116), 
written after he had formulated his theory of the tripartite division of the mind into ego, id and 
superego. However, I shall not discuss this here since again, it is not relevant to our consideration 
of Freud as release-theorist. 
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'It scorns to withdraw the ideational current bearing the distressing affect from 
conscious attention as repression does, and thus surmounts the automatism of 
defence. It brings this about by finding a means of withdrawing the energy from 
the release of unpleasure that is already in preparation and of transforming it, 
by discharge, into pleasure. '257 
In summary, then, the pleasure derived from jokes, the comic and humour, is 
all explicable in terms of an economy in expenditure: on inhibition in (tendentious) 
jokes, on ideation or cathexis in the comic, and on feeling in humour. 
'All three are agreed in representing methods of regaining from mental activity 
a pleasure which has in fact been lost through the development of that activity. 
For the euphoria which we endeavour to reach by these means is nothing other 
than the mood of a period of life in which we were accustomed to deal with 
our psychical work in general with a small expenditure of energy - the mood of 
our childhood, when we were ignorant of the comic, when we were incapable of 
jokes and when we had no need of humour to make us feel happy in our life. '258 
There are aspects of Freud's book, such as his discussion of the relationship 
between jokes and dreams, which I have not mentioned, since this lies beyond the 
boundaries of my predominant concern here, which is Freud's central notion, the 
release theory aspect. The above exposition has been lengthy, but necessarily so, 
if we are to avoid the superficiality of which so many brief discussions of Freud's 
theory of joking are guilty. We now need to consider what we can make of the 
theory. 
4.4 Critique of Freud 
This is not the place for a detailed discussion of the falsifiability or otherwise 
of the claims of Freudian psychoanalysis, and the connected question of whether it 
should be accorded scientific or pseudo-scientific status259 • However, it should be 
noted that the intangibility of certain aspects of Freud's theory makes it difficult 
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to deal with. The most obvious respect in which this is true concerns the central 
notion of psychical energy. Here, Morreall is right to claim that in Spencer, though 
the concept of nervous energy is vague, explaining certain experiences of laughter 
in terms of the release of nervous energy is at least plausible to the extent that 
we are familiar with the idea of needing to release energy which has built up: 
in 'letting off steam', for instance. 'In Freud's account, however, not only is the 
notion of psychic energy vague, but the kind of psychic energy supposedly released 
in laughter is some new kind of energy, the energy of inhibition, about which 
we have few or no intuitions .. .If Freud wants to explain laughter in joking as the 
release of "saved" inhibitory energy, in short, he should first explain just what 
kind of energy this is and how we might measure, or at least detect, it. '260 If Freud 
intends his theory to be understood as a scientific one - and he certainly presents 
it that way - then this is a fair criticism: the notion of psychic energy appears 
merely speculative. It is precisely this type of problem which makes Freud difficult 
to assess. 
4.4.1 'The Purposes of Jokes' 
Our critique of Freud will deal with aspects of the purposes of jokes, the mech-
anism of pleasure, and finally his analysis of 'the comic' and 'humour'. We start 
with the purposes of jokes. We recall that Freud opens this part of his account by 
distinguishing between innocent and tendentious jokes, and claims that tenden-
tious jokes generally produce more pleasure than innocent ones: 'The pleasurable 
effect of innocent jokes is as a rule a moderate one; a clear sense of satisfaction, 
a slight smile, is as a rule all it can achieve in its hearer ... A non-tendentious joke 
scarcely ever achieves the sudden burst of laughter which makes tendentious ones 
so irresistable. '261 
This is a misleading over-generalisation, against which three points are worth 
making. Firstly, this is an example of a general tendency in Freud to base his 
theory on an overview of the human being which fails to account for the great 
diversity of individual experiences and perceptions. In this case, Freud is virtually 
ignoring the vast differences in individuals' senses of humour. Many people will be 
260 Morreall, Taking Laughter Seriously, p.30. 
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able to derive tremendous pleasure from innocent jokes, jokes which are indulged 
in purely for their own sake, rather than to indulge lustful or hostile instincts. This 
claim can be strengthened if we remember Freud's admission that innocent jokes 
need not be trivial or lacking in substance: that an innocent joke may 'be of great 
substance, it may ass~rt something of value'262 • Freud overlooks the pleasure, 
neither lustful nor hostile, which is obtainable from such jokes, as their hearer 
recognises a profound truth. 
A second problem is that Freud makes the unreasonable assumption - akin to 
a position we have already criticised in Chapter Two - that the amount of pleasure 
derived from a joke can be measured by the amount of laughter it generates. But 
in fact one cannot conclude from the fact that I laugh less at joke A than joke 
B that I thereby derive less pleasure from joke A. As suggested by our mention of 
jokes which 'assert something of value', there are jokes of many different levels of 
sophistication, and correspondingly different levels of pleasure taken therein, and 
the more sophisticated pleasures - the appreciation of a particularly clever piece of 
.wit, for instance - are not necessarily expressed in laughter. So there is no reason 
to suppose that the sophisticated innocent joke which reveals something of great 
substance, will be greeted with a belly-laugh. And yet we should be mistaken 
in thinking that this necessarily means that the pleasure derived from it is less 
than that derived from the double entendre which, maybe for reasons of the social 
pressure to laugh at such jokes in certain company, one may greet with raucous 
laughter. In short, Freud cannot assume that laughter is an accurate measure of 
the degree of pleasure taken in a joke. 
Furthermore, Freud uses his claim made in the quote under consideration to 
make an inference which there is no logically compelling reason to accept. The 
argument goes like this. Tendentious jokes generally give more pleasure than inno-
cent ones. The difference between a tendentious and an innocent joke is that the 
former has a purpose, whilst the latter does not. Therefore 'tendentious jokes, by 
virtue of their purpose, must have sources of pleasure at their disposal to which 
innocent jokes have no access' 263 • This conclusion does not follow. Freud is rea-
soning from what generally tends to be the case, to a conclusion about the entire 
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class of tendentious jokes. Were it the case that all tendentious jokes gave more 
pleasure than all innocent ones, Freud would be on safer ground. But, we are 
forced to repeat, this is not the case: some, highly amusing, innocent jokes, give 
greater pleasure than some, very poor, tendentious ones. (It is clear from the 
quote under consideration that Freud is generalising, and hence it is reasonable 
to assume that he himself would accept this.) And yet the very poor tendentious 
joke, by virtue of its being a tendentious joke, has a purpose, which the highly 
amusing innocent joke does not. So if the greater pleasure usually derived from a 
tendentious joke is to be explained precisely in terms of purpose, what goes wrong 
in a poor tendentious joke: why, despite its having a purpose, is it poor? 
Freud's answer would presumably be that, in such a case, the technique of the 
joke is insufficiently good to offer enough fore-pleasure to circumvent the obstacle 
which stands in the way of the satisfaction of the lustful or hostile instinct. But 
Freud's understanding of 'technique' renders this an inadequate answer. Freud's 
'techniques' are essentially just kinds of joke. Consider, for instance, his technique 
of 'double-meaning'. Within this category, we can meet both innocent jokes, and 
tendentious ones, such as sexual double entendres. Many people feel that at some 
point in their development they 'outgrow' the kind of sexual innuendo they may 
have enjoyed as sniggering adolescents. Such a person may therefore derive more 
pleasure from a good innocent 'double-meaning' joke than a typical Carry On 
gag, the likes of which he has heard many times before. Yet, according to Freud's 
understanding of 'technique', both jokes have the same technique: that of 'double-
meaning'. In addition, the tendentious joke has a purpose. So how can the innocent 
joke possibly afford more pleasure? 
Clearly, in order to do so, it must have some quality which its tendentious 
rival lacks. One such quality is one which we have touched upon before: the 
'cleverness' of a joke. This is an important factor in the appreciation of jokes, and 
one which Freud has overlooked. One way in which a double-meaning joke can 
appear 'clever' is in the sheer originality of the double-meaning used. One might 
prefer the afore-mentioned innocent 'double-meaning' to its tendentious competitor 
because one feels the former's creator to have discovered a double-meaning which 
is original; one whose humorous potential one has never before seen tapped, as 
opposed to yet another' sexual innuendo. So we can reasonably doubt whether the 
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different receptions our two jokes received can adequately be explained in terms of 
technique. At the very least, it must be said that if Freud is determined to explain 
the difference in these terms, a far more sophisticated understanding of 'technique' 
is required: one that takes into account factors such as the appreciation of a joke's 
'cleverness'. 
We move on. Another important objection to Freud's discussion of the pur-
poses of tendentious jokes concerns the limitations he places on the purposes such 
jokes can serve. We recall that there are but two, being related to either sexual or 
aggressive instincts. (Although initially Freud explicitly says there are only these 
two, he later discusses 'cynical' jokes, in which aggressiveness is directed against 
institutions or prevailing attitudes rather than particular people, and 'sceptical' 
jokes, which are also hostile: they attack 'the certainty of our knowledge itself'264 • 
In places, Freud reads as if these are new categories, but generally, they seem to be 
intended as sub-categories of 'hostile' jokes.) In fact, these are not the only pur-
poses tendentious jokes can serve. In particular, there is Max Eastman's point that 
sex and aggression can themselves be 'ideal standards against which some people 
are in suppressed revolt. '265 Discussing aggression, Eastman offers the following 
from Mark Twain's account of his trip through the Jordan Valley: 
'We were moping along down through this dreadful place, every man in the 
rear. Our guards -,two gorgeous young Arab sheiks, with cargoes of swords, 
guns, pistols and daggers on board - were loafing ahead! 
"Bedouins!" 
Every man shrunk up and disappeared in his clothes like a mud turtle. My 
first impulse was to dash forward and destroy the Bedouins. My second was 
to dash to the rear to see if there were any coming in that direction. I acted 
on the latter impulse. So did all the others. If any Bedouins had approached 
us, then, from that point of the compass, they would have paid dearly for their 
rashness. We all remarked that, afterwards. There would have been scenes of 
riot and bloodshed there that no pen could describe. '266 
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The repressed feeling which is released here is indeed our opposition to some-
thing like what Eastman calls 'aggression as a cultural ideal' 267 : the pressure to 
exhibit bravery, to 'be a man'. The pleasure we take surely springs from the 
transparently obvious cowardice of Twain and his companions, in whom we can 
recognise a part of ourselves which, ordinarily, we are pressurised into repressing. 
Similarly, an example of a joke which frees the listener from the ideal of sexual 
potency is the Rodney Dangerfield gag quoted in Chapter Two: 
'I said to my wife, '"All things considered I think I'd like to die in bed." She 
said, "What, again?" ' 
In our society, there remains fairly strong pressure on males to live up to 
the ideal of sexual potency. Empathy with Dangerfield, and the attainment of a 
momentary release from such pressure, does indeed seem a plausible explanation 
of the pleasure taken in such a joke. 
There is a further problem with Freud's analysis of hostile jokes. Although 
it is true that a joke at someone's expense is generally more acceptable than a 
more direct means of venting one's hostility towards that person, Freud is wrong 
to claim that a joke is necessarily a safe way of venting a hostile urge. For instance, 
in the example of the commoner's reply to the royal ('Was your mother once in 
service at the palace?' 'No, your Highness, but my father was.'), the commoner's 
reply is a clever response to the insult to his mother's virtue that is implied in the 
royal's question. Freud claims that by this reply, the insult is 'safely avenged'268 • 
But this is surely not the case. It would only be so if the royal failed to realise 
its implications, and given the similarity of the thought behind it to that behind 
his own question, this possibility may be discounted. Freud says that the problem 
faced by the commoner is that one cannot insult a royal 'unless one is prepared to 
purchase that revenge at the price of one's whole existence'269 • There is no reason 
to suppose that a person who would react to being insulted in such a way would 
not react just as extremely to being made fun of. Indeed, to be on the receiving 
end of a 'put-down' is often worse than being insulted outright, especially if one 
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has been hoisted by one's own petard in quite so ingenious a way as has the royal in 
the above example. With an outright insult, there is no sense of being outwitted. 
Also, wit, and particularly repartee such as the above, is a much-admired quality. 
Few of us, surely, can say that we have never at some point thought 'I wish I had 
said that'. So, if one is on the receiving end of such a piece of repartee, there is 
the additional humiliation of having been made to look ridiculous. (It may well 
be that what is laughable in this situation is not the royal, but the witty comment 
itself; but, in such a situation, it is often not easy to convince oneself of this, and 
the idea that it is a witty comment at one's expense will often be uppermost 
in one's mind.) If, on the other hand, you are the object of a direct insult, there 
is a considerably greater chance of bystanders' sympathising with you rather than 
taking the side of the person whose only line of attack is the unsophisticated one of 
direct abuse. So in the above example, the commoner does not 'safely avenge' the 
insult to his mother. For the joker who makes fun of his 'superiors', this joking is 
a far more risky business than Freud allows. In a more everyday scenario in which 
one makes fun of a 'superior', there is no telling what resentment this may foster in 
someone who cannot 'take a joke', even if they recognise the need to appear to do 
so, and hence of what damaging repercussions may result from their taking their 
revenge at a later date. The interesting question that arises from this is what it is 
about the pleasure derivable from joking which sometimes makes such a risk seem 
irresistable. Yet to this Freud offers no answer. 
4.4.2 'The Mechanism of Pleasure' 
There are problems with Freud's account of the mechanism of pleasure, as well 
as with his account of the purposes of jokes. Consider again the mechanism of 
pleasure in a tendentious joke. To create or maintain an inhibition against sexual 
or hostile urges, we are told, we need to expend psychical energy. But when a 
tendentious joke allows us to circumvent the obstacle which stands in the way of 
the satisfaction of the sexual or hostile urge, the yield of pleasure we thereby obtain 
corresponds to the psychical expenditure that is saved, and this saved psychical 
energy then becomes available for discharge in laughter. In other words, the listener 
'laughs with the quota of psychic energy which has become free through the lifting 
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of the inhibitory cathexis; we might say that he laughs this quota off' 270 • Also, 
'the expenditure economized corresponds exactly to the inhibition that has become 
superfluous. '271 So the more psychic energy one has to invest in repressing one's 
sexual or hostile urges, the more one will laugh at jokes which afford release from 
these inhibitions. 
There are big problems with this. It is here that Freud's theory seems at its 
most speculative. Firstly, nowhere in Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious 
does he offer evidence to support his claim that psychical expenditure is needed to 
create or maintain inhibitions, and it is particularly difficult to see what justifies 
his conclusion that, simply because in 'the use of tendentious jokes pleasure is 
obtained, it is therefore plausible to suppose that this yield of pleasure corresponds 
to the psychic expenditure that is saved'272 • 
Secondly, there is no reason to accept the claim made in the last sentence of the 
penultimate paragraph as true. Morreall points out that the very limited empirical 
research which has been conducted in regard to this question sheds grave doubt 
on such a hypothesis. In fact, experiments by Hans Eysenck suggest that precisely 
the opposite is true: that unrepressed people; those who tend readily to express 
their sexual and aggressive feelings, are more likely to enjoy sexual and aggressive 
jokes than those who are repressed. So 'a person's "typical" behavior extends to 
his preferences in the humor field, instead of "repressed" trends finding an escape 
through humor, as Freud had maintained. '273 There are problems with drawing 
definite conclusions from the results of psychological experiments, since once one 
puts subjects in laboratory conditions, one may well be measuring something other 
than what is their 'natural' sense of humour. But nevertheless, such empirical 
evidence as Eysenck's is sufficient to justify our having strong reservations about 
such a hypothesis. 
But there is a more fundamental objection than this. Morreall points out that 
we would only view there as being actually existing energy left over for discharge 
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through laughter if we believed that when we express a hostile or obscene feeling 
instead of suppressing it, 'we "summon" the energy to suppress it anyway. '274 
Morreall does not seem aware that it becomes perfectly clear later in the book 
that this is exactly what Freud thinks happens. In discussing why it is important 
that the internal inhibitions of the hearer of a joke are similar to those of the 
joker, Freud claims that the hearer 'must be able as a matter of habit to erect in 
himself the same inhibition which the first person's joke has overcome, so that, 
as soon as he hears the joke, the readiness for this inhibition will compulsively 
or automatically awaken. This readiness for inhibition, which I must regard as 
a real expenditure, analogous to mobilization in military affairs, will at the same 
moment be recognized as superfluous or too late, and so be discharged in statu 
nascendi by laughter. '275 It is important not to get confused here. Freud's talking 
of summoning the energy for inhibition as a 'real expenditure' could easily lead one 
to wonder how much sense it makes to talk about 'saved' energy being available 
for discharge in laughter. How can energy which has already been summoned, 
energy the summoning of which involves psychical expenditure, possibly be 'saved' 
energy? But it seems Freud means that the psychical expenditure is intuitively 
felt as necessary, and the psychical energy needed for inhibition is therefore built 
up in a way rather similar to Spencer's nervous energy. It is this built-up energy 
itself, not the expenditure made in generating it, which is seen as superfluous, and 
which is then discharged in laughter. 
But again, no evidence is offered to support the claim that we intuitively 
summon the energy for inhibition whenever we hear a joke. And there is a further 
problem with the similar line of reasoning used in Freud's discussion of the comedy 
of exaggerated movement. Remember that the energy saved in laughter at the 
comic is supposed to be that of ideation or thought. The energy summoned to 
understand an exaggerated physical movement, one is asked to believe, is greater 
than that required to understand the movement one would need to make oneself in 
order to achieve the same end. So the increased expenditure required to understand 
the first is rendered superfluous and discharged in laughter. But in what sense is 
it superfluous? In order for the comparison upon which Freud's case depends 
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to take place, the energy required to understand each movement must actually 
be expended, otherwise we would have no way of knowing that the movement 
at which we laugh is exaggerated. So while Freud's line of reasoning previously 
seemed merely implausible, in the case of the comedy of exaggerated movement it 
seems totally incoherent. 
Next we move on to a problem with the mechanism of pleasure in innocent 
jokes. In all three groups of joke-techniques which he mentions here, Freud's 
explanations sound implausible. We shall limit our discussion to the third group. 
Remember that here, in displacement, faulty reasoning, absurdity and nonsense, 
we save psychical energy in that we are released from the constraints of having 
to think logically, to keep to a train of thought or to put words and thoughts 
together so as to make sense. This is an inadequate explanation for the following 
reasons. Consider, for instance, nonsense verse. As mentioned in Chapter Two, 
the cleverness of the first verse of Jabberwocky, for example, lies in the fact that 
the words have been ingeniously put together so as to sound as if they ought to 
mean something. As in most nonsense verse, the person who really appreciates the 
humour in this, when coming across it for the first time, is the person who tries 
to make sense of it, and fails to do so. Trying to make sense of something, and 
failing, surely involves greater psychical expenditure than instantaneously making 
sense of something in the usual way. 
The notion of fore-pleasure is also problematic. We can question, as does 
Richard Wollheim, how the fore-pleasure is of sufficient strength to make sure that 
an inhibition is lifted276 • We have seen that fore-pleasure is that derived from 
the technique alone of a tendentious joke. On Freud's admission, this is a 'small 
amount '277 of pleasure. And yet we are asked to believe that this small amount of 
pleasure is sufficient to overcome, at least momentarily, deep-rooted inhibitions. It 
is very difficult to see why. And given the importance of the notion of fore-pleasure 
in Freud's account, this is a major problem. 
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4.4.3 'The comic' and humour 
Freud's determination to explain everything in terms of differences in psychic 
energy makes his discussion of the comic in character look reductionist and very 
implausible. The claim that a character is comic to the extent that he expends, 
in comparison to oneself, more energy on the physical and less on the mental is 
unsupportable. Who expends more energy on the mental, via his daydreaming, 
and is comic because of it, than James Thurber's Walter Mitty? Moreover, the 
example Freud provides here, of laughter at the ignorant exam candidate, is a 
particularly bad one. Precisely the opposite of what Freud claims is true. If 
the pleasure is derived from an enjoyment of one's superiority over those more 
ignorant than oneself, this may be heightened if the person at whom one laughs 
puts in considerable mental expenditure in order to produce the 'comic nonsense' 
which constitutes his answers. The candidate who tries hard and produces rubbish 
is more comic than he who, realising he cannot do the exam, spends just half an 
hour and minimal psychical expenditure writing his 'comic nonsense' and then, 
with a carefree attitude, walks out. Indeed, the candidate who has studied hard 
and yet is finding the exam difficult, although he will do much better than the 
carefree student, may even feel a sneaking 'astonishment and admiration' for his 
lazier, more laid-back colleague, whereas this 'astonishment and admiration' is 
what we are supposed to feel for those whose mental expenditure is greater than 
our own. 
Also, to stress differences in psychical energy is to explain inadequately cases 
of the comic which depend upon shared experiences; shared predicaments in life. 
Often a character is comic not because of any difference between the amount of his 
mental or physical expenditure and ours, but because he finds himself in the same 
predicament that we have done. Or alternatively, as Morreall mentions, when we 
see him in a predicament which we have never experienced, we laugh precisely 
because we recognise that if we were in such a predicament, we would have no 
alternative but to act in the same way as he does. One example of this would be 
in farce, where the semi-naked lover, hiding on the window ledge until the coast 
is clear, finds himself locked out and has to find a way of reaching safety. If we 
find this amusing, our amusement can be explained either by Schadenfreude or 
by empathy with the lover and his predicament, depending upon our attitudes 
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towards adultery and to that particular character in the play. There is no reason 
to suppose, however, that our amusement depends in any way upon perceiving any 
difference between the lover's expenditure and what our own would be. 
Freud is forced to admit essentially this point when he comes to discuss 'the 
comic of situation 1278 , and mentions a situation in which 'in the middle of an 
activity which makes demands on a person's mental powers, he is suddenly in-
terrupted by a pain or excretory need'. 279 Although he recognises that in similar 
circumstances we could act no differently, Freud still tries to stick to his formula, 
insisting that here, 'the comic difference is that between the high degree of inter-
est taken by [the person concerned] before the interruption and the minimal one 
that he has left over for his mental activity when the interruption has occurred. '280 
This is wholly inadequate, and shows just how far Freud is prepared to twist his 
interpretations in order to get them to fit his theory. 
Finally, the problem of psychic energy emerges yet again in Freud's explanation 
of 'humour'. Consider the story about the navvy's being absent from his place of 
employment. Is it necessarily the case that pity arises and is then distracted? 
It seems to make far more sense to say that the appeal of this story is that it 
is so ridiculous, so obviously a joke (to use this term, for a moment, in a more 
general sense than Freud's), that, realising this, we recognise immediately that 
pity would be inappropriate here, and so none is actually generated. We have a 
similar scenario in gallows humour. Contrary to Freud's claim, it is not that pity 
is built up and then becomes unutilizable. A genuine feeling of pity will prevent 
the appreciation of gallows humour: to appreciate such humour, we need to be 
sufficiently 'distanced'. This condition is only fulfilled if little or no pity is built 
up. So in both cases, no pity is generated in the first place, and so we have the 
problem that the energy upon which Freud claims we 'economize' is not actually 
existing energy. 
4.5 The value of the release tradition 
It seems very clear that neither Freud nor Spencer offers anything like an ad-
278 Freud, Jokes, p.257. 
279 ibid. 
280 ibid. 
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equate theory. One of the key problems, in both cases, springs from taking the 
concept of 'energy' too literally, and trying to give an account of laughter within 
which nervous or psychical energy is understood as one would understand other 
kinds of energy. Indeed, since this energy is supposed to be dischargable as laugh-
ter, 'the supposition is accepted', as Swabey remarks, 'that, when there is a surplus 
of stored or available energy in an organism, there is a tendency (unless obstructed) 
for its conversion to kinetic forms. '281 This supposition leads Spencer and Freud 
inappropriately to quantify nervous or psychical energy: Spencer talking of the 
'quantity' of a 'feeling' and of one 'state of consciousness' as being 'inferior in 
mass' to another, and Freud explaining laughter in terms of the amount of su-
perfluous psychical energy available for discharge. As Wollheim remarks, Freud 
'sometimes treated propositions about energy and its liberation as though they 
were descriptions of observable or even introspectible phenomena'282 • 
However, provided we think of nervous or psychical energy in less literal terms, 
the central idea behind the release tradition can be made plausible, at least for 
some laughter situations. We mentioned some of these at the end of our critique 
of Spencer. More generally, it may be said that we operate under a number of 
constraints, and that laughter can act as a 'safety-valve'. We are under pressure 
to conform to social norms and moral codes; to obey the laws of reason and logic; 
even the need to be serious for most of the time can be felt as a constraint. We 
can see that it makes sense to claim that humour which breaks these rules can 
afford us a release, albeit transitory, from these constraints. In an essay on seaside 
postcards of the 'dirty joke' variety, George Orwell writes: 'Whatever is funny is 
subversive, every joke is ultimately a custard pie ... A dirty joke is ... a sort of mental 
rebellion, a momentary wish that things were otherwise'283 • The same applies to 
other jokes, which, centring around 'cowardice, laziness, dishonesty or some other 
quality which society cannot afford to encourage'28 \ give the subversive side of 
human nature a momentary freedom. 
281 Swabey, Comic Laugher, p.202. 
282 Wollheim, Freud, p.103. 
283 George Orwell, 'The Art of Donald McGill', in Collected Essays (London: Seeker and War burg, 
1961), p.176. 
284 ibid. 
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One extreme example of this is the festivals of the medieval period described 
by Mikhail Bakhtin: 'Nearly all the rituals of the feast of fools are a grotesque 
degradation of various church rituals and symbols and their transfer to the material 
bodily level: gluttony and drunken orgies on the altar table, indecent gestures, 
disrobing. '285 
An apology for such revelries was offered by the Paris School of Theology in 
1414. Such a diversion, and the release it affords, are needed: 
'so that foolishness, which is our second nature and seems to be inherent in 
man, might freely spend itself at least once a year. Wine barrels burst if from 
time to time we do not open them and let in some air. All of us men are barrels 
poorly put together, which would burst from the wine of wisdom, if this wine 
remains in a state of constant fermentation of piousness and fear of God. We 
must give it air in order not to let it spoil. This is why we permit folly on 
certain days so that we may later return with greater zeal to the service of 
God.'286 
One of the benefits of laughter, then, is that it can act as a 'safety-valve', 
allowing us a momentary freedom from the constraints life puts upon us. 
4.6 Summary and conclusion 
To recap on this theoretical tradition, we will start by returning to Spencer. We 
observed that his notion of nervous energy was obscure- though less so than Freud's 
psychical energy. Moreover, much of the time, no nervous energy is introduced to 
or developed in a situation, and so none could require release. In addition, to the 
extent that Spencer can account for individual differences in senses of humour at all, 
his answer, in terms of other emotions of sufficient 'mass' being available to absorb 
the superfluous nervous energy, is wholly inadequate. And finally, we observed 
that a joke often plunges us into a situation of emotional tension, rather than our 
being in one in which qur emotional energy is suddenly rendered superfluous. 
285 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, trans. Helene lswolsky (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. 
Press, 1968), pp.74-75. 
286 Quoted in Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p.75. 
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As regards Freud, the objections we raised included questioning his assumption 
that innocent jokes necessarily afford less pleasure than tendentious jokes. This 
may be true as a generalisation, but largely ignores individual differences in sense 
of humour. Also, we pointed out that jokes can serve more 'purposes' than the 
venting of lustful and hostile instincts, two of these additional purposes being 
release from the pressures of sexual potency and aggressiveness as cultural ideals: 
the converses of the very pressures which Freud stresses. On the mechanism of 
pleasure, we noted the speculative nature of Freud's theory: that no evidence 
was offered to support some of his most central claims, such as why we should 
assume that the pleasure derived from a joke should be equivalent to a saving 
in psychical energy. There seemed no good reason to accept Freud's claim that 
when we hear a joke, we summon inhibitory energy in case it is needed, and then 
realise it is superfluous and discharge it. Furthermore, when applied to areas such 
as the comedy of exaggerated movement, this notion seemed incoherent. Indeed, 
Freud's explanations of 'the comic' and humour in general seem rather contrived -
all stemming from his determination to mould the evidence to fit his hypothesis, 
desired conclusions simply being read into his material. This is reminiscent of the 
I 
stretching of terminology we encountered in both the incongruity and superiority 
traditions. c.( c ~.- '·c, . - ,..,-~ 
'h ... !. .. ~· :: 
To Freud's credit, however, we should note, with our previous two chapters in 
mind, that he at least sees the need to consider both the object of amusement, 
on which incongruity theorists focus but superiority theorists do not; and the 
question of why we laugh, which is central to the superiority tradition but not 
the incongruity tradition. His account of joke-techniques addresses the former 
question, and the rest of his theory the latter. But we also observed that we 
have been given insufficient reason to see why the small amount of fore-pleasure 
derivable from a joke's technique is sufficiently strong to lift an inhibition. It 
therefore seems that Freud has failed to adequately link the first part of his theory 
with the most important aspect of the second. 
The nature of Freud's theory is such that we cannot offer a critique of it in 
terms of demonstrable proof or refutation. However, it is insufficiently plausible 
to be convincing. Nevertheless, we concluded that, if the notions of nervous or 
psychical energy are taken less literally, we can see what is of value in this third 
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theoretical tradition, and that it serves as an adequate explanation of at least some 
important laughter situations. 
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Chapter V 
A conclusion and its implications 
Our discussion so far has taken in the three main humour-theoretical traditions. 
We have shown what is of value in each, and that each thereby succeeds in throwing 
some light on the phenomena of humour and laughter. We have also seen, however, 
that none is adequate as an all-encompassing theory. 
5.1 A synthesis of theories? 
One possible reaction to this realisation would be to suggest a synthesis of 
the theories. It has been argued that one would be mistaken in viewing these 
theoretical traditions as being in competition with each other. For instance, Raskin 
claims that they: 
'are not at all incompatible ... The three approaches actually characterize the 
complex phenomenon of humor from very different angles and do not at all 
contradict each other- rather they seem to supplement each other quite nicely. 
In our terms, the incongruity-based theories make a statement about the stim-
ulus; the superiority theories characterize the relations or attitudes between the 
speaker and the hearer; and the release j relief theories comment on the feelings 
and psychology of the hearer only. '287 
This is not strictly true, of course: the superiority of the hearer may be over 
a third person or group rather than the joke-teller, and Freud, the most eminent 
release-theorist, makes an attempt, in his discussion of joke-techniques, to deal 
with the 'stimulus', as well as the hearer's feelings. But Raskin's main point is 
reasonable, being similar to one we have already made: that the incongruity tradi-
tion concentrates on the joke itself, and the other two traditions on the laugher's 
feelings. 
287 Raskin, Semantic Mechanisms of Humor, p.40. 
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However, while it is true that Hobbes, Schopenhauer and Freud do indeed 
focus on different aspects of the subject, their theories were not intended to be 
complementary to one another. Each theory seems to have been offered as a 
comprehensive one. This is clearest in the case of the most detailed theory, that 
of Freud, but is also true of Hobbes and Schopenhauer, as we have seen: Hobbes 
asserts that 'laughter is nothing else but sudden glory ... ', and Schopenhauer 
announces his as 'the true theory of the liicherlich'. There are no qualifying clauses 
here saying that these writers intend their theories to refer only to certain kinds 
of humour or laughter experiences. To this extent, then, they are competitors: 
competing attempts to to offer a general theory of humour and laughter. 
Nevertheless, Raskin might retort, the idea that we should aim for a synthesis 
of theories can be considered regardless of the the original intentions of Hobbes, 
Schopenhauer and Freud. Raskin claims that a synthesis would give a better ap-
proximation to what humour is than any single theory alone. And this is probably 
true. Indeed, it is interesting to note that such a synthesis is evident - albeit 
pre-Freud - in Charles Darwin's remarks on the causes of laughter: 
'Something incongruous or unaccountable, exciting surprise and some sense of 
superiority in the Iaugher, who must be in a happy frame of mind, seems to be 
the commonest cause .. .If the mind is strongly excited by pleasurable feelings, 
and any little unexpected event or thought occurs, then, as Mr Herbert Spencer 
remarks, "a large amount of nervous energy instead of being allowed to expend 
itself in producing an equivalent amount of the new thoughts and emotion 
which were nascent, is suddenly checked in its flow ... The excess must discharge 
itself in some other direction, and there results an effiux through the motor 
nerves to various classes of the muscles, producing the half-convulsive actions 
we term laughter". '288 
But the key point is this. Such a synthesis will still not give us an adequate 
general theory. We have seen that the inadequacies of the theoretical traditions are 
not merely those of omission, whereby a combination with another theory or set of 
theories which looked at the phenomena from a different perspective would solve 
288 Charles Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p.l98. 
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the problem. Some of the most important problems are intrinsic to the theories 
- most notably the stretching of terminology we observed in both the incongruity 
and superiority traditions. So it cannot be overemphasised: while Raskin may 
well be right to suggest that a synthesis of theories would be an improvement, as 
a theory, on each of those theories by itself, it would still not give us an adequate 
general theory. And unless it can do so, it is not clear that we can learn any more 
from dealing with incongruity, superiority and release in synthesised form, than 
we can learn from considering each theoretical tradition separately. 
5.2 Suggestions for future work on humour and laughter 
We will now briefly reflect upon the reasons for the failure of the theories 
we have considered, and ask what these reasons imply for future work on the 
philosophy of humour and laughter. In the case of the incongruity- and superiority-
based theories, a common denominator in their failure is very clear. We recall our 
conclusion that in both of these cases, a key reason for the theories' failure was 
the need, in their attempt to account for some of the kinds of humour which they 
faced, to stretch the meaning of the key term, be it incongruity or superiority. 
With Freud, the terminology is not stretched, but there is another major problem: 
Freud's approach to his material is so heavily influenced by his own preconceptions 
that he often moulds the evidence to fit his hypothesis, offering explanations which 
sound like conclusions are being read into, rather than genuinely elicited from, that 
evidence. 
It may be objected that the fact that these traditions have failed to provide 
an adequate general theory does not imply that no such theory could exist. Log-
ically, of course, this is true. But when we consider the vast range of material, 
situations and experiences for which an adequate general theory of humour and 
laughter would have to account, it becomes reasonable to doubt that any essen-
tialist, universalist account could hope to succeed without being forced to resort 
to some such move as stretching its terminology or offering explanations which 
merely serve to confirm whatever theory-laden preconceptions are brought to it. 
The detailed analysis of the previous chapters, though it has shed light on various 
aspects of our subject, has also lent weight to the common-sensical view that in 
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humour and laughter we are dealing with phenomena far too rich and complex to 
be adequately explained in terms of a single formula. 
And yet this does not prevent contemporary theorists from continuing in this 
vein. Morreall bemoans the fact that despite the increased academic interest in 
humour and laughter of recent years, there have of late been 'very few attempts 
to construct a comprehensive theory of laughter and humor' 289 • Morreall then 
spends a lengthy chapter of Taking Laughter Seriously outlining a rather forced 
theory which is intended to rectify this deficiency, based around the vague formula 
that 'laughter results from a pleasant psychological shift '290 • Morreall is right that 
in those fields in which humour research is most actively pursued - principally 
psychology - many recent writers have concentrated on smaller, more manage-
able questions about certain aspects of humour and laughter, rather than general 
all-encompassing theories thereof. But surely a major reason for this, as humour 
scholars look at previous attempts at 'comprehensive' theories and consider the 
reasons for their failure, is the increasing suspicion that the task is impossible. 
Besides, pace Morreall, we can state that there is simply no need for future philo-
sophical work on humour and laughter to continue the seemingly doomed attempt 
to construct further general theories which are intended to be all-encompassing. 
Indeed, it makes far more sense for humour theorists to abandon the attempt to 
offer an essentialist, universalist account of humour and laughter. The views of 
literary critic Paul E. Lewis on the faults of literary critical work in this field sound 
a cautionary note to humour theorists in all disciplines: 
'Humor criticism ... has suffered far too much already from overgeneralization: 
attempts to argue that humor can be easily explained or subsumed under a 
catchy formula or definition ... the last thing humor criticism now needs is an-
other reductive and too-broad theory'. 291 
In conclusion, then, we can say that the basic question motivating each of 
the major theories seems to be: 'What does all laughter, or all humour, have in 
common?' And it seems likely that the reason that this question has not been 
289 Morreall, Taking Laughter Seriously, p.x. 
290 Morreall, Taking Laughter Seriously, p.39. 
291 Paul E. Lewis, Comic Effects: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Humor in Litera-
ture (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), p.x. 
118 
satisfactorily answered is not simply that the perfect 'comprehensive theory of 
laughter and humor' has yet to be found, but that no such theory is possible. No 
answer can be given to the above question because there is no one factor which all 
humour, or all instances of laughter, have in common. 
5.3 An introduction to a 'smaller' question 
So the approach of the rest of this dissertation, unlike the approach of Morreall, 
will not be to offer yet another theory which is intended to be 'comprehensive'. 
Instead, I will follow a suggestion made by Lewis: that humour research should 
move away from all-encompassing theories and towards 'questions about the forms 
and functions' 292 of humour and laughter. 
We will deal with such a question in the final chapter. Here we will consider two 
views of the functions of laughter: one social, and one individual. Let us pause to 
reconsider the theories we have looked at so far, in the light of the question: 'What 
is the function of humour and laughter?' How would Schopenhauer, Hobbes and 
Freud respond to this? The answer is most obvious in Freud: tendentious jokes 
offer the means by which a freedom from inhibitions may be attained. There is 
no reason to suppose that these inhibitions are forever triumphed over, however: 
the freedom seems likely only to be a momentary one. We have also seen that 
Schopenhauer explains the pleasure taken in incongruity in terms of a momentary 
freedom: in his case, from reason. Finally, if one takes a Hobbesian view of man 
and laughter, the feeling of sudden glory which causes laughter can also be viewed 
as a momentary freedom: for the brief time during which we laugh, we need not 
fear the other's self-assertion as the threat which it usually constitutes, as we can 
glory, for the moment, in our superiority over him. 
Of course, these freedoms are all of different kinds: we would not be justified 
in falling back into the universalist trap of attempting to bring all of these diverse 
functions of laughter under one banner heading, and attempting to construct a 
new 'freedom' theory of laughter. However, it does make it interesting to consider 
just how far the connection between laughter, the sense of humour, and individual 
freedom can be taken. It is this question which we will explore in the final chapter, 
292 Lewis, Comic Effects, p.x. 
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via a consideration of two views of the function of laughter - one restricting, and 
one celebrating, individual freedom. 
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Chapter VI 
Two views of the function of laughter: social correction 
and individual liberation 
The purpose of this chapter is to compare and contrast two views of the func-
tion of laughter. The first of these comes from the author of one of the best known 
and most influential books on laughter, the second from a philosopher hardly ever 
mentioned in connection with the subject. These writers are Henri Bergson and 
Friedrich Nietzsche respectively. We will consider Bergson's view that the func-
tion of laughter is to act as a social corrective, and contrast this with the role 
laughter plays in Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra, where it is presented as the 
appropriate response to the ultimate liberation of an individual. 
6.1 Henri Bergson and the social function of laughter 
Bergson is one of the best-known theorists of laughter. His book Le Rire293 
has been described by one literary critic, D.J.Palmer, as 'the beginning of modern 
comic theory' 29\ and shares with Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious the 
distinction of being arguably the best known text in the field. 
The aspect of Bergson's theory on which we will concentrate here, that laughter 
is above all a social corrective, is a central one therein. We will consider Bergson's 
claims that 'our laughter is always the laughter of a group'; that therefore laughter 
must be considered in its 'natural environment' of society; and that its function is 
a social one. We will need briefly to consider the dualism between the mechanical 
and the living in Bergson, as it relates to his claim that the comical consists in 
'something mechanical encrusted on the living'. The examples he offers to illus-
trate this point are intended to give us a glimpse of laughter's social function: 
293 First translated, as Laughter: an essay on the meaning of the comic, by Cloudesley 
Brereton and Fred Rothwell (London and New York: Macmillan, 1911). Also included, under the 
title Laughter, in Wylie Sypher (ed.), Comedy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1956), pp.61-190. Page numbers given in this chapter refer to this latter edition. 
294 D.J.Palmer, in the editor's introduction to his Comedy: Developments in Criticism (Lon-
don: Macmillan, 1984), p.15. 
121 
society plays upon the fact that nobody likes being laughed at by using laughter 
as a weapon to hold over individuals who exhibit 'inelasticity' and 'unsociability'; 
qualities which stand in the way of what society requires of an individual. In-
dividuals are thereby coerced into acting in the way which is required for social 
living. 
6.1.1 Laughter as a social entity 
The first place to start in our task of fleshing out the above outline is the 
beginning of Laughter. There, Bergson stresses three fundamental observations on 
the comic which he intends to guide his approach to the subject. One of these is 
that laughter is a social entity: 'You would hardly appreciate the comic if you felt 
yourself isolated from others ... Our laughter is always the laughter of a group. '295 
In support of this claim, he mentions the experience of overhearing: 
'travellers relating to one another stories which must have been comic to them, 
for they laughed heartily. Had you been one of their company, you would have 
laughed like them, but, as you were not, you had no desire whatever to do so. 
A man who was once asked why he did not weep at a sermon when everyone 
else was shedding tears replied: "I don't belong to the parish!" What that man 
thought of tears would be still more true of laughter. However spontaneous it 
seems, laughter always implies a kind of secret freemasonry, or even complicity, 
with other laughers, real or imaginary. How often has it been said that the 
fuller the theatre, the more uncontrolled the laughter of the audience! On the 
other hand, how often has the remark been made that many comic effects are 
incapable of translation from one language to another, because they refer to 
the customs and ideas of a particular social group!' 296 
Bergson's assumption throughout his essay, then, is that: 'To understand 
laughter, we must put it back into its natural environment, which is society, and 
above all we must determine the utility of its function, which is a social one. Such, 
let us say at once, will be the leading idea of all our investigations. '297 
295 Bergson, Laughter, p.64. 
296 Bergson, Laughter, pp.64-65. 
297 Bergson, Laughter, p.65. 
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6.1.2 Mechanism, life, automatism and inelasticity 
How is this 'leading idea' used in Bergson's theory? To understand Laughter, 
we must bear in mind Bergson's overall philosophical position. Reacting against 
mechanistic and materialistic attempts to understand reality, he offers a vitalist 
view central to which is the idea of an elan vital or 'life force'. A key contrast here, 
then, is between the mechanical and the living, and it is in this context that we 
must understand what has become the most quoted phrase from Laughter: namely, 
that the comical consists in 'something mechanical encrusted on the living'298 • 
To understand the emergence of this formula, and its connection with the 
Bergsonian view of the function of laughter, we need to consider some of the ex-
amples Bergson gives. The first is the man who stumbles and falls in the street 
- basically the familiar 'banana-skin' joke - and the second the simple victim of 
common practical jokes, such as filling his pen's inkstand with mud or removing 
his chair when he goes to sit down. 'The laughable element in both cases con-
sists of a certain mechanical inelasticity, just where one would expect to find the 
wideawake adaptability and the living pliableness of a human being. '299 It is a 
'lack of elasticity, through absentmindedness and a kind of physical obstinacy, as 
a result, in fact, of rigidity or of momentum'300 that makes one continue 'like a 
machine in the same straight line'301 , thus failing to avoid the stone in the road. A 
trace of this self-same inelasticity is also present in Bergson's third example, that 
quality which he claims has inspired many a comic writer: absent-mindedness. The 
absent-minded individual demonstrates his rigidity by failing to adapt himself to 
reality. Fourthly, the 'over-romantic, Utopian bent of mind'302 of a Don Quixote 
betrays a similar inelasticity. Such impractical idealists bear strong affinities with 
Bergson's first two examples: 'They, too, are runners who fall and simple souls 
who are being hoaxed - runners after the ideal who stumble over realities, child-
like dreamers for whom life delights to lie in wait. '303 Finally, those who are guilty 
of comic vice also display rigidity. The kind of vice capable of making a character 
298 Bergson, Laughter, p.84. 
299 Bergson, Laughter, p.67. Throughout, any italics are Bergson's. 
300 Bergson, Laughter, p.66. 
301 ibid. 
302 Bergson, Laughter, p.69. 
303 ibid. 
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comic is 'that which is brought from without, like a ready-made frame into which 
we are to step. It lends us its own rigidity instead of borrowing from us our flexi-
bility. We do not render it more complicated; on the contrary, it simplifies us. '304 
Hence we can see how a particular 'comic type' can come into existence. Rather 
than seeing, as in tragedy, characteristics incorporated in a particular individual, 
here the vice itself, rather than the characters as individuals, remains central. The 
vice 'plays on them as on an instrument or pulls the strings as though they were 
puppets. '305 We see them not as a particular individual, but in terms of their vice: 
as a miser, a misanthropist, or whatever. 
What is common to all these examples? The answer, Bergson is keen to stress, 
is 'an effect of automatism and of inelasticity. '306 And it is from here that we get 
a glimpse 'of the laughable side of human nature and of the ordinary function of 
laughter. '307 That function is as follows. Life requires from each individual tension 
- a constant alertness to whatever is the present situation - and the elasticity 
necessary to adapt to it. Absence of these from the body can cause sickness, 
infirmity and accidents; from the mind mental deficiency and insanity; and from 
the character those serious inadaptibilities to social life which cause misery and 
sometimes crime. The standards set by society, however, are higher than those 
of life: whereas a moderate degree of adaptability enables one to live, society 'is 
not satisfied with simply living, it insists on living well. '308 Consequently, it fears 
that we might 'give way to the easy automatism of acquired habits'309 and also 
respect only the basic conditions of social adjustment rather than striving for 'an 
increasingly delicate adjustment of wills which will fit more and more perfectly 
into one another. '310 Hence society is suspicious of all inelasticity or rigidity of 
character, mind or body, as this is 'the sign of an eccentricity'311 , and uses as 
its weapon laughter, a 'social gesture'312 which, by inspiring fear, restrains such 
304 Bergson, Laughter, p.70. 
305 ibid. 
306 Bergson, Laughter, p.72. 
307 ibid. 
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inelasticity. 
Bergson does not intend this to be understood as a definition of the comic, but 
it is intended to be 'the leitmotiv which is to accompany all our explanations. '313 
6.1.3 'The Comic in Character' 
He explicitly returns to this theme in his third and final chapter, 'The Comic 
in Character'. One of the 'essential conditions '314 needed in order that a character 
may appear laughable is that character's unsociability. Bergson claims that comedy 
begins with: 
'a growing callousness to social life. Any individual is comic who automatically 
goes his own way without troubling himself about getting in touch with the rest 
of his fellow-beings. It is the part of laughter to reprove his absentmindedness 
and wake him out of his dream ... Each member [of society] must be ever attentive 
to his social surroundings; he must model himself on his environment; in short, 
he must avoid shutting himself up in his own peculiar character as a philosopher 
in his ivory tower. Therefore society holds suspended over each individual 
member, if not the threat of correction, at all events the prospect of a snubbing, 
which, although it is slight, is none the less dreaded. Such must be the function 
of laughter. Always rather humiliating for the one against whom it is directed, 
laughter is really and truly a kind of social "ragging". '315 
This social corrective view of laughter is the central assumption of the dis-
cussion from then on. 'The man who withdraws into himself is liable to ridicule, 
because the comic is largely made up of this very withdrawal. This accounts for 
the comic being so frequently dependent on the manners or ideas, or, to put it 
bluntly, on the prejudices, of a society. '316 
The character's unsociability is essentially a form of automatism. Automa-
tism, we have observed, can manifest itself in the form of absentmindedness, ex-
313 Bergson, Laughter, p. 74. 
314 Bergson, Laughter, p.155. 
315 Bergson, Laughter, pp.147-148. 
316 Bergson, Laughter, p.150. 
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tending itself as far as the 'systematic absentmindedness'317 of Don Quixote. No 
character can be comical, claims Bergson, 'unless there be some aspect of his per-
son of which he is unaware, one side of his nature which he overlooks; on that 
account alone does he make us laughms. For instance, often a character condemns 
a certain line of action, and is then immediately guilty of it himself: an example, 
from Moliere, being M: Jourdain's philosophy teacher's criticising anger and then 
himself flying into a passion. This is but one example of 'inattention to self, and 
consequently to others'319 • Such inattention: 
'is here equivalent to what we have called unsociability. The chief cause of 
rigidity is the neglect to look around - and more especially within oneself: how 
can a man fashion his personality after that of another if he does not first 
study others as well as himself? Rigidity, automatism, absentmindedness and 
unsociability are all inextricably entwined; and all serve as ingredients to the 
making up of the comic in character. '320 
6.1.4 Bergson's conclusions on laughter 
Bergson's theory highlights the negative side of laughter. Though we some-
times sympathise with a comic character, and put ourselves briefly in his place, 
this sympathy cannot last long, claims Bergson, precisely because the function of 
laughter is to humiliate. 'By laughter, society avenges itself for the liberties taken 
with it. It would fail in its object if it bore the stamp of sympathy or kindness.' 321 
Of necessity, it works in a very hit and miss fashion: 
'Laughter punishes certain failings somewhat as disease punishes certain forms 
of excess, striking down some who are innocent and sparing some who are 
guilty, aiming at a general result and incapable of dealing separately with each 
individual case'.322 
317 Bergson, Laughter, p.l55. 
318 ibid. 
319 Bergson, Laughter, p.156. 
320 ibid. 
321 Bergson, Laughter, p.l87. 
322 Bergson, Laughter, p.l88. 
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This negative side of laughter results from the negative side of human nature: 
laughter can succeed in its aim of humiliating because of the trace of spite, or at 
least mischief, within man. This realisation leads to 'a curious pessimism which 
becomes the more pronounced as the Iaugher more closely analyses his laughter'. 323 
At the very end of his essay, Bergson remarks that laughter 'is a froth with 
a saline base. Like froth, it sparkles. It is gaiety itself. But the philosopher who 
gathers a handful to taste may find that the substance is scanty, and the aftertaste 
bitter. '324 
So what is Bergson's justification for laughter as he sees it? Despite its negative 
aspects, his overall view is to hold laughter's function of correction by humiliation 
in a positive light. He believes that overall, 'nature has utilised evil with a view 
to good'325 , and that, despite the injustices of laughter in each individual case, its 
overall result is 'a utilitarian aim of general improvement'326 • 
Despite his 'curious pessimism', then, it seems that in the final analysis, Berg-
son would sympathise with W.D.Wallis's remark that laughter is 'the jolly police-
man who keeps the social traffic going after the approved manner'. 327 
6.1.5 Summary 
In summary, then, we have seen that Bergson claims that 'our laughter is al-
ways the laughter of a group', and so we must understand its 'natural environment' 
to be society, and its function as being a social one. Examples are given to back 
up Bergson's claim that the comic consists in 'something mechanical encrusted on 
the living'. These are intended to give us a glimpse of the function of laughter: 
society requires from each individual a high degree of adaptability, or 'elasticity', 
and laughter is the weapon it uses to coerce individuals into adapting to its needs, 
since, by inspiring fear, laughter restrains inelasticity. 
323 ibid. 
324 Bergson, Laughter, p.190. 
325 ibid. 
326 Bergson, Laughter, p. 73. 
327 W.D.Wallis, 'Why Do We Laugh?', in Scientific Monthly, No.15 (1922), p.344. 
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6.2 Critique of Bergson 
Before analysing Bergson, we should observe that his is essentially a kind of 
superiority theory, and we shall not in this section merely repeat criticisms appli-
cable to Bergson which we have already made against superiority-based theories. 
However, there are two flaws Bergson's theory shares with theories previously crit-
icised in Chapters Two, Three and Four, and which are worth briefly mentioning. 
Firstly, in his list of examples of the laughable, there is, just as we observed in 
the incongruity and superiority traditions, an element of stretching of terminology 
needed to subsume under the heading of 'automatism' and 'inelasticity' phenomena 
as diverse as a man's stumbling over an obstacle, the dreams of a Don Quixote, and 
vices such as miserliness and misanthropy. Secondly, one suspects that, like Freud, 
Bergson at times reads desired conclusions into his - selective - evidence, rather 
than genuinely eliciting those conclusions from the evidence. There are plenty of 
examples of the laughable of which 'automatism' and 'inelasticity' are unnatural 
and implausible explanations. Even a comedian such as Buster Keaton, who, with 
his stiff, robot-like walk, seems at first glance to fit well the Bergson formula of 
'something mechanical encrusted on the living', is at his funniest when he is at 
his least 'automatic' and 'inelastic'. As Richard Boston points out, Keaton is at 
his best when 'he escapes from danger in a way that is intelligent, resourceful, 
graceful and unexpected - in short, human ... we laugh at the marvellous ingenuity 
with which Keaton faces new and unexpected circumstances. '328 • 
6.2.1 'The laughter of a group' 
Apart from this, however, what is our response to be to our central concern 
in Bergson; the view of laughter as a social phenomenon? At first glance, one's 
tendency is to agree with his preliminary observation that laughter is a social 
entity. Laughter is far more common in those activities of everyday life pursued in 
common with others, than in those pursued alone. Phrases which tie in with this 
assumption have entered the language. 'He's a good laugh' conjures up an image 
of a 'life and soul of the party' type; likewise 'it was a good laugh' would be far less 
likely to be used to describe a solitary event than a social one such as a party, or 
an evening out with friends. More importantly, there is the point made in Chapter 
328 Boston, An Anatomy of Laughter, p.135. 
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Two that one generally laughs with more gusto in company than alone; that there 
is something infectious about laughter. 
However, Bergson's claim is far bolder than that made in the above obser-
vations. Let us look again: 'Our laughter is always the laughter of a group.'329 
The main problem with evaluating this claim is Bergson's equivocation over the 
word 'group'. We saw, in the first lengthy quote of section 6.1.1, that he mentions 
overhearing the comic stories of a group of which one is not a member, and also 
the infectiousness of laughter amongst theatre audiences. Here, he clearly under-
stands 'group' in the sense of a group of friends, acquaintances, or people in the 
same place: an actual group of people, with a common physical location. Later in 
that same paragraph, however, he goes on to refer to 'comic effects' often being 
untranslatable due to their reference to the ideas of a particular social group. Here 
he clearly understands the term differently: 'the laughter of a group' can refer to 
a shared perspective or cultural understanding of a particular society, or section 
of society. 
So we need to consider Bergson's claim in the light of these two different 
understandings of 'the laughter of a group'. On the first understanding, the claim 
is patently false. It is perfectly possible to laugh outside the company of others, as 
anyone who has ever, whilst alone, read a particularly funny piece of comic writing, 
or watched a hilarious television programme, could testify. There are, of course, 
the points made in the first paragraph of this section, and it could be claimed 
that, all other factors being equal, one is more likely to laugh at the same joke 
in company than when alone, due to whatever causes laughter's infectiousness: 
a feeling of togetherness, perhaps. However, this claim is a significantly weaker 
one than Bergson's. Bergson himself betrays unease with his claim here by his 
need to appeal, in the paragraph under consideration, to 'secret freemasonry, or 
even complicity, with other laughers, real or imaginary'330 . But even referring 
to imaginary fellow laughers does not adequately explain solitary laughter. In 
particular, it does not explain the experience of being the only person amused by 
something, and hence being embarrassed by receiving blank stares from everyone 
else in one's company. In such situations, it is not clear that there must be someone 
329 Bergson, Laughter, p.64, my emphasis. 
330 ibid., my emphasis. 
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who, had they been there too, one is certain would also have laughed, thereby 
joining with one in forming a 'group'. Bergson's 'secret freemasonry, or even 
complicity, with other laughers, real or imaginary' is not a necessary condition for 
either amusement or laughter. 
We turn to the second understanding of the 'laughter of a group'. Interpreted 
in this way, Bergson can be seen to be making a very valuable point, namely that 
humour often does presuppose a set of values, and serves to reinforce these values, 
and thereby often the prejudices, of a particular set of people. One obvious way in 
which this manifests itself is in racist and sexist humour, which we have already 
mentioned in Chapter Three. Here, particular values and prejudices often manifest 
themselves in humour in the form of stereotypes: the 'thick' Irishman and the 
mean Jew, or the grotesque, nagging mother-in-law. Jokes which portray mothers-
in-law as ogres, Irishmen as stupid, and Jews as mean, all reinforce existing social 
stereotypes. There is an element, in all value- and prejudice-reinforcing humour, 
of the 'them and us' technique outlined during our discussion of racist and sexist 
humour. In humour which makes 'them' appear inferior to 'us', 'our' values and 
prejudices can thereby be reinforced. 
To this conservative view of laughter; that it reinforces a set of values, it may 
be objected that this fails to account for the subversive nature of much humour. 
Humour, especially satirical humour, often succeeds precisely because it attacks 
existing values and prejudices. P.G.Wodehouse- hardly the most obvious of sub-
versives- approvingly reports the view of one Wolcott Gibbs that: 'Humour implies 
ridicule of established institution'331 • We might reasonably suggest this is one of 
the reasons Plato considered comedy to be a threat to his ideal society. 
But Bergson can be defended against this objection. It may indeed be possi-
ble to distinguish humour which attacks the established values and prejudices of 
society in general- 'radical' humour- from that which defends such values and prej-
udices - 'conservative' humour. But closer inspection of 'radical' humour reveals 
an interesting point. 'Radical' comedians, like their traditional counterparts, also 
reinforce a given perspective, albeit that of a smaller portion of society. By means 
331 P.G.Wodehouse, 'Some Thoughts on Humorists', in Richard Usborne (ed.), Vintage Wade-
house (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), p.l97. 
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of an example, take a comedian such as the black American Richard Pryor. Much 
of Pryor's early stand-up comedy consisted of anti-police material, viewing white 
authority as 'the enemy'. Although this is not the established view of society as a 
whole, it nevertheless served to reinforce the perspective and, indeed, prejudices, of 
Pryor's own audience, consisting primarily of young liberal whites, and blacks who 
may have shared Pryor's resentment of the police. A similar point can be made 
about the 'alternative comedy' movement which emerged in Britain in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, and which was based around the rejection of sexist, racist 
and anti-gay material. The anti-authoritarian humour offered by 'alternative' co-
medians in place of the fare of the traditional stand-up comic itself presupposes a 
particular set of values, usually of the political left. Additionally, after a few years, 
during which a number of the first wave of 'alternative' comics became mainstream 
television performers and writers, there become evident a need, under the pressure 
of producing regular material, to draw upon a new set of stereotypes. Mothers-in-
law, Irishmen and gays were replaced as stock comic characters by new figures of 
fun- Margaret Thatcher being a favourite- and new stereotypes, such as 'yuppies' 
and 'Essex Man'. So such 'radical', 'subversive' humour often ends up doing the 
same job as the jokes dependent upon the stereotypes of the traditional stand-up 
comedian: reinforcing the values and prejudices of a particular potential audience. 
However, while the above shows that laughter is often that of a group, rein-
forcing values and prejudices even more often than may at first appear to be the 
case, we shall shortly see reason to dispute the claim that this is always the case. 
Hence we shall also dispute the claim that laughter must necessarily be understood 
as a social phenomenon, with a social function. We shall say no more about this 
at this stage, but will wait until our consideration of the laughter of the individual 
in Nietzsche. 
6.2.2 The importance of playfulness 
We turn to another objection to Bergson: an important factor which Berg-
son, like Hobbes, overlooks. In concentrating solely on the value- and prejudice-
reinforcing side of laughter, Bergson fails to consider the spirit of playfulness which 
we have already accused Hobbes of ignoring: the playfulness which, we have main-
tained, is needed to explain the enjoyment of much humour based around nonsense 
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and absurdity. We mentioned before that adults can enjoy the humour in children's 
literature such as Winnie the Pooh to the extent that they have retained some-
thing of this spirit of childlike playfulness. The same may be said of adults who 
can enjoy 'childish' nonsensical jokes, such as the following: 
'Q: What's purple and lies at the bottom of the ocean? 
A: Moby Plum.' 
One will be not be able to appreciate jokes like this unless one is prepared 
to allow oneself to relish a childlike 'silliness': the pleasure comes precisely from 
seeing something from a new angle ·and in a spirit of playfulness. This is 
certainly a more plausible explanation of how the above joke can be enjoyed than 
what seems to be the Bergsonian alternative, namely that we laugh in order to 
coerce by humiliation either whales or plums into being flexible enough to adapt 
to whatever society demands of them. 
Another important deficiency of Bergson's theory is that it cannot answer the 
question of why each individual values humour, or the possession of a sense of 
humour. And yet, as we mentioned at the outset, virtually all individuals do. 
Recall the great offence taken by people accused of having no sense of humour. 
This cannot be explained in terms of Bergson's justification of laughter: that 
each individual values his sense of humour because he sees the value of laughter's 
pursuing 'a utilitarian aim of general improvement'. So why, exactly, do we value 
a sense of humour? Some of the advantages of having a sense of humour can be 
made clearer by considering serious and humorous attitudes to various experiences, 
or to life in general, as discussed by Morreall332 • And this, we shall see, shows that 
Bergson's view of the motives behind laughter have far more in common with 
a serious than a humorous attitude: that accepting a Bergsonian view involves 
affirming a theory which attributes to laughter the most serious, even sinister, of 
motives. 
6.2.3 Serious and humorous attitudes 
To have a serious attitude towards a particular issue, claims Morreall, involves 
considering it as important and worthy of our resolute attention, allowing it to 
332 Morreall, Taking Laughter Seriously, pp.l21-129. 
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make demands upon us which call for earnestness both in our intentions towards 
it and in the way we think and speak about it. In contrast, having a humorous 
attitude towards something involves being distanced from its practical aspects. 
(We have mentioned before this idea of the need to maintain a certain 'distance'.) 
You do not feel governed by the situation which amuses you, and are able to feel 
playful towards it. To use a Morreall example we have also mentioned before, 
imagine getting up in the morning and, whilst still half asleep, pouring coffee over 
your cornflakes. To find this funny, you need to be able to step back from being 
practically involved in what you are doing: the person who gets upset because 
of wasted food and time is precisely the one who has not attained this distance, 
the one who is still engaged in the practicalities of making his breakfast. Morreall 
claims that if we can achieve this distance from a situation, we are free from being 
totally dominated by that situation. This is regularly attested to by humorists 
living under oppressive political regimes. 333 
In reality, of course, we all have practical concerns. But this ability to distance 
oneself, the ability not to get 'locked into a practical frame of mind'334 makes 
the person with a sense of humour more flexible and open to experience than the 
individual whose attitude is fundamentally a serious one. The person with a sense 
of humour, Morreall continues, lives with: 
'the awareness that nothing is important in an absolute way; to become ob-
sessed with something he values, or to get locked into a particular way of 
looking at things, he will see as unhealthy. Even when engaged in some practi-
cal task, moreover, he realizes that it is often best to take a somewhat playful 
and humorous attitude toward what he is doing, for the simple psychological 
333 Humour is often perceived by such regimes as being a great potential threat, because of its ability to 
enable people to see things from perspectives other than the officially approved 'correct' perspective. 
Ideologically unsound humour therefore tends to be heavily censored. In the days of hard-line 
Communism in the Soviet Union, the Central Committee of the Communist Party established a 
state journal of humour, K rokodil, the aim of which was: 'By the weapon of satire, to expose 
the thieves of public property, grafters, bureaucrats, boastful snobs, subservient individuals and 
rottenness; ... and to subject to criticism the bourgeois culture of the West, showing its ideological 
insignificance and decay'. When on one occasion the writers of Krokodil strayed too far from 
these rigid aims, the entire staff was sacked. (See Morreall, Taking Laughter Seriously, 
p.l02.) 
334 Morreall, Taking Laughter Seriously, p.123. 
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reason that the distance of humor will keep him calm and thus working more 
effectively. '335 
These latter claims make for a highly idealised description. Though most of 
us like to think of ourselves as having a sense of humour, few of us would claim to 
live up to the standards described here. Most of us, surely, whilst agreeing that 
keeping the distance necessary to be able to see things in perspective is a valuable 
asset, would admit that all too often we fail in this regard. We do get too involved 
in the day to day trivia of our lives; we are likely to curse that stupid coffee pot 
for allowing itself to be poured over the cornflakes when it knows perfectly well 
that we've got a train to catch. 
Nevertheless, the point about the need not to be over-involved, and not to 
attach too great an importance to an issue are important characteristics of a hu-
morous attitude towards it. We can see how such an attitude would help one attain 
a more relaxed and 'philosophical' attitude to life. We can see how this in turn 
could help protect us from unnecessary anxiety. Furthermore, 'getting' a joke often 
involves seeing things in a way which one hadn't thought of before, or from a new 
perspective: one realises that there are more ways of looking at the world than one 
previously realised. This realisation, coupled with the absence of self-absorption 
(that is, attaching to oneself as one currently is an inappropriate absolute impor-
tance), can be particularly useful in enabling one to laugh at oneself. To do this 
one needs to have attained the distance necessary for healthy self-criticism, and 
the potential for the improvement of one's character which thus results can make 
us feel more at home with ourselves, and make the personality of the person with 
a sense of humour more attractive to others than that of the person without. 
These, then, are some of the advantages of having a sense of humour. The rel-
evance of this to Bergson's theory is that, on Bergson's view, the motives behind 
laughter have far more' in common with a serious attitude than with a humorous 
one. Suppose for a moment that Bergson was correct in his view that what is 
laughable is 'rigidity', and that laughter functions as 'social ragging' which aims 
to make us fit in with society's demand that we be less 'rigid' and more 'elastic'. 
Two points need to be made here. Firstly, we can laugh at ourselves. And if, 
335 Morreall, Taking Laughter Seriously, p.125. 
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as argued above, an important aspect of the humorous attitude is the ability to 
distance oneself from a situation, to step back and see oneself from outside, then 
in laughing at ourselves, we must be recognising and laughing at our 'rigidity', 
and to the extent that we can do this, we have ceased to be 'rigid'. Secondly, con-
sider society's motives when it aims to 'correct' socially undesirable characteristics 
through laughter. In so far as it is intolerant of such characteristics, society can 
be accused of attaching practical- even absolute- importance to its own goals. So 
in this respect, society is itself 'rigid'. It is practically involved in its own motives, 
it cannot stand back and take in the wider view: it is incapable of possessing one 
of the most important attributes of the humorous attitude, and instead exhibits 
precisely those qualities more appropriately described as a serious attitude. On an 
individual level, too, for the same reasons, when an individual uses humour in such 
a way as to humiliate people into playing the role he has alloted to them in his 
goals or into conforming with his way of thinking, he is attaching to those goals or 
to that way of thinking a practical importance inappropriate to a truly humorous 
attitude. 
Bergson, then, presents us with a theory of laughter in which there lurks behind 
laughter the most serious and sinister of motives, and in which its social function 
puts great restrictions upon the freedom of the individual. 
Let us consider an alternative view of the function that laughter can have: one 
which not only allows for individual freedom, but which views laughter as being 
the appropriate response to an individual's ultimate liberation. 
6.3 Friedrich Nietzsche and the individual function of laughter 
Laughter is not one of the phenomena most commonly associated with Friedrich 
Nietzsche. Indeed, numerous people to whom I have mentioned my interest in Ni-
etzsche on laughter seem to have assumed that connecting the two was my own, 
rather warped, idea of a joke. The momentous-sounding ideas for which Nietzsche 
is best known - the Ubermensch, the will to power, the urgency of the need for 
self-overcoming - might at first glance appear to lend support to such a reaction. 
Moreover, in that small field of philosophical work on laughter and humour, Ni-
etzsche is almost invariably ignored. But ignoring Nietzsche's contribution to this 
subject is an important oversight, since he awards laughter a status higher than 
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that granted by any other philosopher. For Nietzsche, laughter is far from being 
a trivial, frivolous phenomenon. Rather, it plays an important role in his entire 
world-view. According,to Walter Kaufmann, 'for Nietzsche laughter represents an 
attitude toward the world, toward life and toward oneself. '336 
Although there is in Nietzsche no extended analysis of laughter, the role it 
plays in Thus Spoke Zarathustra sheds important new light on the role laughter 
can play in an individual's life337 • To understand this role, we need initially to 
consider two kinds of laughter, 'the laughter of the height', and the 'laughter of 
the herd', and the question of how the former may be achieved. 
6.3.1 'The laughter of the herd' 
In the prologue Zarathustra, after ten years of solitude in the mountains, de-
scends back into the world of men to share his wisdom with others. In the market 
place of the nearest town, he discourses on both the Ubermensch who, he teaches, 
is 'the meaning of the earth'338 , and the 'most contemptible'339 Last Man. The 
Last Man is, and is perfectly happy to be, virtually the same as everyone else. By 
contrast, the Ubermensch is, to quote Bernd Magnus, 'what is extraordinary rather 
than average, exceptional rather than everyday, rare rather than commonplace and 
common'. 340 The Ubermensch is the goal for which Nietzsche wishes the best spec-
imens of humanity to aim: a being who represents ascending life, self-overcoming 
and self-possession. It is important to realise, of course, that though Nietzsche 
has a very low regard for the common 'herd' of humanity, it is not a case of the 
336 Walter Kaufmann (trans. and ed.), The Basic Writings of Nietzsche (New York: Modern 
Library, 1968), p.422n. 
337 In the light of the importance of laughter in the development of Nietzsche's Zarathustra, it is 
interesting to note, as an aside, Mikhail Bakhtin's report of Pliny's remark that only one man was 
said to have laughed at the time of his birth: the original Zarathustra, or Zoroaster. Based on 
Aristotle's claim that a child does not begin to laugh before the fortieth day after its birth, and that 
only thereafter does it become a human being, Zarathustra's having entered the world laughing 
was apparently interpreted as an omen of his divine wisdom. (See Bakhtin, Rabelais and his 
World, p.69.) 
338 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. R.J.Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Pen-
guin, 1969), p.42. 
339 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p.45. 
340 Bernd Magnus, Nietzsche's Existential Imperative (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1978), p.33. 
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Ubermensch overcoming the herd by over-powering it, but of overcoming the herd 
instinct within himself. 
Back to Zarathustra in the market-place. The crowd greets Zarathustra's dis-
course with scornful, mocking laughter, and he realises that the townspeople hate 
him: 'there is ice in their laughter'. 341 They make it clear that they are not in-
terested in the Ubermensch and, mocking Zarathustra, ask him to make them into 
not the Ubermensch but the Last Man. Note the function which the crowd's laugh-
ter serves. It has a strong Bergsonian flavour. Firstly, at this stage of the book, 
Zarathustra feels that he has a message (that of the Ubermensch) to preach to the 
whole crowd. Clearly, Zarathustra's message is an idealistic one, and we have seen 
that Bergson includes idealism amongst his examples of the kinds of 'inelasticity' 
which can be comical. Secondly, we have also seen how for Bergson, each mem-
ber of society 'must be ever attentive to his social surroundings; he must model 
himself on his environment'. This Zarathustra singularly fails to do. (His failure 
is hardly surprising, given that he has lived as a solitary in the mountains for the 
previous ten years.) So for these reasons Zarathustra is, on Bergsonian terms, 
laughable. But he is not merely a figure of fun: we are told that there is 'ice' 
in the crowd's laughter. This is so because Zarathustra's radical discourse comes 
as a challenge and a threat to what the townspeople believe and want to believe. 
Behind the scornful laughter with which they dismiss it, lurks a deep resentment 
of Zarathustra, the outsider. Soon after his discourse, he is told: 'Go away from 
this town, 0 Zarathustra ... Too many people here hate you. The good and the just 
hate you and call you their enemy and despiser; the faithful of the true faith hate 
you, and they call you a danger to the people. It was lucky for you that they 
laughed at you ... you have saved yourself for today. '342 So in merely being laughed 
at and no more, Zarathustra has had a narrow escape. Here, then, we have a very 
clear illustration of the serious and sinister side of the Bergsonian laughter of social 
correction. In Nietzschean terms, we can call the crowd's laughter 'the laughter of 
the herd'. 343 
341 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p.47. 
342 Nietzsche, Zarathusfra, p.49. 
343 Note here, too, the fact that the crowd are not even prepared to consider Zarathustra's ideas before 
dismissing them: this reinforces our earlier point that, though it may indeed sometimes reprove 
the 'rigidity' and 'inelasticity' of individuals, society has its own 'rigidity' or 'inelasticity'. 
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6.3.2 'The laughter of the height' 
With 'the laughter of the herd' may be contrasted the 'laughter of the height'. 
Zarathustra reaches 'the height' at the end of part three of the book, when he 
embraces eternal recurrence, Nietzsche's view that everything that happens has 
happened before and will happen again, time after time. The most important 
point about eternal recurrence is not the ontological question of whether this is 
the way the world actually is. Nietzsche's predominant concern is rather with the 
individual who could affirm eternal recurrence: who, by achieving self-overcoming, 
could make his life so joyous that he would be perfectly happy to live the same life 
over and over again, for all eternity. But what is the role of laughter in such an 
affirmation? 
This is most powerfully illustrated by Zarathustra's vision near the start of 
part three. Within this vision, following the first explicit presentation of eternal 
recurrence, to his great enemy the 'Spirit of Gravity', Zarathustra is confronted 
with a young shepherd into whose mouth a heavy black snake has entered and 
bitten into the shepherd's throat. Try as he might, Zarathustra cannot tug the 
snake from the agonised shepherd, so he urges him to bite off its head. 
'The shepherd .. : bit as my cry had advised him; he bit with a good bite! He 
spat far away the snake's head - and sprang up. 
No longer a shepherd, no longer a man - a transformed being, surrounded 
with light, laughing! Never yet on earth had any man laughed as he laughed! 
0 my brothers, I heard a laughter that was no human laughter - and now 
a thirst consumes me, a longing that is never stilled. 
My longing for this laughter consumes me: oh how do I endure still to live! 
And how could I endure to die now!' 344 
Zarathustra cannot endure to die now because he has not yet laughed this 
extraordinary laughter. The urge to do so drives him on, and eventually, his 
consuming thirst is quenched, the real culmination of the book coming in the final 
four sections of the third part. Indeed, Zarathustra's facing up to and finally 
344 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p.l80. 
138 
embracing his most 'abysmal thought'34S, the eternal recurrence, is, in Laurence 
Lampert's words, 'the event for the sake of which the whole book exists.'346 
As Zarathustra himself suggests at the time, his vision is best seen as a premo-
nition. At the end of part three, we discover that the young shepherd is Zarathustra 
himself. And as for the heavy black snake: 
'The great disgust at man - it choked me and had crept into my throat: and 
what the prophet prophesied: "It is all one, nothing is worth while, knowledge 
chokes." 
... "'Alas, man recurs eternally! The little man recurs eternally!" 
'I had seen them both naked, the greatest man and the smallest man: all 
too similar to one another, even the greatest all too human! 
'The greatest all too small! - that was my disgust at man! And eternal 
recurrence even for the smallest! that was my disgust at all existence!'347 
Eternal recurrence is such an 'abysmal thought' because, if everything eternally 
recurs, this includes that which is small in man, which Nietzsche so passionately 
loathes. 'Nothing is worth while' because the ideal of a future Ubermensch, it 
seems, cannot be realised. Confronted with this thought, Zarathustra is so sickened 
that he is unable to get up, eat or drink for seven days. 
So how is this sickness triumphed over: how may the snake's head be bitten off? 
The answer, as Zarathustra comes to realise, is to give the highest affirmation of 
life possible: to say a joyous Yes to life despite its negative side, despite its horrors 
and suffering. When Zarathustra dances with Life following his redemption, he 
whispers to her words which are not explicitly revealed to the reader, but the 
progress of the book has left only one reasonable possibility. His words must be 
words which affirm eternal recurrence: as Lampert says, Life is told 'that she 
is of all things the sweetest. He loves her as she is and does not aim to alter 
345 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p.178. 
346 Laurence Lampert, Nietzsche's Teaching: An Interpretation of {Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra' (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), p.210. 
347 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, pp.235-236. 
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her. '348 Thus, in Zarathustra, the 'yea-saying attitude' which Nietzsche wants the 
exceptional individual to adopt to life in spite of its horrors and suffering, reaches 
its zenith: when there is nothing in life at which he cannot laugh the transforming, 
redeeming laughter of the shepherd. 
6.3.3 'Laughing lions' 
To further understand the role oflaughter in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, we should 
consider the fourth and final part, after Zarathustra's joyous affirmation. Harold 
Alderman expresses the view that the often overlooked part four is itself intended 
as a dramatic comedy which emphasises Nietzsche's claim that all things recur not 
by offering additional arguments, 'but by demanding that we re-experience and 
rethink what we have already experienced and thought. Thus does it become in 
both its content and form an icon of human existence by requiring of the reader 
what Zarathustra has required of himself: patient, finally playful, attention to the 
details of self-creation. '349 
We need to say more about what is meant by 'self-creation': what is the self 
that Zarathustra has created? To understand this, we need to consider one of 
Nietzsche's most puzzling phrases: 'How one becomes what one is'. For Niet-
zsche, there is no unchanging entity that constitutes the self. The self is rather 
something one creates, consisting of the sum total of one's thoughts, desires and 
actions. According to Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche holds that 'a person worthy 
of admiration, a person who has (or is) a self, is one whose thoughts, desires and 
actions are not haphazard but are instead connected to one another in the intimate 
way that indicates in all cases the presence of style ... an admirable self, as Niet-
zsche insists again and again, consists of a large number of powerful and conflicting 
tendencies that are controlled and harmonized ... style, which is what Nietzsche re-
quires and admires, involves controlled multiplicity and resolved conflict' .350 It is 
one of Nietzsche's central messages that one has the power to create one's self. 
348 Lampert, Nietzsche's Teaching, pp.238-239. 
349 Harold Alderman, Nietzsche's Gift (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1977), p.ll4. 
350 Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1985), p.7. 
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That explained, back to the laughter of the height. In part four, Zarathustra 
comes across a number of 'higher men'. While Nietzsche intends the reader to 
regard these higher men as superior to the 'herd', they are inferior to Zarathustra 
and are a long way from being Ubermenschen. Each of them exemplifies, according 
to Alderman, 'some incomplete aspect of Zarathustra's experience'351 and each 
comes to realise that, in comparison to Zarathustra, he is indeed incomplete in 
some way. Hence the higher men's cry of distress, which greets Zarathustra when he 
returns to his cave. Having already experienced the joy of the height, Zarathustra 
is capable of being more playful than the higher men and, announcing that they 
need someone to make them laugh, offers to play that role himself. Rejecting 
the adoration poured on him by one of the higher men on behalf of his fellows, 
Zarathustra tells them that 'You may all be Higher Men ... but for me - you are 
not high and strong enough. '352 What must follow are 'higher, stronger, more 
victorious, more joyful men, such as are square-built in body and soul: laughing 
lions must come!'353 
This is a reference to the subject of Zarathustra's first discourse after the 
prologue, the three metamorphoses of the human spirit: into a camel, from a 
camel to a lion, and from a lion to a child. Nietzsche, of course, strongly rejects 
the belief in objective, universal moral facts, asserting rather that just as one can 
create one's self, so one can create one's own values. But in order to do this, one 
must first liberate oneself from the burden of these absolute values which, camel-
like, the human spirit has taken on. By changing from a camel to a lion, the spirit 
becomes capable of struggling with and killing the dragon of absolutism. Thus 
the lion is able 'to create itself freedom for new creation'354 : the creation of its 
own values. Because of the role it has played in his own liberation, Zarathustra's 
praise of laughter in his speech to the higher men is ecstatic. He urges them to 
'learn to laugh at yourselves as a man ought to laugh!'355 Contrasting himself 
with Jesus, who in Luke 6:25 wishes 'woe to you who laugh now', Zarathustra has 
an alternative to Jesus's crown of thorns: 'This Iaugher's crown, this rose-wreath 
351 Alderman, Nietzsche's Gift, p.l17. 
352 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p.293. 
353 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p.294. 
354 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p.55. 
355 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p.303. 
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crown: I myself have set this crown on my head, I myself have canonized my 
laughter'. 356 He describes himself as 'Zarathustra the laughing prophet'357 and the 
speech ends on another passionate exhortation to the higher men to 'learn - to 
laugh!'358 Laughing lions, then, are what the higher men have to become in order 
to embrace the eternal recurrence and laugh the laughter of the height. It is only 
when they do this, which they indeed eventually do in an affirmation almost as 
ecstatic as Zarathustra's own, that they realise their freedom: that they do not 
need to follow some preordained code, or even Zarathustra himself: that they have 
the potential to create' their own selves and their own values. This creation can 
take place after their final metamorphosis into children, the child representing the 
'new beginning'359 and spirit of playfulness which Zarathustra wants the higher 
men to bring to their lives. 
What is clear from all this is that Nietzsche views laughter, the laughter of the 
height, as the appropriate response to Zarathustra's and the higher men's ultimate 
liberation. But what must this liberation be like? 
We must understand that Nietzsche is going far beyond those theories in the 
release tradition which regard laughter as being a release from the constraints 
of decency, politeness, and so on, for the following reasons. As suggested, the 
creation of one's self, for Nietzsche, involves 'a continual process of integrating 
one's character traits, habits, and patterns of action with one another. '360 This is 
incredibly difficult to achieve, and even once it is achieved, what has been achieved 
is only the unification of one's past with one's present. There is still the future 
to consider, and so we can never afford to rest on our laurels. This is a vitally 
important point. Since the laughter of the height is an appropriate response to 
liberation, it is easy to think of it as a triumphant, joyous laughter of victory, of an 
obstacle finally overcome. In this regard, it is relevant to mention Pete A. Gunter, 
one of the very few critics to have written on Nietzschean laughter. Gunter remarks 
that we do not need to be able 'to conceive the laughter of an [ Ubermensch] to see 
356 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p.305. 
357 ibid. 
358 ibid. 
359 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p.55. 
360 Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature, p.185. 
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that the kind of duality with which Nietzsche is concerned is a feature of the most 
ordinary laugh-experience' .361 Nietzsche, for Gunter, is praising the laughter of a 
surfer on successfully riding a dangerous breaker over the mocking laughter of the 
crowd who take malicious pleasure in seeing him take a fall, the 'laughter of lovers' 
over that resulting from the telling of most dirty jokes, and the laughter of a child 
playing with a new toy over the laughter of a group of children at a particular child 
who does not fit in. In each of the first of this set of contrasting examples, says 
Gunter, laughter results from the overcoming, or the absence, of some obstacle. 
This leads him to suggest the general rule that the 'higher' laughter expresses the 
attainment of desire. But there is a danger of overlooking something important 
by taking this line. Even for the self which Nietzsche's admirable individual has 
become, the future is always a threat, since, as Nehamas says, 'any new event 
may prove impossible to unify, at least without further effort, with the self into 
which one has developed. '362 So the creation of one's self, one's becoming who one 
is, cannot be some final goal, some final success which can be greeted with this 
triumphant, joyous laughter of victory. And yet at the end of part three, when 
Zarathustra has become what he is, this is where he laughs the laughter of the 
height. Why? 
6.3.4 'The comedy of existence' 
The reason is that the laughter of the height, while certainly being joyous, also 
involves as an important element laughing at the comedy of existence; one's own 
existence included. Support for this view comes in the work prior to Zarathustra, 
The Joyful Wisdom 363 , in which Nietzsche looks forward to a time when 'laughter 
will have united with wisdom, perhaps then there will be only "joyful wisdom". 
Meanwhile, however, it is quite otherwise, meanwhile the comedy of existence has 
not yet "become conscious" of itself, meanwhile it is still the period of tragedy, the 
period of morals and religions.' 364 But the person who attains the height can laugh 
at 'all tragedies, real or imaginary'. 365 From the vantage-point of the height, there 
361 Pete A. Gunter, 'Nietzschean Laughter', in The Sewanee Review, Vol.76 (1968), p.504. 
362 Nehan1as, Nietzsche: Life as Literature, p.85. 
363 This passage is pointed to by Gunter. 
364 Nietzsche, The Joyful Wisdom, trans. Thomas Common (Edinburgh: T.N.Foulis, 1910), 
pp.32-3. 
365 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p.68. 
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is nothing that cannot be amusing, and the ultimate joke is life itself. Nietzsche 
remarks elsewhere, 
'Perhaps I know best why man is the only animal that laughs: he alone suffers 
so excruciatingly that he was compelled to invent laughter. The unhappiest and 
most melancholy animal is, as might have been expected, the most cheerful'. 366 
We remarked earlier that despite the horrors and suffering that he sees in 
life, Nietzsche wants to adopt a 'yea-saying attitude' towards it. The suggestion 
in Nietzsche that the perception of the comedy of existence and the laughing of 
Zarathustra's redeeming laughter involves an affirmation of suffering emphasises 
a vitally important point: that the tragic and the comic are not polar opposites, 
or mutually exclusive, but subtly and sometimes almost paradoxically inter-linked 
modes of experience. The melancholy disposition of many leading comedians is 
commonly remarked upon: T.G.A.Nelson comments that 'a heightened sensitivity 
to the potential dreadfulness of the universe seems to be characteristic of those 
who know how to make others laugh'367 • More importantly, writers usually classed 
as 'comic' regularly show their awareness of this close connection between the 
tragic and the comic. Eugene lonesco writes: 'Humour makes us conscious ... of the 
tragic or desultory condition of man'368 . (According to Martin Esslin, lonesco's 
'favourite theme' is 'the identity of comedy and tragedy'369 .) James Thurber, too, 
366 
367 
368 
369 
Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. 
p.74. 
T.G.A.Nelson, Comedy, p.34. 
Anthony M. Ludovici (Edinburgh: T.N.Foulis, 1909), 
Eugene lonesco, 'La demystification par !'humour noir', quoted in Martin Esslin, The Theatre 
of the Absurd, 3rd ed. (Harmondworth: Penguin, 1980), p.192. 
Esslin, The Theatre 'of the Absurd, p.173. lonesco provides an especially interesting example 
of this inter-connection of the tragic and the comic, which lends support, in particular, to the 
view that there is nothing intrinsically comic or intrinsically tragic, but that it is all a matter of 
perspective. He is popularly viewed, as Esslin points out, as the writer of 'hilarious nonsense plays' 
(Esslin, The Theatre of the Absurd, p.133.), perhaps the most famous of which is his first 
play, La Cantatrice Chauve {The Bald Prima Donna). The play contains a family all 
of the members of which- male and female- appear to be called Bobby Watson, and a recognition 
scene between a married couple who are amazed when, through a process of logical deduction, 
they arrive at the conclusion that, since they live in the same street, at the same house, on the 
same floor, in the same room, and sleep in the same bed, they must therefore be married to each 
other. One critic (Alain Bosquet, 'Le theatre d'Eugene lonesco, ou les 36 recettes du comique', in 
Combat (17 Feb, 1955 ), quoted in Esslin, p, 195.) notes thirty-six comic techniques (or 'recipes 
of the comic') in the play, but on showing the play to friends, Ionesco was amazed that they found 
it funny, since he viewed it as a thoroughly serious play; 'a tragic spectacle of human life reduced 
to passionless automatism through bourgeois convention and the fossilisation of language' (Esslin, 
The Theatre of the Absurd, p.141.). This is reminiscent of the writer Hajek in Jaroslav 
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remarks: 'The true balance of life and art, the saving of the human mind as well 
as of the theater, lies in what has long been known as tragicomedy, for humor and 
pathos, tears and laughter are, in the highest expression of human character and 
achievement, inseparable. '3 70 
But as we have seen, Nietzsche does not merely point out the close connection 
between the comic and the tragic aspects of life: he urges us to make a positive 
response to life's tragedy; a positive response of laughter, which for Nietzsche is, 
in Kaufmann's words, 'a symbol of joyous affirmation of life and of the refusal to 
bow before the spirit of gravity'. 371 A parallel can be drawn between this and the 
attitude of the writer who, aware of the tragic, responds with humour. E.B.White 
remarked that: 
'One of the things commonly said about humorists is that they are really very 
sad people, clowns with a breaking heart ... there is a deep vein of melancholy 
running through everyone's life and ... the humorist, perhaps more sensible 
to it than some others, compensates for it actively and positively. '372 
Zarathustra idealises this active and positive attitude: as mentioned, in him 
the yea-saying attitude reaches its peak. What Zarathustra realises is the need to 
confront and destroy the 'Spirit of Gravity', and that 'one does not kill by anger 
but by laughter. '373 
6.3.5 The humorous attitude revisited 
So we have seen that Nietzsche sees laughter as the appropriate response the 
an individual's ultimate liberation. Now the liberation from absolutes includes 
liberation from the absolute importance we so often attach to our current selves. 
We mentioned earlier, in discussing the difference between serious and humor-
ous attitudes, Morreall's claim that having a humorous attitude towards some-
Hasek's The Good Soldier Svejk: 'a very cheery and nice man. He used to go to a pub and 
always read his stories there, which were so sad that everybody roared with laughter at them.' 
(quoted by T.G.A.Nelson, Comedy, p.33.) 
370 James Thurber, 'The Case for Comedy', in Atlantic, May 1960, p.98. 
371 Walter Kaufmann (trans. and ed.), The Basic Writings of Nietzsche, p.423n. 
372 E.B.White, 'Some Remarks on Humor', pp.173-174, my emphasis. 
373 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p.68. 
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thing involves being distanced from its practical aspects, and we agreed that over-
involvement in an issue often prevents our being able to take a humorous attitude 
towards it. Morreall also explains why a person with a sense of humour possesses 
the quality of flexibility. 'In part this flexibility comes from the realisation that 
what is important is relative to the situation someone is in and to his point of view. 
Nothing is important simpliciter. '374 Noting the importance of perspectivism, and 
the rejection of absolutes, this sounds something like Nietzsche's view of life in 
general. The person whom Zarathustra has become, the one who realises that 
becoming what he is involves constant self-creation, that there is in life no final 
goal or final success, and yet is able to laugh at this realisation, to laugh 
the laughter of the height, is exhibiting to an enormous extent the qualities nec-
essary to what could properly be called a humorous attitude to life. Zarathustra 
is showing the required flexibility and openness to experience, in accepting his 
need to continually integrate his traits, habits and patterns of action; always re-
maining open to whatever the future might bring, and surely, to be able to view 
this prospect with amusement, he must have attained the practical distance from 
his own current self necessary to this humorous attitude towards life. Contrast 
this with 'a realisation many of us make at some point in our life, when we see 
or decide that our character has developed enough and that we neither need nor 
want to change any more. '375 Attaching such unnecessary importance to our cur-
rent character, especially if we take practical steps to prevent ourselves changing, 
seems to have more in common with an over-serious attitude. It reminds us of 
Sartre's 'spirit of seriousness', which leads to the kind of 'bad faith' exhibited by 
those people who define themselves in terms of some particular current role, be it 
lover, grandfather or waiter, and explain their circumstances or natures in terms of 
external factors, rather than accepting their unlimited freedom for self-creation. 376 
What Zarathustra has learned, the vital skill upon which his liberation and 
self-overcoming is dependent, is the ability to laugh at himself 'as a man ought to 
laugh.' One can genuinely be said to be capable of laughing at oneself if one can 
accept Nietzsche's claim that one's life is, in an absolute sense, pointless, and laugh 
374 John Morreall, Taking Laughter Seriously, p.123. 
375 Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature, p.189. 
376 I am grateful to David E. Cooper, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Durham, for first 
suggesting the possibility of a link with Sartre in this respect. 
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the laughter of the height at this realisation, rather than resorting to some sort of 
'bad faith'. When Zarathustra laughs the laughter of the height, the 'serious' side 
to his life; the constant self-creation which he will need to continue throughout 
the rest of that life, is, it seems at that point, no burden. And why? Because by 
embracing eternal recurrence, Zarathustra is bringing to life itself, and to the idea 
of the need for this constant self-creation, that spirit of childlike playfulness which 
we have on a number of occasions stressed as being a common element in humour, 
and which Bergson overlooks. 
6.3.6 Nietzsche, Nagel and the absurd 
At this point, it is worth comparing Zarathustran laughter with a view pro-
pounded by Thomas Nagel in his paper 'The Absurd'377 • For Nagel, a situation in 
ordinary life is absurd 'when it includes a conspicuous discrepancy between pre-
tension or aspiration and reality' 378 , such as a complicated speech being given in 
support of a motion that has already been passed, or my declaration of love to 
my girlfriend being made over the telephone to her answering machine. 'The sense 
that life as a whole is absurd arises when we perceive, perhaps dimly, an inflated 
pretension or aspiration which is inseparable from human life and which makes its 
absurdity inescapable, short of escape from life itself. '379 What makes everyone's 
.life absurd, argues Nagel, is: 
'the collision between the senousness with which we take our lives and the 
perpetual possibility of regarding everything about which we are serious as 
arbitrary, or open to doubt. 
We cannot live human lives without energy and attention, nor without 
making choices whi~h show that we take some things more seriously than others. 
Yet we have always available a point of view outside the particular form of our 
lives, from which the seriousness appears gratuitous. These two inescapable 
viewpoints collide in us, and that is what makes life absurd. It is absurd 
377 Included in his Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp.ll-23. 
378 Nagel, Mortal Questions, p.13. 
379 ibid. 
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because we ignore the doubts that we know cannot be settled, continuing to 
live with nearly undiminished seriousness in spite of them. '380 
Nagel, like Morreall in his discussion of the humorous attitude, focuses on hu-
mans' 'special capacity to step back and survey themselves, and the lives to which 
they are committed, with that detached amazement which comes from watching 
an ant struggle up a heap of sand. '381 We are faced with what Stephen Leacock 
described as 'the incongruous contrast between the eager fret of our life and its 
final nothingness'382 • The view each person can have of his 'highly specific and 
idiosyncratic position', says Nagel, 'is at once sobering and comical. '383 
So which of many possible reactions should we make to this realisation of life's 
absurdity? There is no need, in Nagel's opinion, to share the view expressed by 
Camus in The Myth of Sisyphus; the view that one may salvage a certain dignity 
by taking an attitude of defiance towards the world, since 'there is no fate that 
cannot be surmounted by scorn. '384 To Nagel, this seems 'romantic and slightly 
self-pitying'. 385 A sens~ of the absurd need not occasion defiance or agony, since 
'such dramatics ... betray a failure to appreciate the cosmic unimportance of the 
situation. If sub specie aeternitatis there is no reason to believe that anything 
matters, then that does not matter either, and we can approach our absurd lives 
with irony instead of heroism or despair.' 386 
There are clear similarities and differences between Nagel's and Nietzsche's 
positions. Nietzsche would echo Nagel's claim about the need to make choices 
which show that we take some things more seriously than others. For Nietzsche, 
in the absence of absolutes, creating our own values to live by is essential, if we are 
to give any meaning to our lives. Yet there is no ultimate reason or justification 
for our particular set of values, other than that which we ourselves provide. As 
suggested, the laughter of the height results, to an important degree, from the 
38o M l Q · Nagel, orta uestwns, pp.l3-14. 
381 Nagel, Mortal Questions, p.l5. 
382 Leacock, Humour and Humanity, pp.219-220. 
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perception of this incongruity. The most important difference between Nietzsche 
and Nagel is over the ease with which Nagel appears to think we can accept the 
absurdity of our existence. It may be possible for me to accept intellectually the 
'cosmic unimportance' of my situation, but to assume, as Nagel appears to, that 
it is easy to choose to react to the comical or ironic aspect of this rather than 
the aspect which leads to despair is psychologically untrue for many, maybe most, 
people. Nietzsche, on the other hand, with his description of the attainment of the 
laughter of the height, has no such illusions as to the difficulty of this task. Morreall 
is like Nagel in failing to emphasise the difficulties in accepting the absurdity of 
our existence. In his discussion of the humorous attitude, Morreall discusses the 
science-fiction scenario of knowing that a star would be colliding with the Earth 
in a few days, leading to everyone's certain extinction. He casually remarks: 
'In that situation everything would lose its urgency. It would be relatively easy 
to distance oneself from practical considerations, and laugh at any incongruity, 
since nothing that anyone did would make much of a difference. We might even 
imagine someone sufficiently distant from what was going on, that when the 
planet Earth met its demise he found that funny. '387 
But we simply cannot assume that reacting to such a scenario in so 'laid-back' 
a way is so easy. If the comparison is not too unflattering, we could compare Nagel 
and Morreall to Zarathustra's animals, whose own plea to Zarathustra to affirm 
eternal recurrence388 reveals them as insufficiently aware of the degree of suffering 
which this involves, and is rather too 'light and easy'389 • 
6.4 What can we learn from Nietzsche on laughter? 
In commenting on Nietzsche, it is essential to understand that he is not at-
tempting to offer a 'theory of laughter' in the same way as is Bergson, or any of 
the other theorists considered in our previous chapters. There is no established 
humour-theoretical tradition in which Nietzsche is the central figure, and nowhere 
does he claim, either explicitly or implicitly, that all laughter is of the liberat-
ing kind he portrays in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. (Indeed, as his consideration 
387 Morreall, Taking Laughter Seriously, p.124. 
388 I refer to the animals' fourth speech in the section entitled 'The Convalescent'. 
389 Lampert, Nietzsche's Teaching, p.223. 
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of the crowd's laughter at Zarathustra shows, Nietzsche is perfectly aware that 
there are kinds of laughter radically different from that of individual liberation.) 
It would therefore be a wrong-headed approach to spend time detailing those as-
pects of laughter for which Nietzsche does not account. Nietzsche's contribution 
to our subject is of a different kind to any of the other writers we have considered. 
Our concern in this chapter is with the functions of laughter, and we have seen 
in Nietzsche a particularly powerful illustration of an alternative function to the 
Bergsonian one of social correction. He thereby raises the status of laughter to 
new heights, taking us beyond the realms of categorising and analysing examples 
of humour, and showing us something of the potential open to the individual who 
takes an attitude to life closely akin to what we have called a humorous attitude. 
Let us consider in more detail, then, what we can learn from reading Nietzsche 
on laughter. There is much to be learned here, regardless of the possible moral 
objections that may be raised against laughing 'at all tragedies, real or imaginary', 
of whether one accepts anything like a Nietzsche an view of the world, or of whether 
liberation to the extent that he talks of it is even possible. 
A preliminary point worth making is that there is in the Nietzschean laugh-
ter of the height something of the elements identified in each of the three major 
theoretical traditions. We have seen that for Nietzsche the human situation is 
incongruous, at least in the extended sense of the word understood by the incon-
gruity tradition as discussed in Chapter Two. There is also a clear element of 
superiority in Zarathustra's laughter: over both the members of the herd and his 
former self, who thought he could teach his doctrines to a crowd of townspeople; 
and also in the sense that through his standing back, he can be seen as momentar-
ily transcending the world through laughter. Finally, we have seen that the release 
with which Nietzsche is concerned is one which goes way beyond our 'release the-
orists': if we take a Nietzschean view, we are not dealing with a mere momentary 
freedom, but with laughter as the appropriate response to an individual's ultimate 
liberation. 
Two further points should be made. Firstly, as we mentioned at the beginning 
of our discussion, Nietzsche awards laughter a status far higher than that granted 
to it by any other philosopher. This is not merely restricted to laughter's role 
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in Zarathustra: in Beyond Good and Evil, he sets himself up in opposition to the 
anti-laughter sentiments of Hobbes, 'who, being a real Englishman, sought to bring 
laughter into disrepute among all thinking minds'390 • Nietzsche says that, far from 
condemning laughter like Hobbes, he 'would go so far as to venture an order of 
rank among philosophers according to the rank of their laughter - rising to those 
capable of golden laughter'391 • We have seen that Nietzsche's seeing laughter as the 
proper response of the individual to his liberation is the reason for this exaltation 
of it. 
This touches on the second, connected, point: our consideration of Zarathus-
tran laughter has highlighted that the laughter of the free individual is an im-
portant and valuable object of study. While accepting that much laughter must 
be understood in a social context, we can now explicitly reject Bergson's claim 
that we can only ever understand laughter as a social phenomenon, serving a 
social function. Nietzsche's individual laughter needs to be highlighted not only in 
response to Bergson, but also to restore the balance of much contemporary work 
in our field, which ignores the laughter of the individual, concentrating instead on 
that which occurs within the social context of a group. 
We have observed ·a number of important factors necessary to the laughing 
of Zarathustran laughter. The first of these concerns the perception of the inter-
relationship of the tragic and the comic. We remarked that the suggestion in 
Nietzsche that the perception of the comedy of existence and the laughing of 
Zarathustra's redeeming laughter involves an affirmation of suffering, and hence 
emphasises the vitally important point that the tragic and the comic are not polar 
opposites, or mutually exclusive, but subtly and sometimes almost paradoxically 
inter-linked modes of experience. 
Zarathustra's being able to take an 'active, positive response' to the tragic side 
of life, and what he perceives as life's absurdity; and to 'laugh at himself as a man 
ought to laugh', depends upon two important factors. These are being able to 
achieve a certain 'distance' from the practical aspects of his life - which Bergson's 
personified society does not do; and being able to bring to that life a childlike 
390 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. R.J.Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), 
p.199. 
391 ibid. Nietzsche's italics. 
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playfulness - an important aspect of laughter which Bergson overlooks. Zarathus-
tran laughter highlights the sense of humour's potential to make your world bigger 
from your childlike 'new beginning' of being amenable to seeing things in a new 
way, or from a new perspective, and to realise that there are more ways of looking 
at the world than you previously acknowledged or of which you were even aware: 
one of the qualities w~ most admire in the best humorists. Since humour has 
this potential, it might reasonably be asked, why limit oneself to the conserva-
tive, Bergsonian 'laughter of the herd', which is designed to keep people 'in their 
place', if the option of laughing the more joyous laughter of liberation is available? 
We recall Bergson's own reservations about laughter as he describes it: his recog-
nition of the unjust, hit and miss fashion with which it selects and punishes its 
'victims', and the 'curious pessimism which becomes the more pronounced as the 
laugher more closely analyses his laughter'. 392 As Gunter points out, this 'curi-
ous pessimism' comes about precisely because Bergson has ignored the 'higher', 
affirmative laughter which Nietzsche highlights. 
None of this is to ignore the obvious social or group aspects of humour. We are 
of course aware of these: the pleasure of sharing a joke; the feeling of togetherness 
which can accompany humour. And there are obvious advantages to feeling part 
of a group. It remains true, however, that group membership demands a price 
for its benefits: the individual in any group is placed under certain constraints 
by his very membership of that group. He must obey the rules of his society, or 
risk being ostracised by that society. Within a group of friends, there are certain 
things that one cannot afford to do without risking the loss of the others' friendship. 
Zarathustra laughs the laughter of the height because, as the solitary individual, he 
is free from these constraints too. To follow Zarathustra is no easy task: it means 
making some hefty sacrifices. As Harvey Mindess observes, we have a fundamental 
desire for security: 
'We all feel a need to bank on something or someone, to believe in something 
or someone, be it reason, morality, science, the church, democracy, family, 
friends, or our own attractiveness, intelligence, strength, or charm. These 
anchors provide our security; they keep us safely moored in the frightening 
swirl of being, but they thwart the full development of our capacity for humor. 
392 Bergson, Laughter, p.189. 
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Our sense of humor is stunted, individually, by our personal security-blankets; 
it is stunted, collectively, by the fact that we crave security at all. '393 
It is precisely these crutches of security that Zarathustra at the height chal-
lenges us to throw away. Jeff Mason offers a neat description of Nietzsche as 'the 
outsider saying "Look at me, I'm on the outside and I dare you to come out". '394 
There is an important point to be made here in connection with humour. In taking 
the attitude of the outsider as opposed to the group member, one is taking the 
attitude most akin to that of the best humorists: Mindess seems to be thinking 
along these lines when he speaks of 'the frame of mind in which humor flourishes -
the individual, iconoclastic outlook'395 • If, as mentioned earlier, one of the things 
we most admire about the humorist is his ability to see things from a new perspec-
tive, we should recognise that he has been able to do this precisely because he has, 
unlike the rest of us, freed himself from, and stood outside, the accepted, shared 
perspective of his particular clique or society, and that it is this which has allowed 
his horizons to be expanded. Is it not possible, then, that by reaching the height, 
and the extreme freedom from constraints with which Nietzsche is concerned, that 
the sense of humour might realise its maximum potential? 
393 Harvey Mindess, Laughter and Liberation (Los Angeles: Nash Publishing, 1971), p.31. 
394 Jeff Mason, Philosophical Rhetoric: the function of indirection in philosophical 
writing (London: Routledge, 1989), p.30. 
395 Mindess, Laughter and Liberation, p.41. 
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